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NAVAL HISTORY
OF
THE WORLD WAR

THE STRESS OF SEA POWER

1915 - 1916



THOMAS G. FROTHINGHAM
CAPTAIN, U.S.R.

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**THE NAVAL HISTORY OF THE
WORLD WAR**

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The Naval History of the World War

THE STRESS OF SEA POWER
1915—1916

BY

THOMAS G. FROTHINGHAM

CAPTAIN U.S.R.

With Maps and Diagrams



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THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF
REAR ADMIRAL NATHAN C. TWINING, UNITED
STATES NAVY. IN HIS UNTIMELY DEATH
BOTH HIS SERVICE AND HIS COUNTRY
SUFFERED IRREPARABLE LOSS

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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**THE NAVAL HISTORY OF THE
WORLD WAR**

CHAPTER I

THE SIEGE OF THE CENTRAL POWERS

(See Map at page 11)

THE early months of the year 1915 had offered great strategic opportunities to the Entente Allies. Not only had the Teutonic Allies lost the offensive but the Central Powers were practically besieged. Their armies were held in a deadlock on entrenched fronts, and their nations were feeling the relentless pressure of Sea Power in the hands of the Allies.

A study of the map will show this siege of the Central Powers. Although the German armies had penetrated into France and Belgium, they had been brought to a standstill, and on the Eastern Front increased forces were needed, as the Austro-Hungarians were so hard pressed that German aid was necessary to prevent a collapse in the southeast.

The defeat of the great German offensive had prevented any of the hesitating Balkan nations from joining the Central Powers, and the Teutons were thus cut off from even their Turkish ally. The innate hostility of the Italian people against Austria was impelling Italy to a declaration of war against her ancient enemy. As a consequence, the Central Powers were surrounded by a ring through which there was no passage.

This situation, in itself, had created new strategic objectives. That of the Entente Allies was to constrict

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and press the siege. That of the Central Powers was to break through and raise the siege. These objectives were so unmistakable that they could hardly fail to be the visible motives of the strategy of 1915. The advantage lay with the Entente Allies, and on the surface their plans were promising. They had their own projects to gain the two logical objects of Allied naval strategy, which were emphasized in the preceding volume of this work, control of the Dardanelles and control of the Baltic, and there were supposedly adequate military plans for offensives both on the West and in the East. These plans of the Entente Allies, with the approaching entrance of Italy against Austria, were thought to presage the utter defeat of their enemies.

On the other hand, the Central Powers were planning to break through and raise the siege by a concentrated joint attack of German and Austro-Hungarian forces against the Russians in the southeast, while the German armies were only to hold their lines on the Western Front.

But there was a vast difference in estimating the means necessary to carry out these strategic plans, and this made 1915 a year of tragedy for the Entente Allies and a year of success for the Central Powers.

Each of the three nations of the Entente Allies had intrusted its plans and preparations for the coming campaigns of 1915 to the leading soldier of the nation. Joffre had become paramount in France, after his victory of the Marne. Lord Kitchener had been given control in Great Britain. The Grand Duke Nicholas held absolute sway in Russia. Each of these military leaders had so great power in personal control of affairs,

that he might truthfully be called a dictator in military matters.

Each of these men was the typical soldier of his nation, and each had gained the confidence of his people by his conduct of the war in 1914. Therein lay the causes for the failures of the Entente Allies in 1915, for each of these leaders believed that the height of military efficiency had been reached in the successes of 1914, and each believed that the ensuing operations would be carried out on the same lines. None of them realized that far greater tasks and utterly different conditions would be encountered in 1915.

It was evident that the commands of the Allied armies believed they would be able to defeat the armies of the Teutonic Allies by the use of the military means at their disposal. On the Western Front, General Joffre had made his plans for attacks upon the Germans in the region of Arras and Rheims, and it is known that he was confident he would be able to break through the German line.¹ In the southeast, the Russians were supposed to have an assured winning superiority, as the fall of the fortress of Przemysl was inevitable, and the Grand Duke Nicholas' armies were mistakenly assumed to be on the point of penetrating the Carpathians into Hungary.

These preparations of the Entente Allies were deemed to be amply sufficient, at the time, and there was then no suspicion of the more efficient preparations of their enemies. In the councils of the Central Powers there had been a different situation. The German

¹ "I met Joffre . . . as arranged . . . Joffre's plan was as follows: He meant to break through the enemy's line from the south at Rheims and from the west at Arras." — "1914," Lord French.

régime of 1914 had been overthrown, in consequence of the defeat of its supposedly infallible military plan, and the new Chief of Staff, Falkenhayn, had yielded to the Hindenburg-Ludendorff influence for a complete change in strategy and tactics.

Consequently, in contrast to the artificial German strategy of 1914, which had thrown away the initial military superiority of the Germans, as has been described in the preceding volume, the German strategy of 1915 was complete, both in preparation and in the tactics employed. Against the Russians in the southeast, a great mass of mobile artillery was prepared, in which heavy howitzers were used as fieldpieces. This overpowering force was assembled in Galicia, without being suspected by the Grand Duke Nicholas and his commanders. It was an especially dominating force against the Russians, because the Russian armies were weak in artillery and weak in ammunition, as Russia was shut off from supplies.

When this heavy concentration of artillery suddenly opened upon the Russians,¹ the result was never in doubt. The Russian armies were at once blasted from their positions, and were never able to make a stand against what Falkenhayn called "the spearhead group." The break-through was accomplished by the Austro-Germans, with losses for the Russians that crippled their armies beyond repair, and a succession of Russian defeats ensued, which also resulted in Bulgaria joining the Central Powers and the overthrow of Serbia in the fall of 1915.

These Teutonic victories continued throughout 1915,

¹ Battle of the Dunajec, also called by the Germans Battle of Gorlice-Tarnow, May 1, 1915.

and nothing could prevent these disasters in the East. On the other hand, the military offensives of the Entente Allies had so entirely lacked any conception of the forces necessary to win victory against the Central Powers that they became mere ineffectual nibbles, which did not even accomplish the result of drawing enemy troops away from the disastrous concentration in the East. Not even the entrance of Italy in the war created a diversion which would aid the Russians. The siege of the Central Powers was raised by this breakthrough, and the *Mittel Europa* tract was won by the Teutons.

In studying the naval history of the World War, the reader must keep constantly in mind this succession of military defeats for the Entente Allies, which continued through 1915, and which made 1915 a year of military disaster, only offset by the pressure of Sea Power in the hands of the Entente Allies. This great factor was constantly counting against the Central Powers, and the mistake, in most histories of the World War, has been to dwell too much upon details of the military operations and not emphasize the counteracting effect of Sea Power. In the preceding volume of this work, the influence of Sea Power has been explained and defined, and the reader must never forget that Sea Power eventually dominated the decision of the World War. As has been stated, the one initial possibility of winning the war by the great German "dry land"¹ offensive of 1914 had failed, and from that time Sea Power grew to be the controlling factor in the World War.

From the course of events which has been narrated

¹ Admiral Tirpitz.

in the first volume of this work, Germany had been shut off from the use of the seas. The German merchant marine was either lying in home ports or had taken refuge in neutral ports. Consequently, Germany was shut off from sea traffic. Her laboriously acquired colonies were isolated and had been occupied by the Entente Allies, or, as in the case of Africa, were doomed to fall into the hands of the enemy.¹ The German outlying naval cruisers had been swept from the seas, only excepting furtive refugees that could not menace traffic overseas.

Consequently also, the Entente Allies possessed all the benefits of the waterways of the world, to transport men and supplies, to maintain their armed forces, to sustain their industries — and the Central Powers were shut off from all these resources.

The only two abatements of Allied control of the seas have been defined in the preceding volume. Pre-war conditions had given to Germany control of the Baltic Sea and had also vested the control of the Dardanelles with Turkey, the one nation which was under the domination of Germany. Consequently, as in the case of the self-evident military objectives, these two areas stood out clearly as the two main naval objectives for the Entente Allies — and, consequently, both became the objectives for actual naval plans of the Entente Allies, although these plans were ineffective.

The narrative of the ill judged attempt to gain the Dardanelles by naval forces alone has been given in the preceding volume. Its failure (March 18, 1915) had been unmistakable, and preparations were being made

¹ "The last of the German Colonies — German East Africa — has been cleared of the enemy." — War Cabinet Report, 1917.

for a military operation in April, 1915, with the fleet in support, of which an account will be given in this volume.

The Baltic project of the British Admiralty, undertaken in November, 1914, had an unusual history, which has been related in the preceding volume. Lord Fisher entered upon his duties as First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty, with a preconceived scheme of naval strategy, devised from the time of Frederick the Great, for landing a Russian army of invasion upon the Pomeranian coast. Lord Fisher had become so absorbed by this idea,¹ that he concentrated upon it all his well known energies and personal domination in the Admiralty. So potent was his influence, that, only four days after he had assumed control,² a conference of the Admiralty on November 3, 1914,³ adopted his program.

This program comprised the construction of 612 specially built ships, called by Lord Fisher his "Armada" — and, to quote Lord Fisher's own words, "After this a meeting of all the shipbuilding firms of the United Kingdom took place in the Admiralty under the presidency of Lord Fisher, and the programme mentioned above in italics was parcelled out there and then."⁴

Thus quickly were all possibilities of offensive operations in the Baltic tied to this scheme of landing a

¹ ". . . my main scheme of naval strategy." — Lord Fisher, "Memoirs."

² "Lord Fisher had joined the Admiralty as First Sea Lord four days before this meeting." — Ibid.

³ "The First Sea Lord (Lord Fisher) presided at a Conference this day at the Admiralty." — Ibid.

⁴ The "programme mentioned above in italics" was given in full in the first volume of this work.

Russian army of invasion on the Pomeranian coast. It is useless to discuss the merits of this academic idea of former days, as there was never any Russian army available to carry out the project. In the spring of 1915, when Lord Fisher was still jealously fostering the building program for this project, the Russian armies were being thrown back in defeat all along their front. Thus the scheme perished before its birth, and Lord Fisher's Baltic project of invasion must only be considered as to its effect upon British naval strategy. In this respect it had a very real and harmful influence, because it absorbed the British preparations for offensive naval operations in the Baltic. Lord Sydenham has written emphatically: "The effects of this diversion of the energies of the Admiralty staff from naval to military objects cannot be estimated."

This well sums up the harm done by the adoption of Lord Fisher's project. It diverted all the energies of his dominant personality to a scheme that never had a chance of fulfilment,¹ and this implied also the diversion of the energies of the British shipyards to building craft for this especial purpose.² All that can be said in favor of this building program was that some of the ships were afterwards of use for other purposes. But the reader must keep in mind that at this stage, at the beginning of 1915, this program of Lord Fisher's stood in the way of any other form of naval offensive. Consequently, in the words of the

¹ "Ever since his accession to office he had been devoting all his well known energy almost entirely to its preparation. His plans involved a large building programme of specially designed ships." — Sir Julian Corbett.

² "Her (*Furious*) guns with their enormous shells were built to make it impossible to prevent the Russian Millions from landing on the Pomeranian Coast!" — Lord Fisher, "Records."

THE SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF 1915

THE SIEGE OF THE CENTRAL POWERS

(This Map is diagrammatic only)

A study of this map will show that the Central Powers were practically besieged, as they were even cut off from their ally Turkey, with Italy and the Balkan states remaining neutral in 1914. Thus the situation was favorable for the Entente Allies, as all the wide areas of the seas had been cleared of the enemy, leaving Teutonic control of the Baltic and Dardanelles the only abatement of Sea Power. The shaded areas were controlled by the Central Powers.

———— Battle Fronts neutral frontiers.

The Entente Allies planned three offensives:


- (1) The attack on the Dardanelles:
- (2) The offensive on the Western Front:
- (3) The Russian offensive in Galicia, with an attempt to invade Hungary.

There was also the abortive Fisher plan for the Baltic.

For none of these Allied offensives was there adequate preparation to gain success.

The Central Powers planned merely to hold their line on the Western Front, but to concentrate German and Austro-Hungarian forces against Russia.

- (A) (A) The projected great Austro-German offensive in Galicia, with coöperating German attacks in the north.



report of the United States Naval Attaché at Berlin, "The Baltic, south of the Gulf of Finland, has remained a German lake."

It was in the Baltic that the Germans had most feared harassing naval attacks by the British. And it must be acknowledged that there were great possibilities for harassing operations of British submarines with the advantage of bases in the Russian Baltic ports. But the Germans were left practically free to use the Baltic for undisturbed transportation of minerals and supplies from Sweden. And, being thus undisturbed by British naval offensives, the Germans were enabled to develop the offensive use of their own U-boats into a determined attempt to impair the Allied control of the seas. An account of this German submarine offensive will be given in the following chapter.

CHAPTER II

GERMAN PROJECTS FOR U-BOAT WARFARE

AS has been explained in the previous volume, neither side had developed the offensive use of submarines at the outbreak of the World War. It was only from first tentative beginnings, after the opening of hostilities, that the submarines gradually became more of a factor as the war continued. But it soon became evident that they held great possibilities for harassing attacks upon an enemy's navy and commerce.

In recognizing and developing these possibilities for the offensive use of submarines, Germany had far outstripped the Entente Allies. It is true that submarines of the British Navy had extended their operations, and patrols of these craft were maintained even off the German naval outwork of Heligoland. But the only two British submarines, which first went into the Baltic, "put into Lapvik, where they were definitely placed under Admiral von Essen's orders."¹ There was not in any sense a campaign undertaken for harassing naval operations in the Baltic, nor, in fact, for harassing naval operations against the Germans in any area. All ideas for the offensive of the British Navy in the North of Europe were concentrated upon the program for Lord Fisher's Baltic scheme. Consequently, it should be understood that, at the beginning of 1915, nothing

¹ "As an assistance to the Russians in disputing the command of the Baltic, their presence was little more than a token of good will." — Sir Julian Corbett.

had been undertaken that amounted to a strategic offensive use of submarines on the part of the British Navy.

On the other hand, the German Navy quickly made so great strides in the development of offensive uses for their U-boats, that Admiral Jellicoe, in his book,¹ has given to his chapter on the second and third months of the war the heading "The Submarine and Mine Menace in the North Sea." The submarine and the mine became closely allied in the naval tactics of the World War, and Admiral Jellicoe's narrative has given a striking picture of the disturbing effects of these two new factors in warfare upon the superior British naval forces, which had been considered secure in their control of these areas. This feeling of security had been rudely shaken. From the anxieties caused by these new dangers, the Grand Fleet had been kept on the move and forced to change its bases. There also had been disconcerting losses, and so great a moral effect had been produced that Admiral Jellicoe, as has been described in the preceding volume of this work, had written a formal letter to the British Admiralty (October 30, 1914),² in which he admitted that new tactical methods were necessary to cope with mines and torpedoes. In this letter Admiral Jellicoe conceded a German superiority in these new weapons: "The Germans have shown that they rely to a very great extent on submarines, mines and torpedoes, and there can be no doubt whatever that they will endeavour to make the fullest use of these weapons in a fleet action, especially since they possess an actual superiority over us in these particular directions."

¹ "The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916."

² Given in full in Appendix, page 313.

It was natural that the Germans should take advantage of this superiority which they had acquired by their quicker development of the new weapons, and, as they were not disturbed by the anticipated British attacks in the Baltic, the German Navy prepared for an extended U-boat campaign against Great Britain.

It was the obvious strategy of the Germans to use these new naval weapons against British commerce. Admiral Tirpitz has stated this situation from the German point of view: "The most effective weapon that we possessed against England's commerce was the submarine. If it was to be employed against enemy freight vessels, it was clear from the outset that the existing rules of maritime law, which in the main dated from the days of sailing vessels, did not properly cover the circumstances of the present day. The rules most nearly applicable were those of the old blockade."¹

Admiral Tirpitz has also stated that, in the first discussions² as to the possibility of a submarine campaign, the views of German naval authorities favored some form of a blockade. On November 7, 1914, the Chief of the German Naval Staff, Admiral Pohl, had produced "a draft of a declaration of the submarine blockade of the whole coast of Great Britain and Ireland."³ As to this project, Admiral Tirpitz took the ground that a blockade of the whole coast would be difficult to maintain and would lead to many complications. He argued that such a declaration of blockade should not be made until the Germans had available a greater number of

¹ "My Memoirs."

² "From the beginning of November onwards." — "My Memoirs," Admiral Tirpitz.

³ Ibid.

U-boats, and he proposed instead a declaration of a blockade of the Thames.

He maintained: "Such a limited declaration would have been more in accord with the means available, and would have accustomed the world gradually to the new idea of blockade. We should have spared America, in particular, not touching the Atlantic passenger vessels, which always sailed to Liverpool, and should thus have lessened the danger from that quarter." It should be noted that both German schemes, at this stage, implied a declaration of a blockade. In fact, the original "suggestion of the Leaders of the Fleet"¹ to Admiral Pohl had stated: "The whole British coast, or anyway a part of it must be declared to be blockaded, and at the same time the aforesaid warning must be published."²

But, in December, 1914, a different form of submarine campaign began to be favored in Germany, and the Chief of the German Naval Staff asked for "approval of the opening of a submarine campaign at the end of January, the English Channel and all waters surrounding the United Kingdom to be declared as a war zone."³ Admiral Tirpitz, to whom this proposal was submitted, wrote in answer (December 16, 1914) that he regarded this scheme as premature; and he also wrote the following, which proved to be prophetic: "I have in addition certain objections against the form of conducting the campaign which Your Excellency proposes to adopt. Submarine warfare without a declaration of blockade, as Your Excellency proposes, is in my view much more far-reaching in its effect on materials

¹ "Germany's High Sea Fleet," Admiral Scheer.

² Ibid.

³ "My Memoirs," Admiral Tirpitz.

than a regular legal blockade, and is thus considerably more dangerous politically."

There was more discussion, and Admiral Tirpitz has stated that even as late as January 31, 1915, the Naval Staff was still working on his proposal for a Thames blockade. But it was decided "to keep to the form of a declaration of a war zone, and not to that of a blockade."¹

Consequently, on February 4, 1915, the following was published:

NOTICE IN THE IMPERIAL GAZETTE

1. The waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, are herewith declared to be in the War Zone. From February 18, 1915, onward, every merchant ship met with in this War Zone will be destroyed, nor will it always be possible to obviate the danger with which the crews and passengers are thereby threatened.

2. Neutral ships, too, will run a risk in the War Zone, for in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordained by the British Government on January 31, and owing to the hazards of naval warfare, it may not always be possible to prevent the attacks meant for hostile ships from being directed against neutral ships.

3. Shipping north of the Shetland Islands, in the eastern part of the North Sea, and on a strip of at least 30 nautical miles wide along the Dutch coast is not threatened with danger.

Chief of the Naval Staff

(Signed) v. Pohl.

¹ "My Memoirs," Admiral Tirpitz.

The German Government also published a memorandum in which it stated: "As England has declared the waters between Scotland and Norway to be a part of the War Zone, so Germany declares all the waters round Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English Channel, to be in the War Zone, and she will combat hostile shipping in those parts *with every weapon at her disposal*. For this purpose, from February 18 and onward, she will seek to destroy every hostile merchant ship which enters the War Zone, and it will not always be possible to obviate the danger with which the persons and goods on board will be threatened. Neutrals are therefore warned in future not to risk crews, passengers and goods on such ships. Further, their attention is drawn to the fact that it is highly desirable that their own ships should avoid entering this zone. For although the German Navy has orders to avoid acts of violence against neutral ships, so far as they are recognizable, yet in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordained by the British Government, and owing to the hazards of warfare, it may not always be possible to prevent them from falling a victim to an attack directed against an enemy ship."

It will be seen, from these statements, that the German Government assumed the attitude that the earlier declaration by the British of the "military area"¹ justified this new German policy. It was true, as has been explained in the first volume of this work, that declaring the whole of the North Sea a military area was, in the words of the British Admiralty's historian,

¹ "They therefore give notice that the whole of the North Sea must be considered a military area." — British Declaration of November 2, 1914. See "Offensive Operations 1914-1915" of this work.

“a new departure” from all former blockades.¹ But it must be emphasized at the outset that there was a radical difference between the two policies. The British declaration defined safe routes, and promised sailing directions that would insure safety. The German declaration threatened destruction to enemy and neutral alike in the War Zone.

By this ruthless threat Germany again defied the public opinion of the world, as in the invasion of Belgium. For a second time the German Government made the mistake of aligning moral forces against Germany—and again these moral forces counted heavily against Germany in the subsequent course of the war.

The first proof of this was one immediate effect to the disadvantage of Germany, which became apparent in the ensuing months. Before this German declaration, the British policy, with an increasing list of contraband, had caused a great deal of irritation among the neutrals. As Lord Sydenham expressed it, “Any clear and consistent plan would have aroused less irritation to neutrals than arrangements constantly varying which left the neutral in constant doubt as to what he could do and what he could not do.”² This was growing into a great embarrassment for the Entente Allies. But so drastic was the German departure, in the Notice of February 4, 1915, with its threat against the very lives of passengers and crews, that this German menace overshadowed the British restrictions in the minds of the neutral nations.

¹ “Admiral Jellicoe, as we have seen, in his proposal for a prohibited area, had already indicated the lines on which a new departure should proceed. . . .” — Sir Julian Corbett.

² Speech H. of L. December 20, 1915.

Thus in a few months Germany made herself an object of national resentments among the neutrals, of which the United States was the most important. In comparison with this, the annoyance with Great Britain was almost forgotten. And here it should be pointed out that Germany was taking the first step in a naval policy, of which the results were always offset by the growing hostility aroused against Germany. In fact, an underlying condition of the war was being created by Germany from this time, through her own act, which was fatal to her chances of winning the war. Even when the unrestricted submarine campaign, in 1917, threatened the sea power of the Entente Allies, it brought about the greatest military result of all against Germany, the entrance of the United States into the war, which changed German victory into German defeat — an object lesson of the axiom that moral forces cannot be antagonized in war.

In the books written by the German leaders immediately following the World War, each of them has tried to make the war keep in step with his own record. And each has blamed the others for the German failure. In these recriminations, the German leaders have abandoned all pretense in outbursts of temper. The following of Admiral Tirpitz, written to throw the blame onto someone else, has bluntly stated the truth of this cynical German policy beyond any possibility of misunderstanding: "The die was cast. On February 18th, 1915, submarine warfare was to begin, threatening, in accordance with the decision taken by Bethmann in opposition to my advice, the destruction of every ship bound for England or Ireland."

Although in this, as in other broad aspects of the war,

the Germans were, from training, unable to gaze far into the crystal, their leaders were disconcerted by the protests of the neutrals, especially the note of the American Government (February 12, 1915). The German Government vacillated, but eventually held to their course. So entirely was the spirit of the American protest misunderstood that, even in his book published after the wreck of Germany, Tirpitz has only complained that the "right tone" was not adopted.¹

In "My Memoirs" Admiral Tirpitz has published the following summary of the course of German naval policy in this first submarine campaign, given to him by the Chief of Staff of the Fleet:

"February 4th, 1915. — Declaration of War Zone."

"February 14th, 1915. — Request, on urgent political grounds, to send orders by wireless to the submarines sent out, not for the present to attack ships sailing under neutral flag. (In the then state of submarine wireless, the request could not be complied with, as the boats were already far off. Besides, every ship at that time sailed under neutral flag.)"

"February 15th, 1915. — Order from General Headquarters, that submarine and trade campaign against neutrals was not to begin on February 18th, but only on receipt of special order. As a result of this order, the next batch of boats to be held back, thus causing a pause."

"February 18th, 1915. — A belt between Lindesnares

¹ Here, as in other comments, Tirpitz has betrayed the vain hopes of the Germans for working upon elements in our population: "We should have given a definite cry to which all the elements in the United States which were working against Wilson could have rallied: the Germans, the Irish, the Quakers, the cotton interests. We never adopted the right tone in dealing with the Americans." — "My Memoirs."

and the Tyne is to be kept free for Danish and Swedish vessels, in which there is to be no mining or sinking.”

“February 20th, 1915. — Order to open campaign in North Sea and English Channel, American and Italian flags to be spared even here. A free safe belt is provided for Scandinavians to sail to England.”

“February 22nd, 1915. — Order to open campaign on west coast of United Kingdom. Especial care recommended to spare American and Italian flags.”

“March 7th, 1915. — The free belt for Scandinavians is abolished, but is not to be mined: it is thus really hardly endangered.”

“March 30th, 1915. — The free belt is wholly abolished.”

“April 2nd, 1915. — After loss of several submarines through traps, order that safety of our own boats is to come before all other considerations. No longer essential to rise to surface.”

CHAPTER III

THE NAVAL SITUATION

BEFORE giving a narrative of the events of the German U-boat campaign of 1915, it would be well to describe the general situation on the sea which the Germans sought to change by this new means. It was altogether adverse to the Central Powers, as, at this stage of the war, the German cruisers and commerce destroyers had been swept from the waterways of the world, and there was practically no interference with Allied control of the surface of the outlying seas.

The German cruiser *Königsberg* had been shut up in the Rufigi River, where she was afterwards destroyed in July, 1915, by the two lightdraft monitors, *Severn* and *Mersey*, sent out for that purpose. It should be noted that the bombardment, directed against this cruiser by means of airplane spotting, was another example of the difficulties of indirect fire for ships' guns. As was the case at the Dardanelles, the ships had a hard task to obtain hits on their target. Their first attempts failed, but the *Königsberg* was at last damaged beyond moving, although the Germans were afterwards able to mount her guns at Dar-es-Salaam.

The cruiser *Dresden*, after her escape from the Falkland action,¹ had only been able to lurk in hiding among inlets on the west coast of South America. She had been ordered to try to get to Germany, but could not make the attempt, on account of the condition of her engines as well as the uncertainty of a supply of coal.

¹ See previous volume, "Offensive Operations 1914-1915."

She was at length discovered off Juan Fernandez by the British cruisers *Kent* and *Glasgow*, and destroyed in Chilean waters on March 14, 1915. The British commander justified this act by claiming that the *Dresden* was using Chilean waters improperly in obtaining supplies. Upon complaint of Chile, the British Government made a formal apology.

The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, which had been left behind by Admiral Spee on the west coast of South America to make decoy signals,¹ had gone around the Horn into the Atlantic, but, being slower than the British cruisers, could not do any extensive harm. Among others, she sank the American barque *William P. Frye*, for which the German Government was obliged to pay a large sum in compensation. (The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was compelled to run into Newport News for repairs in March, 1915, but she could not be put in condition for a successful cruise, and she was interned there April 8, 1915.

The *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, which had been armed by the German cruiser *Karlsruhe*, was also in bad condition, and was forced to take refuge in Newport News, where she was interned (April 26, 1915).

In the words of the British Admiralty's historian, "So ended the first phase of the German attack upon our seaborne trade." After this there were a few isolated German raiders, but the great waterways of the world were practically free for the uses of the Entente Allies, until the development of the U-boat menace.

The losses to Allied shipping caused by the German cruisers had been over 240,000 tons, of which the bulk had been steamships. Added to this total of actual

¹ See previous volume, "Offensive Naval Operations 1914-1915."

losses, we must also consider the harm caused by the diversion of shipping from the infested areas, which implied great delays in transportation of troops and material. The whole makes an impressive total of the damage done by the small number of German commerce destroyers which were footloose on the seas. But it is a still more impressive object lesson of the damage that might have been done, if the Germans had not abandoned their former plans for an extended cruiser warfare against commerce after they lost faith in this form of naval aggression.¹ This does not mean that the Germans could have continued for long to inflict losses on this scale, but they might have done much more harm by a greater use of their demonstrated system of conducting cruiser operations by means of secret bases and supplying at sea.

It was not alone in the increased disturbance to shipping that the Germans might have done greater damage, but a more extended use of cruiser warfare would have diverted more naval forces of the Entente Allies. In the preceding volume of this work it has been shown that surprisingly large numbers of naval craft were kept busy by even the few German cruisers that were footloose on the seas. This fact has made it evident that, if the Germans had adhered to their former plans, the Allies would have been compelled to reply by the use of a greater number of ships, possibly even to the extent of weakening the British Battle Fleet. Undoubtedly the German loss of faith in cruiser warfare, after the efficient preparations had been made of which

¹ "No one believed for a moment, however, that any essential effect upon the outcome of the war could be attained by a war on commerce by surface craft alone." — "The War at Sea," German official.

so few German cruisers were able to reap the benefit, saved the Entente Allies from a threatening danger.

Any true history of the World War should emphasize, beyond the possibility of misunderstanding, the part that shipping played in its results. The economic war fought on the seas was the very life of the military war fought on land. And shipping in the hands of the Entente Allies was a force as potent as their naval forces.

Most fortunately for the Entente Allies, at the outbreak of war in 1914, there was the unusual advantageous situation that the shipping of the world, and this meant especially British shipping, was in excess of the normal demand upon it for traffic. "There was therefore a margin of easily acquired tonnage, and the large building orders placed during the previous year continued to be a valuable offset against the losses of the first year of the war."¹

The benefit of this favorable factor cannot be overstated. When the first demands of the increased needs of war were made upon shipping, and of course this meant for the most part British shipping, there was this margin that could be called upon, without drawing too largely upon the normal demands of the nations.

Requisition for Government use had to be resorted to at once, and it was inevitable that the control of shipping should rest with Great Britain. Thus London became the headquarters of this control throughout the war. At first this was national, and the British Transport Department was the means for early requisitions of ships needed for war service. This national British

¹ "Allied Shipping Control," British Series Carnegie Endowment History.

system remained the main impelling force until 1917, when there was coördination of Allied control.¹ But, as early as August, 1914, there had been established in London the Commission de Revitaillement. This was a British organization to coördinate purchase for the Allies. "It was under British management and it derived its strength and effectiveness largely from the fact that the purchases had to be made with British credits."²

Consequently, in the first two years, although each nation made its own arrangements, Great Britain was doing the principal share. "In 1915 and 1916, therefore, British shipping assistance to the Allies was rather improvised than organized. During this period there were normally some six hundred ocean-going British ships in the service of France and Italy, in addition to some 250,000 tons of small coastal vessels in the French coal trade."³ For these demands upon British shipping there was the valuable addition of enemy ships, captured or detained in British ports, which amounted to 241 ships of a tonnage of 626,000 tons.

With control of shipping came its natural corollary, control of commodities. The first necessity for this came from the sudden emergency for sugar in Great Britain. Of the yearly importation of 2,200,000 tons 1,800,000 tons had been derived from the Central Powers. At once the British Government was compelled to make large purchases and constitute Government supervision, and this was the beginning of Food Control, which became so great a factor in the World

¹ Special Committee for Maritime Transport and General Imports.

² "Allied Shipping Control."

³ Ibid.

War. Perhaps the most important stride in control of commodities in Great Britain was the creation of the Ministry of Munitions (June, 1915). This made the British industries a potent agency in winning the war.

With the shipping of the Entente Allies thus employed over the waterways of the world, and the shipping of the Central Powers thus excluded from these waterways, the corresponding control of commodities by the Entente Allies also implied the exclusion of commodities from the Central Powers.

In this regard the following from the Carnegie Foundation History should be carefully studied: "The complement to the measures to ensure and make the best use of supplies was the blockade system, which simultaneously restricted those of the enemy. In this, as in every other sphere, the arrangements made during peace were based on a conception of war as a struggle between military forces and not between whole populations. The first efforts at restrictions encountered the most serious difficulties — legal, diplomatic, and administrative — which resulted from this conception."

The above has stated the fact that was pointed out in the preceding volume of this work, that European prewar calculations had not begun to grasp the real possibilities of modern nations at war, in contrast to the old ideas of wars fought by the armed establishments. European military experts, in this respect as well as in regard to tactics and weapons, had ignored the lessons of our Civil War. In the Civil War (1861–1865) the citizen bodies of both sections were wholeheartedly engaged in this extraordinary warfare. It was thus a struggle between the peoples of both sections, and not only were methods of warfare revolu-

tionized, but, in the siege of the South, methods of blockade were evolved which were destined to be used in the World War. But this was not seen at the beginning of the World War, and no methods of national blockade had been prepared in advance.

Consequently, before the outbreak of war in 1914 there had been no conception of the World War as a struggle between whole populations of nations, and, equally of course, there was no appreciation of the importance of the doctrines developed in our Civil War. In the legal Civil War blockade of the Confederate States, it was held that supplies of all kinds were maintaining the Southern people in warfare, and should be excluded for this reason. In 1914 the provisions of the Declaration of London, which Great Britain had not ratified,¹ did not approach a solution of this vast problem.

“Under these rules the blockade would in effect have been limited to preventing the import of finished munitions; ‘conditional contraband’ could have flowed freely into Germany through the contiguous neutrals; and many of the most important of her military needs (rubber, hides, cotton, wool, and metallic ores) would have gone direct and without interference. The blockade would have been entirely ineffective and would not have been worth the expense. It gradually became apparent that the distinctions in the Declaration were inapplicable to a war in which the whole effort of the combatant nations was engaged. ‘In this war,’ as Ludendorff has said, ‘it was impossible to distinguish where the sphere of the army and navy began and that of the people ended.’ First raw material and then food

¹ “The fons et origo of a torrent of terrible evils.” — Lord Sydenham.

were, therefore, brought within the orbit of the blockade, and by 1916 all distinction as to use or intermediate destination had practically disappeared."

"This was, however, a difficult and dangerous process. The importance of the rules (which had never been ratified by Great Britain) consisted in the claims based on them by neutral countries, by Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Holland, who could offer transit to Germany, and by America, whose supply of munitions and other commodities was vital to the Allies."

The above, from the Carnegie Endowment History, has stated the case admirably. It was a most complicated and difficult problem, but the changes of policy, which were adopted by the Entente Allies, were irritating piecemeal approaches to a solution, instead of a solution on the broad lines of the World War.

The following, from the same valuable work, has also stated the outstanding defect in the policies of the Entente Allies, and this should be kept in mind as a constant influence upon the period of the naval war which is to be described in this volume. "It was nearly a year, however, before the blockade became really effective. In the early months supplies of all kinds, except finished munitions, flowed abundantly into Germany. Merchants had learnt how to send 'conditional contraband' through the contiguous neutrals." This last was a strong factor in the prolongation of the war by the Central Powers.

It must also be kept in mind that, although these policies of blockade were carried even to the formation of a "Ministry of Blockade" in Great Britain (January, 1916), yet no formal blockade of Germany was declared.

An account of the development of the blockade of the Civil War has been given in the preceding volume of this work.¹ Its importance, as establishing precedents, was thus summed up by Lord Sydenham in one of the subsequent debates (H. of L., 22 February, 1916) on the question of the blockade: "Thus it can be said that the French Wars could provide no guidance, and until the American Civil War there was very little to be learned on the subject. The action of President Lincoln when the Northern States were fighting, just as the Allies are fighting now, for national existence does, however, supply international precedents of the utmost importance. Briefly, what the Federal Government did at that time was this. It proclaimed a blockade of the whole Confederate coast; it boldly extended the doctrine of continuous voyage, and made food-stuffs and everything that the Confederate States needed for carrying on the war absolute contraband. The practical effect, though not the technical effect, of that was to set up a long-distance blockade, which included neutral Mexican ports, our Port of Nassau in the Bahamas, and also our port of Bermuda."

As stated in the preceding volume, this American legal blockade had established the two principles, most important of all for the Entente Allies. Not only was it determined that the ultimate destination of goods for the enemy settled the status of the goods, "the doctrine of the continuous voyage," but it was also established that the normal consumption of a neutral country should be the measure for determining whether goods were passing through that country for belligerents. These two doctrines eventually became the main reli-

¹ "Offensive Operations 1914-1915."

ances of the Entente Allies, but unfortunately there was a great deal of shifting about before these doctrines were applied, and consequently there was much leakage of supplies into Germany.

Instead of a concerted policy, there were successive Orders in Council. Of this period Lord Beresford gave the following description: "Now we have only a 'sort of blockade' carried out by Proclamations, Orders in Council, Agreements, and Committces, and it is not clear who controls the blockade."¹ The most notable of these Orders in Council was the "Reprisals Order" of March 11, 1915, and this, as its name implied, announced its measures as "reprisals" instead of assertions of maritime rights.²

"In the Reprisals Order of March 11, 1915, she (Great Britain) announced her intention to stop all goods of enemy origin or destination, and proceed henceforth to stop supplies intended for Germany, without regard to the distinction of the earlier contraband rules or to the fact that the supplies might be consigned through a neutral port. Even this, however, was not enough. It was useless to prohibit every cargo of food destined for Germany whether sent through contiguous neutral countries or not, if these neutral countries could themselves import freely for their own uses, and with the sufficiency so obtained, export their own produce to Germany by routes which the Allies could not control. This was the reason for the 'ra-

¹ H. of L., 22 February, 1916.

² "We then made the mistake of announcing those Orders in Council as 'reprisals.' . . . As our measures were necessary in any case if we were to win the war, we ought, instead of announcing them as reprisals, to have declared simply that the Allies were going to assert their full maritime rights." — Lord Sydenham, H. of L., 22 February, 1916.

tioning' policy, which was begun in 1915, and subsequently became the central feature in the whole blockade system. Detailed statistics were compiled as to the pre-war imports and consumption of all the neutral countries which had uncontrolled access to Germany; and only enough war imports were allowed to give a bare sufficiency for internal consumption. The neutral countries were, therefore, compelled to adopt internal rationing measures, so that the system of official control extended over almost the whole world — neutral and belligerent alike."¹ By these means did the Entente Allies eventually resort to the means used in the Civil War.

But these effective means were not taken until the failure to make prompt use of them had allowed great quantities of supplies to get into Germany, which might have been excluded if the lessons of the Civil War had been appreciated at their full value. To show the long time that was allowed to elapse, with ineffective piecemeal measures, it is only necessary to state that July 7, 1916, was the date of the Order in Council which repealed other former Orders in Council and affirmed: "The principle of continuous voyage or ultimate destination shall be applicable both in cases of contraband and of blockade."

It must be emphasized that the supplies, which were allowed to pass into Germany in this long period of the World War, made it possible for the Central Powers to prolong the war. There can be no question of this. Germany was enabled to maintain her fighting strength by means of the material which came in through the neutral nations, and it is established that a great deal of

¹ "Allied Shipping Control."

this material was from Great Britain. There were British exports to neutral nations out of all proportion to the needs of their populations and of their normal industries — and these industries in neutral countries were thus supplied and operated for the benefit of the Central Powers.

As has been stated in the preceding volume of this work, this failure on the part of the Entente Allies to exclude goods promptly from the Central Powers must be considered one of the most costly errors in the strategy of the Allies.

As to food for the German people, “down to Easter, 1916, the supplies available for the population as a whole had not been greatly inferior to those available before the war. At Easter, it became necessary to reduce the meat ration, but the guaranteed rations of all foods were still reasonably sufficient when supplemented by the available unrationed food, such as fruit, vegetables, fish, and polished barley.”¹ But, in the following summer of 1916, scarcity of food began to be felt, and from that time on was a strong influence upon the German people.

Throughout the course of the events of the naval warfare, which are to be related, these factors must always be counted as shaping its results and also as having a widespread influence upon the military strategy of the World War.

And here it should be mentioned that, as the pressure of economic isolation increased, there was much talk in Germany of procuring supplies by using submarines for transportation of goods by sea. The U-boat *Deutschland* was equipped for commercial transportation, and

¹ “Seaborne Trade,” Vol. II, Fayle.

successfully made the voyage across the Atlantic and back. She came into Norfolk on July 15, 1916, with a cargo of dyestuffs, and in the following month returned to Germany with nickel, tin, and rubber, procured through German agents. But, although much was made of this voyage, and the *Deutschland* also made a second voyage, yet it turned out to be only a gesture for effect, as nothing more was done to fulfill the Germans' exaggerated hopes of submarine traffic, and the *Deutschland* herself was changed back into an armed U-boat.

There was another important use of shipping, at the command of the Entente Allies, which had early become a strong factor in the war. Neutral shipping was available for the Allies to an unusual degree in consequence of the overproduction in shipbuilding just before the war, which has been described. As a result, the Entente Allies were enabled to charter large numbers of neutral ships from the very beginning. "Neutral owners who before the war were, like other shipowners, faced with a prospect of low freights for at least 1914 and 1915, made instead unprecedented and exorbitant profits wholly as a result of the war, of which the cost both in money and in life fell upon the Allies, and was possible only through the defence of the seas by the Allies' forces. And these profits were made mainly from the Allies themselves."¹ This ability to charter and use neutral shipping was one of the great benefits to the Entente Allies from naval control of the seas.

After this review of the situation on the seas, it will be evident that the control of the waterways had placed great resources at the disposal of the Entente Allies. On the other hand, this was imposing restrictions upon

¹ "Allied Shipping Control."

the Central Powers. In spite of the delays in adopting right policies and the resultant leakage in the blockade, these restrictions were causing increasing hardships in Germany. The first attempt to change this established situation was the U-boat campaign of 1915.

CHAPTER IV

THE U-BOAT CAMPAIGN OF 1915 AND THE *LUSITANIA*

AS has been stated, the German Government began the U-boat campaign with misgivings and with concessions to the protests of neutrals, especially the United States. On February 18, 1915, the following instructions were issued to the U-boats:

“1. The U-boat campaign against commerce is to be prosecuted with all possible vigour.”

“2. Hostile merchant ships are to be destroyed.”

“3. Neutral ships are to be spared. A neutral flag or funnel marks of neutral steamship lines are not to be regarded, however, as sufficient guarantee in themselves of neutral nationality. Nor does the possession of further distinguishing neutral marks furnish absolute certainty. The commander must take into account all accompanying circumstances that may enable him to recognize the nationality of the ship, e.g. structure, place of registration, course, general behaviour.”

“4. Merchant ships with a neutral flag travelling with a convoy are thereby proved to be neutral.”

“5. Hospital ships are to be spared. They may only be attacked when they are obviously used for the transport of troops from England to France.”

“6. Ships belonging to the Belgian Relief Commission are likewise to be spared.”

“7. If in spite of the exercise of great care mistakes

should be made, the commander will not be made responsible.”

These instructions, in the main, reflected a very different spirit from the first truculent German declaration, and even gave promise of care for the lives of neutrals. Yet the very basis of the campaign was such that Germany was sooner or later bound to incur odium. Admiral Scheer has explained this: “In these instructions the Naval Staff had been obliged to conform to the declaration which the Imperial Government had made to America, explaining its conception of the conduct of the campaign against trade in the War Zone, although they had no opportunity of expressing their doubts of the possibility of carrying out these instructions in practice.”

Consequently, it must be kept in mind that, although the Germans were entering upon a course that would have an adverse moral effect, they did not, at this time, have sufficient means to carry out the physical effect of their ambitious program. Admiral Tirpitz wrote: “The declaration was in my view premature and unhappy.” And he has quoted the following from Admiral Müller: “The Secretary of State and myself disapproved the manner in which the submarine campaign against merchantmen was introduced. The time was ill chosen, the means insufficiently prepared, and the wording of the notification characterized by the greatest clumsiness.” As Admiral Tirpitz summed it up, “The submarine warfare now became, as Bachmann had prophesied, of no effect in securing the ultimate victory of the German people, but still had material enough to create incidents and quarrels with the Americans.”

It is now known that Germany was able to use, at the outset of the U-boat campaign, only "about 24"¹ submarines, and Admiral Scheer has stated that "for the first months the new boats built just about covered the losses. . . . With these 24 boats it was only possible to occupy permanently three or four stations on the main traffic routes of English commerce. The tonnage sunk during the whole year of 1915 equalled the tonnage sunk in only six weeks when the unrestricted U-boat campaign was opened. In view of the attitude of conciliation adopted towards the complaints of neutrals, it was premature to begin the U-boat campaign in 1915. It would have been better to wait until the larger number of boats, resulting from the intensive building of 1915, guaranteed a favorable outcome — and then to have persisted in the face of all objections. *Had there been no giving way in 1915, the right moment to start the campaign—the beginning of 1916—would not have been missed.*" (The italics are Admiral Scheer's.)

In these unmistakable terms the Germans have expressed their regret at their strategic mistake in beginning the U-boat campaign in 1915. From these comments, it will be evident that this first attempt at a submarine campaign against commerce can be dismissed as a possibility for a decisive effect upon the World War. But, on the other hand, it must not be thought that it was without serious harm.

On the contrary, the new threat of the U-boats caused a great deal of disturbance in traffic. This effect was marked by the great increase over the rates prevailing in January of the same year. But the actual physical losses of Allied shipping caused by the U-boats

¹ Admiral Scheer.

were far below German expectations, and this justified the gloomy prophecies of Tirpitz that the U-boat campaign would be premature, without sufficient preparation to insure results. As stated in "Seaborne Trade," "The results which it had hitherto attained, though considerable, fell far short of the wholesale destruction which had been foretold by the enemy. During the whole period from February 18th to April 30th the losses of British shipping through submarine attack, amounted to 39 steamers of 105,000 tons. . . . Allied shipping, as was natural from its smaller volume, suffered less severely, the total number of ships sunk being only 5 steamers and 2 sailing vessels, with a tonnage of 12,000."

In fact, at this time, the U-boat was still feeling its way, and had not then become the dangerous commerce destroyer which was developed later in the war. At this stage there were too few, even for the campaign in the coastal waters of Great Britain where the main effort was made. The all-important stretch of the British Channel had the advantages for defense of narrow waters, without great depth. Behind the outer defense of the British mine fields, the British maintained a line of drifters with indicator-nets,¹ supported by destroyers and armed trawlers ready to chase and destroy U-boats detected by means of the indicator-nets. For the protection of the northern entrance of the Irish Sea the same means were employed, but the nets could not be so effective because the water was three times as deep (60 to 70 fathoms). The wide entrance on the south was naturally much more difficult. "All

¹ This was a special net, fitted with buoys devised to be automatically lighted wherever the U-boat fouled the net.

round the British and Irish coasts, moreover, the destroyer flotillas and the units of the Auxiliary Patrol were on the alert to intercept submarines on their passage northabout, to harry them on their appearance at any point on the coastline, or to give assistance to ships attacked.”¹

But “Seaborne Trade” added: “In spite of all these precautions and of the activity of the patrols, the tale of losses continued, and the range of the attack soon spread beyond its original points of impact. During the month of March casualties and attacks were reported from points all along the English Channel between the Downs and the Lizard, from the North Sea, the west coast of Ireland, the Irish Sea, the entrance to the Bristol Channel, and the neighborhood of the Scillies.”

These showed that the Germans were rapidly making progress in the development of the U-boat. Moreover, they were taking measures for increasing its scope. A submarine base had been established at Zeebrugge, and another in the Mediterranean. In April, 1915, a U-boat was sent to the Dardanelles, and two of the newest U-boats were sent to Pola, the Austrian naval base on the Adriatic.

These dispositions, even on so small a scale, presaged the tactical use of the U-boat that was destined to make it so great a menace to shipping. The outstanding advantage of the submarine, over the surface craft, was the fact that its ability to conceal itself below the surface gave it the ability to operate in the defended areas where there were congestions of shipping, instead of being compelled to take to the outlying trade routes

¹ “Seaborne Trade.”

in order to avoid enemy cruisers. It will be seen at once that, aside from the obvious impossibility of a raider operating in the guarded British home waters, there would be no chance for surface craft to gain much success against shipping in Mediterranean waters. These, and other areas where traffic was focal, were crowded with shipping from the necessities of traffic, and it is obvious that these conditions did not admit of any substantial changes. Hitherto, against the attacks of surface craft, the defense of such areas had been a simple problem. Against the submarine, new means of defense were necessary, as the new enemy could not be held off by the defenses that had been adequate against surface craft. But, of course, this great advantage of the submarine was something that was not to prove its full value until later, when the use of the U-boat was more developed.

The sinkings in British home waters were not alarming in the first part of April. In fact, for a time there was a decrease, and they thought in Great Britain that a check had been given to the U-boat campaign, instead of realizing that the Germans had undertaken it with insufficient means.¹

But, on the contrary, the Germans were making new efforts. "While traffic in the Irish Sea and English Channel remained free from molestation, the vigor of the attack was intensified during May in the North Sea and the Southwestern Approach."² In fact, the Germans, in planning to attack the great influx of steam

¹ "Best of all, a distinct check had been administered to the submarine attack." — "Seaborne Trade." Later in the same work: "The apparent check administered to the German submarines was not, unfortunately, followed by any permanent diminution in their activities."

² "Seaborne Trade."

vessels through the Southwestern Approach, had extended their areas, and were working off the Irish coast. And here occurred the tragic sinking of the *Lusitania*, which at once changed the whole aspect of the submarine campaign.

The following advertisement had appeared in American newspapers:

“Notice. — Travellers intending to embark on Atlantic voyages are reminded that the state of war exists between Germany and her Allies and Great Britain and her Allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government vessels flying the flag of Great Britain or any of her Allies are liable to destruction in these waters; and that travellers sailing in the war zone in ships of Great Britain or her Allies do so at their own risk. — Imperial German Embassy, Washington, D. C., April 22nd, 1915.”

Of the situation off the coast of Ireland, the British Admiralty's historian has written as follows: “But when, in the first week of May, it became obvious that the area was dangerously infested, one of these ships, the largest and fastest of them all, became a source of special anxiety. She was the *Lusitania* due off Queens-town on May 7.” On May 5, 6, and 7, warnings were sent to the *Lusitania* of the presence of submarines in Irish waters. Of the last of these warnings, received by Captain Turner of the *Lusitania* as he was changing his course at 12.40 P.M., May 7, 1915, and proceeding at a speed of 18 knots,¹ the Admiralty's historian should

¹ “Shortly before noon she ran into clear weather again, and increased to 18 knots.” — Sir Julian Corbett.

also be quoted: "As he was altering course another message was passed to him through Valencia saying that submarines had been seen that morning south of Cape Clear, which was now thirty miles astern. Accordingly, feeling himself well clear of that danger, he held on till, at 1.40, the Old Head of Kinsale came in sight to port. He then returned to his original course, which would take him past the headland at a distance of about ten miles. The weather was now quite clear and the sea calm."

Shortly after, as the passengers were coming on deck at 2.15 P.M. from luncheon, the great liner was torpedoed amidships on the starboard side. The *Lusitania* soon began to take a heavy list. "The engines stopped, and in twenty minutes she plunged down head foremost and was gone. . . . Her crew and passengers numbered within two score of 2000 souls, and of these there perished of men, women and children no less than 1198."¹

This appalling loss of life, with the destruction of women and innocent children, made a most profound impression all over the world. All other discussions, and irritations as to the situation, faded into insignificance in comparison with this tragedy. Especially was this the case in regard to the United States, as about one hundred of the victims had been Americans, including many women and children. Before this, as has been stated, the United States, in common with the other neutrals, had been involved in arguments with Great Britain as to Allied policies on the seas, including, not long before, a protest against the use of the American flag as a disguise. But, for all practical

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

purposes so far as the United States was concerned, Germany had, by this act, blotted out whatever irritation remained against Germany's enemies, and had concentrated public opinion in condemnation of Germany. It was another example of the fatal error of arousing moral forces and aligning them against Germany. As has already been stated, the German menace in the use of the submarine had put all other irritations in the background. This German act had not only ended these, but had substituted indignant hostility against Germany.

For this reason, it is no exaggeration to say that the sinking of the *Lusitania* assumed an importance that did the greatest possible harm to Germany.¹ In a subsequent chapter the course of events will be described through which the *Lusitania* case curbed the German submarine campaign. But, above and beyond this check, it should be stated at this stage that whatever results the Germans might win, by developing their U-boat warfare in 1915, were set at nought by the reaction against them caused by the slaughter of the passengers on the *Lusitania*. Even looked at only from the point of view of the German Government's material strategy, there was nothing that could be gained by the U-boat campaign that would offset the strategic harm done by thus aligning public opinion against Germany.

¹ "The *Lusitania* case, too, cast its shadow over events." — "The Kaiser's Memoirs."

CHAPTER V

THE MILITARY ATTEMPT AT THE DARDANELLES

(See Map at page 110)

IN the preceding volume of this work, an account has been given of the attempt of the Entente Allies to win the Dardanelles by means of the Fleet alone. The defeat of this ill-judged operation was decisive in the last naval attack to force the Narrows (March 18, 1915), called by Admiral Wemyss "a battle which finally put an end to all hopes of forcing the Dardanelles without the assistance of the Army."¹ Both its complete failure and the reasons for failure were admitted in the following dispatch from the Naval Commander-in-Chief to the British Admiralty: "The assumption underlying the plan originally approved for forcing the Dardanelles, by ships, was that forts could be destroyed by gun-fire alone. As applying to the attacking of open forts, by high velocity fire, this assumption has been conclusively disproved."²

The ensuing attempts to win the Dardanelles and Constantinople were to be by means of combined operations of the Army and the Fleet, but the same malign influence of inadequate conception and preparation continued to baulk this undertaking, and prevented a proper use of coördinated forces that would give success.

In the first place, the extraordinary situation existed

¹ "The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign."

² Sir John de Robeck to First Lord, March 27, 1915.

that the strong military force of the Entente Allies, which was actually assembled off the Dardanelles before the final naval attack, was not in the least ready to take an active part in combination with the Fleet. It is known that on March 18, the date of the last naval attack, the Turks were ill prepared to resist a combined attack by the Army and Navy. But, instead of being available for any such immediate joint operation, which was the one way to success, this powerful Allied army was there with only the vague mission of following up an expected naval victory. Sir Ian Hamilton, who was made Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, has left no doubt of this in his own account.¹ He has written that he was given his appointment by Lord Kitchener, in person, on March 12, 1915,² and at once left for the Mediterranean. The following statement is unmistakable: "We soldiers are to understand we are string Number 2. The sailors are sure they can force the Dardanelles on their own and the whole enterprise has been framed on that basis; we are to lie low and to bear in mind the Cabinet does not want to hear anything of the Army until it sails through the Straits. But if the Admiral fails, then we will have to go in."³ And General Hamilton has added this equally unmistakable and

¹ "Gallipoli Diary."

² "Opening the door I bade him good morning and walked to his desk where he went on writing like a graven image. After a moment he looked up and said in a matter-of-fact tone, 'We are sending a military force to support the Fleet now at the Dardanelles, and you are to have command.'" — Ibid.

³ "The Fleet has undertaken to force the passage of the Dardanelles. The employment of military forces on any large scale for land operations, at this juncture, is only contemplated in the event of the Fleet failing to get through after every effort has been exhausted." — Lord Kitchener's instructions to Sir Ian Hamilton, Ibid.

significant comment on his mission: "The Dardanelles and Bosphorus might be in the moon for all the military information I have got to go upon."¹

Admiral Wemyss has also stated the naval point of view: "The experience we had undergone pointed to the following argument: the battleships could not force the Straits until the minefield had been cleared — the minefield could not be cleared until the concealed guns which defended them were destroyed — they could not be destroyed until the Peninsula was in our hands, hence we should have to seize it with the Army. Any main operations must therefore be postponed until such time as preparation for a combined attack could be made."

There can be no question of this state of unreadiness, which would be incredible if it had not been set forth by the British Commander-in-Chief, in terms that are a revelation of the innate helplessness of the whole undertaking. It is evident that, with this helpless situation existing, there was no possibility of a prompt joint attack. Consequently, there is no profit in discussing a joint attack as a "might-have-been." But any true narrative of the Dardanelles Campaign must strongly emphasize the harm that was done by the postponement from March to April, after notice had been thus served to the Turks to prepare for defense against an army.

In March the Turks were badly equipped. This was so evident that Ambassador Morgenthau even thought a renewed naval attack might have pushed through.

¹ "Braithwaite set to work in the Intelligence Branch at once. But beyond the ordinary text books those pigeon holes were drawn blank. The Dardanelles and Bosphorus might be in the moon for all the military information I have got to go upon." — "Gallipoli Diary."

This last is also not worth discussing, as it has been shown that the British Naval Command admitted defeat beyond a possibility of renewing the action, and consequently there was no chance of another purely naval attack. But there is no question of the fact that the Turks would have been vulnerable to a joint attack in March, and yet it is equally indisputable that they were well prepared for a strong resistance in April. The delay caused by the reorganization of the Expeditionary Force, before it was ready to attack in April, had thus a fatal effect in allowing the Turks ample time for preparing an efficient defense. This great harm, from giving the factor of time to the enemy, must be clearly understood. As has been pointed out, with the British Command in such a hopeless muddle, there was no chance of a joint operation. But the March situation comprised the actual presence of a powerful Allied army and a powerful Allied fleet against an unprepared Turkish defense. And, although the inferior enemy force was unprepared, these superior Allied forces were not coördinated and used, but were withdrawn because they also were unprepared!

The opportunity to attack the Turks when they were still unprepared was then lost forever, because, after the unmistakable warning that had been given by the advent of the Allied forces, the Turks had been fully awakened to their coming danger, and quickly began preparations for defense against it, making excellent use of the time granted to them by their adversaries. On March 23 the German General Sanders was given the command of Gallipoli. He at once began to organize the whole system of defense, not only by constructing intrenchments at every possible landing place, but also

by making many new roads, by which troops could be moved from point to point in concentration for defense. This work was pushed forward with great energy, and with large numbers of workmen. Consequently, in April Sir Ian Hamilton had to face a far more difficult task than would have been the case if he had been ready with a plan of attack in March.

Sir Ian Hamilton had arrived at Mudros on March 17, and on that day attended a conference on board Admiral de Robeck's flagship *Queen Elizabeth*, at which were present the naval commanders and General d'Amade, who commanded the contingent of French troops. This was the day before the final naval attack and General Hamilton stated, of Admiral de Robeck: "His chief worry lies in the clever way the enemy are now handling their mobile artillery." This mobile Turkish defense has been explained in the preceding volume.

When Sir Ian Hamilton's instructions had been read to the Admiral, and after the British General's lack of information was understood,¹ Admiral de Robeck explained that the Turkish defenses were being greatly strengthened, and he gave General Hamilton a chance to make a personal observation from the *Phaeton*. General Hamilton was impressed by the difficulties of a landing and at once wrote to Lord Kitchener (March 18): "Here, at present, Gallipoli looks a much tougher nut to crack than it did over the map in your office."

The same afternoon Sir Ian Hamilton witnessed the

¹ "The Admiral asked to see my instructions and Braithwaite read them out. When he stopped, Roger Keyes, the Commodore, inquired, 'Is that all?' And when Braithwaite confessed that it was, everyone looked a little blank." — "Gallipoli Diary."

defeat of the naval attack, and, on March 19, 2 P.M., telegraphed to Lord Kitchener: "I have not yet received any report of the naval action, but from what I actually saw of the extraordinary gallant attempt made yesterday, I am being most reluctantly driven to the conclusion that the Dardanelles are less likely to be forced by battleships than at one time seemed probable, and that if the Army is to participate, its operations will not assume the subsidiary form anticipated."

"The Army's share will not be a case of landing parties, for the destruction of forts, etc., but rather a case of a deliberate and progressive military operation, carried out in order to make good the passage of the Navy."

At 5.45 P.M. on the same day Lord Kitchener replied: "With reference to the last paragraph of your telegram of today you know my views that the passage of the Dardanelles must be forced, and that if large military operations on the Gallipoli Peninsula by the Army are necessary to clear the way, they must be undertaken, after careful consideration of the local defences, and must be carried through."

On the morning of March 22 there was another conference of the Army and Navy Commands on board the *Queen Elizabeth*. General Hamilton has stated: "The moment we sat down de Robeck told us *he was now quite clear he could not get through without the help of all my troops.* [The italics are General Hamilton's.] . . . So there was no discussion. At once we turned our faces to the land scheme. Very sketchy; how could it be otherwise?"

Consequently, Sir Ian Hamilton was obliged to

make a decision for which there had been no proper preparation. He has thus described the situation: "Almost incredible really, we should have to decide so tremendous an administrative problem off the reel and without any Administrative Staff. But time presses, the responsibility cannot be shirked, and so I have cabled K. that Lemnos must be a wash-out and that I am sending all my troops to get ship-shape at Alexandria."

This change of base to Alexandria, for the purpose of preparing the forces for the landing, meant a delay of over five weeks. But those on the spot did not think the Expeditionary Force ready for landing operations,¹ and Admiral de Robeck sent a dispatch to the Admiralty in which he approved the plans of Sir Ian Hamilton, after the British General had said that "he could not take action until the 14th April."²

Sir Ian Hamilton has given his reasons for not attempting an immediate landing:

"(1) No details thought out, much less worked out or practiced, as to form or manner of landing;

(2) Absence of 29th Division;

(3) Lack of gear (naval and military) for any landing on a large scale or maintenance thereafter;

(4) Unsettled weather."³

The British Admiralty's historian has stated: "Since the Army had been sent out merely to make good what the Navy had won, and to push on thence to ulterior operations, it was unfit to undertake a wholly different

¹ "By the men on the spot a postponement was regarded as inevitable."
— Sir Julian Corbett.

² Sir John de Robeck to First Lord, March 27, 1915.

³ "Gallipoli Diary."

operation, and, as we have seen, it had to concentrate in Egypt for reorganization.”¹

In view of this actual situation at the Dardanelles in March, 1915, when no plans at all had been made, and the British Army was held to be utterly unprepared for a landing, there is again no profit in discussing the possibility of an immediate landing as a “might-have-been.” The British Command had put it out of the question. But any narrative of the events should again emphasize, at this stage, the harm that was done by allowing the project to develop gradually into successive stages, which gave ample warnings to the Turks to prepare new defenses. Even recognizing that, in the unfortunately existing unprepared situation, the British Commander-in-Chief felt obliged to incur this last delay, caused by reorganizing his force at Alexandria, yet it must be pointed out that these weeks before the landing on April 25 were of especial value to the Turks in strengthening their defense, which had been weak in March.

The Turks had been fully awakened to the danger, and on March 23 the German General Sanders was given the command at Gallipoli. He at once began to organize the whole system of defense, not only by constructing intrenchments at every possible landing place but also by making many new roads, by which troops could be moved from point to point in concentrations for defense. This work was pushed forward with great energy, and with large numbers of workmen. Consequently, in April Sir Ian Hamilton had to face a much more difficult task than would have been the case in March.

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

After the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force had been taken to Alexandria, General Hamilton was joined by his Staff and by the 29 Division. There the British General worked out his plans, the transports were reloaded, and his force was reassembled at the island bases. One transport, the *Manitou*, was surprised by a small Turkish torpedo boat, *Demir Hissar*, which had slipped out of Smyrna. Fifty-one lives were lost in abandoning ship; but the *Manitou* was not sunk, and the Turkish torpedo boat was chased by British destroyers and run ashore. After this, the rest of the transports were escorted, and there was no other contretemps. On April 24 Sir Ian Hamilton's forces were disposed for landing on the following morning.

In the meantime, there had been a great deal of naval preparation. In the first place, it was necessary to reorganize the minesweeping flotilla. "Moreover beach-gear for a disembarkation in force had to be improvised, a landing flotilla had to be collected, and the transport anchorages thoroughly protected, work which could not be done in less time than the Army would require for its own preparations."¹ A new aerodrome base was established in Tenedos, "and from this time the British air service was able to assert a full ascendancy over that of the enemy."²

"To prevent reinforcements of the Gallipoli Peninsula was one of the Admiral's chief cares till the troops were ready."³ The British naval forces kept up a continued harassing activity against whatever positions they could get under fire. But the Admiralty's historian has stated that little was accomplished to retard

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

General Sanders' working parties, which were active at night.¹

"But the Admiral's main idea was to use his submarines for the actual interruptions of the enemy's communications."² As early as December 13, 1914, a British submarine, B-11, had entered the Dardanelles and torpedoed the Turkish cruiser *Messudieh*. But the attempts against Turkish communications before the landing did not have any success. The first submarine sent in was lost, and her hull was destroyed by a British boat detail, to prevent its falling into the hands of the Turks. "With that the Admiral rested content, and no further attempt at this time was made to get submarines past the minefields."³

There had been hopes of Russian coöperation from the Black Sea, but this had been abandoned before the landing.⁴ Consequently, Russian assistance did not form any part of the plans, although it was believed that the threat of Russian activity had kept reinforcements away from Gallipoli.

After the preparations for the landing had been deemed sufficient, the attempt was twice postponed for twenty-four hours on account of unfavorable weather. But the landing took place on April 25, with perfect weather conditions. Sir Ian Hamilton had decided to make his main landings on the toe of the Gallipoli Peninsula, dividing his forces and making several simultaneous landings, with feints at other points to divert the forces of the enemy. One of these attempts

¹ "Every morning fresh work could be seen." — Sir Julian Corbett.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ ". . . of Russian military assistance, there was no longer any hope for months. . . ." — Ibid.

was to be tentative, but the landing was to be held if possible. This was at a cove north of Gaba Tepe, to be undertaken by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, from the initials of which it afterwards received its name, "Anzac." The feint diversion of the French contingent was to be a real landing at Kum Kale, but the position was not to be held after serving the purpose of diverting Turkish forces from Gallipoli.

The landings on the toe of the Gallipoli Peninsula were on Beaches Y, X, W, V, and S, as shown on the map. The British effectives have been given as 75,000,¹ which was a two to one superiority over the defending forces. But again must be stated the increased difficulty of the task, from the vacillating delays of the project. This disadvantage has been summed up by the Admiralty's historian in a quotation from a German source: "If the enemy had only attacked a little earlier, Heaven knows how the matter would have ended. But by this time all companies were in well intrenched positions at the various important military points along the coast, and behind them the reserves who were to hold the assailants until the big divisions came up."

The reader must realize the great difficulties of the conduct of the operation of April 25, from a naval point of view. In the usual narratives there has been so much discussion of details that the whole picture has not been shown. "The British transports alone numbered over sixty, trawlers and sweeping craft over thirty, besides tugs and other auxiliary craft. So that, as the ships of war and torpedo flotilla numbered well over ninety, the whole operation must have involved the movement of at least 200 vessels."²

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² Ibid.

The disposition of Admiral de Robeck's Fleet, to carry out its functions in this operation, is very interesting.

Fleet Flagship: *Queen Elizabeth*
Vice-Admiral (Act.) John M. de Robeck

FIRST SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral Rosslyn E. Wemyss
Rear-Admiral Stuart Nicholson

BATTLESHIPS

Swiftsure (2nd flag)
Albion
Lord Nelson
Implacable
Vengeance
*Prince George*¹
Goliath
Cornwallis

CRUISERS

Minerva
Euryalus (flag)
Talbot
Dublin
6 fleet-sweepers

SECOND SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral Cecil F. Thursby

BATTLESHIPS

Queen (flag)
London
Prince of Wales
Triumph
Majestic
Bacchante, cruiser
Adamant, submarine depot ship
Ark Royal, seaplane carrier
Manica, balloon ship
8 destroyers
4 trawlers

¹ Attached to Rear-Admiral Guépratte's squadron for the landing operations of April 25.

THIRD SQUADRON

Captain Heathcoat S. Grant
BATTLESHIP

Canopus

CRUISERS

Dartmouth

Doris

2 destroyers

2 trawlers

FOURTH SQUADRON

(Attached to First Squadron)

CRUISERS

Sapphire

Amethyst

12 trawlers

FIFTH SQUADRON

Captains H. A. S. Fyler and A. W. Heneage
(Captain "S")

Agamemnon, battleship

10 destroyers

3 French minesweepers

2 trawlers for net-laying

SIXTH SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral P. F. A. H. Guépratte

BATTLESHIPS

Jauréguiberry (flag)

Henri IV

*Charlemagne*¹

CRUISERS

*Latouche-Tréville*²

Jeanne D'Arc

Askold

Savoie

7 destroyers

5 torpedo boats

¹ Did not take part in operations of April 25.

² Ibid.

SEVENTH SQUADRON

Captain C. P. Metcalfe

4 destroyers

Triad, armed yacht (Smyrna blockade)

“The general idea of the organization was to provide each zone of operations with a separate squadron, which in its turn was divided into ‘covering ships’ and ‘attendant ships.’ The function of the ‘covering ships’ was to prepare for the landing with their fire, and subsequently to cover it by searching the enemy’s trenches and batteries inland. The function of the ‘attendant ships’ was to carry the advance echelons of the covering troops, who were to seize the beaches and advance to a position in which they could cover the completion of the landing.”¹ As a daylight attack had been decided upon, “the Admiral had offered to take the advance troops close in before transferring them to the landing flotilla as soon as possible after dawn. It was a method which would considerably reduce the exposure, and at the same time permit a preparatory bombardment.”² At Beach V a collier, the *River Clyde*, with 2000 men on board, provided with lighters and a landing gear, was to be run ashore to land troops.

“To the main landings at the toe of the peninsula the First Squadron was devoted, under Admiral Wemyss, in the *Euryalus*. . . . To him were also attached the two light cruisers of the Fourth Squadron, which were told off to Y Beach. The covering squadron, which was placed under the command of Admiral Nicholson, included, besides these two ships, six battleships, *Swiftsure* (flag), *Lord Nelson*, *Albion*, *Vengeance*, *Prince George* and *Goliath*, and the three cruisers of the First

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.² *Ibid.*

Squadron, *Minerva*, *Talbot* and *Dublin*. The Second Squadron, under Admiral Thursby, was assigned to the Anzac landing at Gaba Tepe, with the *Triumph*, *Majestic* and *Bacchante* forming its covering division, and, as this zone of operations was out of convenient reach of the aeroplanes, he was to have the seaplane carrier *Ark Royal* and the balloon ship *Manica*, to direct the ship fire. The small Third Squadron, under Captain Heathcoat Grant, in the *Canopus*, was to attend to the feint on Bulair. Captain Fyler, in the *Agamemnon*, had charge of the Fifth Squadron, which, with its flotilla under Captain Heneage, was to look after the mine-sweeping and net-laying inside the Straits. Admiral Guépratte's force, which formed the Sixth Squadron, was devoted to the landing and demonstration on the Asiatic side, while the *Triad* with four destroyers which formed the Seventh Squadron watched Smyrna to guard against torpedo attack from that direction." ¹

Yet all this array of naval force was unable to save the troops from great losses, which were incurred in the landing. The preparations of the Turks had not been fully understood. Their intrenched positions for machine gun and rifle fire and their wire entanglements along the beaches proved to be a costly surprise. Admiral Wemyss wrote: "When as close in as they could get without grounding the steam pinnaces slipped the tows and the pulling boats, coming up in line abreast, pushed on under oars until they took the ground. Up to this moment the fire of our ships had prevented the enemy from leaving his dug-outs, but immediately it ceased a hail of rifle and machine gun fire opened upon

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

the party who, jumping out of the boats, found themselves struggling in wire-entanglements which the ships' guns had failed to destroy." The losses were especially heavy at Beaches W and V, and at Beach Y there was so sharp a counter attack that this point was abandoned, the troops being transferred to Beach X. The Anzac landing north of Gaba Tepe had been successfully carried out before dawn, and this position was to be held. The French contingent had made good their landing at Kum Kale on the Asiatic side, but these troops were to be removed, after accomplishing their object of preventing Turkish gun fire from that side of the Straits.

The result was a bad military situation, in that General Hamilton's troops had only secured foothold on the Gallipoli Peninsula, his main forces on the toe, with the Anzac position north of Gaba Tepe held by an isolated force of some 12,000. In these positions, he was at the great disadvantage that his whole hand lay exposed upon the board. He had no additional strength to throw into the balance, and his army had gained these separated positions at such heavy cost that it had not enough strength to push forward, against the strong defenses which had been prepared by the Turks. In fact, it was all the British could do, for the time being, to beat off the Turkish counter attacks. And, even on this narrow peninsula, the guns of the powerful naval forces operating with the army were unable to dislodge the Turkish defenders and help the advance. The British were thus at a standstill.

General Hamilton's own words (dispatch of May 20, 1915) gave a complete picture: "The reorganization of units and formations was impossible during the 26th

and 27th owing to persistent attacks. An advance was impossible until a reorganization could be effected, and it only remained to entrench the position gained and to perfect the arrangements, water and supplies to the ridge — in itself a most difficult undertaking.”¹

¹ Sir Ian Hamilton reported the British losses 13,979 killed, wounded, and missing.

CHAPTER VI

DISAPPOINTMENTS FOR THE ENTENTE ALLIES

THE month of May, 1915, which found Sir Ian Hamilton's army on the Gallipoli Peninsula definitely held up by the long prepared Turkish defense, was also a critical time for the Entente Allies in other theatres of the war. That month, on the Western Front, brought home the knowledge that the Allied armies would not be able to push back the Germans, as had confidently been expected. In reality, the measure of the inadequate preparations and tactics of the Allies had been taken earlier by the Germans in the very first military test, the Battle of Neuve Chapelle (March 10 *et seq.*, 1915). It is interesting, as a comment upon the failure to comprehend the great scale of the World War, that this action was first described in London as "the battle bigger than Waterloo," and yet the supposedly overpowering combined artillery and infantry attacks of the British were on too small a scale to gain a decision, even against merely a small part of the German defensive positions on the Western Front.

Indeed, so inadequate was the preparation, that the next British attempt (Second Battle of Ypres, April, 1915) was turned into a German counter offensive, with the first use of poison gas. In May, 1915, the carefully planned coördinated offensives of the French (Battle of the Artois) and the British (Battle of Festubert) were failures. Not only were the Entente Allies

thus unable to win in the West, but these Allied offensives were not even threatening enough to create a military diversion that would help the situation on the Russian front, where a fearful change for the worse had taken place. As explained in the introductory chapter of this volume, the Germans had adopted an entirely different strategy, and the Austro-German assault in the southeast had broken through the Russians, with a well prepared impetus that could not be checked. There followed successive smashing dislocations of the Russian armies, which made even a defensive stand impossible. Much less was there any possibility of an offensive by a Russian army against the Austro-Germans in 1915.

Consequently also, there was never any possibility of carrying out Lord Fisher's Baltic project for landing a Russian army of invasion on the Pomeranian coast. As a matter of fact, when Lord Fisher's building program for his "Armada" approached completion, there was no Russian army available for the "Armada" to land. This sentence sums up the situation, as to the program which had absorbed British naval offensive efforts against the waters about Germany. Yet, so wedded was Lord Fisher to his cherished project, that, even after the Russian armies had lost the offensive and their defeat had begun, he so resented interference with his program for his Baltic "Armada" that he resigned from the Admiralty.

The occasion was the decision of the War Council to persevere in the Dardanelles undertaking, and Lord Fisher has put himself unmistakably on record as to his reasons for his resignation: "On May 14, 1915, the War Council made it clear to me that the great projects

in Northern waters which I had in view in laying down the Armada of new vessels were at an end, and the further drain on our naval resources foreshadowed that evening convinced me that I could no longer countenance the Dardanelles operations, and the next day I resigned."

"It seemed to me that I was faced at last by a progressive frustration of my main scheme of naval strategy."

"Gradually the crowning work of war construction was being diverted and perverted from its original aim. The Monitors, for instance, planned for the banks and shallows of the Northern waters, were sent off to the Mediterranean where they had never meant to operate."

"I felt I was right in remaining in office until this situation, never contemplated at first by anyone, was accepted by the War Council. I felt right in resigning on this decision."¹

The effects of the unexpectedly bad situation of 1915, and its reactions upon both military and naval strategy, have been thus stated by the British Admiralty's his-

¹ The British Admiralty's historian has maintained a reticence as to Lord Fisher's "main scheme of naval strategy," but he leaves no doubt as to the reason of Lord Fisher's resignation: "The plan which, as Lord Fisher believed, could alone give decisive results within measurable time was obviously to be postponed indefinitely, and feeling unable any longer to be responsible for the conduct of the war at sea, he next morning resigned." In a previous chapter, Sir Julian Corbett had also veiled the ending of the possibility of Russian forces for a landing on the Pomeranian coast: "On the other hand, it was also a moment when the great lines of the war seemed to be taking a new direction, which raised doubts whether the North Sea plan was that best adapted to meet the threatening development." The fact was, Sir Julian Corbett had given to Lord Fisher ("in the early autumn of 1914") an academic paper in favor of Lord Fisher's project, and this paper Lord Fisher has printed, in Volume II, "Memories and Records," pages 208-212.

torian: "The resistance of the Germans was proving very strong, and it was only too clear that the sanguine expectation that they were becoming exhausted by the gigantic efforts they had made must be abandoned. . . . The military authorities at home had therefore come to the conclusion that there was nothing to be done in the main theatre for some time to come except stand on the defensive."

"By all experience, therefore, it was the moment to press a minor offensive within the capacity of our surplus force at some other point vital to the enemy." Yet Sir Julian Corbett has gone on to describe the deterrent viewpoint of the British military leaders, which had persisted to a surprising degree, even after the real uses and objects of German forces had been developed: "But in the opinion of the military authorities there was little or no surplus force. Our losses in the recent fighting had been very heavy, and, moreover, it was not only of the security of our line in France they were thinking, but also of the security of our own shores. The spectre of invasion had again arisen, as it always had done when our arms were unsuccessful abroad, and the elaborate efforts to allay it, to which so much thought had been devoted before the war, proved of no effect. . . . So deep, indeed, was the apprehension in military circles, that they began to express discontent with the naval dispositions in the North Sea, and to press the Admiralty to take further precautions."

This clearly described the continued ill effects of the persistent invasion idea upon British naval strategy. That it thus persisted showed the deeply grained prejudice of a prewar impression. All the developments of the war were against the possibility of a landing

in force on the British coasts. The lessons of the actual raids upon the eastern coast were all against this idea.¹ Against it also were all the new changes of weapons and tactics in naval warfare. In fact, the new uses of submarines and mines, in which the Germans were the demonstrators, had really increased the dangers that would threaten German transports, at any attempt to land an invading army in Great Britain. The very lessons of the newly begun U-boat campaign were against it.

These things are stated to show that there was knowledge, actually available at the time, that should have been sufficient to enable the Admiralty to allay for good and all this needless anxiety on the part of the military authorities. But, on the contrary, some of the naval leaders shared this groundless apprehension, and it must be considered as a case of both military and naval leaders not availing themselves of all the knowledge at hand at the time, but clinging to a preconceived idea which was already out of date.

It is a strange fact that the disturbance caused by the U-boat campaign, instead of pointing to an additional defense against German transports, was held to be an argument for increased naval precautions against invasion.

The British Admiralty's historian has left no doubt of this last: "On the other hand, it was felt in certain naval quarters that owing to recent developments the old confidence of the sea service in its ability to intercept any formidable raiding force could scarcely be

¹ See "Offensive Operations 1914-1915."

"The German raids on the East Coast, properly understood, showed invasion to be an impossibility." — Lord Sydenham.

maintained in full integrity. It could not be disguised that the scouting movements of cruisers were now to some extent restricted by the menace of submarines, and contact with an enemy's force was therefore more difficult to obtain. It appears to have been mainly for this reason that it was considered necessary to maintain the large reserve of troops which, instead of being reckoned as a disposable surplus, were concentrated about Cambridge as the Central force of the Home Defence army."

Even with every due allowance for the trend of mind of the times, the description of these dispositions, in itself, is enough to show a strategic misconception out of all proportion to the existing situation, and it must be evident to the reader that this was a constant deterrent factor against British harassing naval offensives in the waters about Germany. As will be seen from the above, the effect was to use the British submarine and auxiliary naval forces in defensive and protective measures against the harassing German tactics, instead of giving Germany in turn an experience of the same tactics. Especially, it must be kept in mind, that there was no serious attempt to disturb German control of the Baltic, which had been dreaded in Germany.

This defensive rôle of the Grand Fleet and its auxiliaries, to give protection against invasion, remained an influence that diverted British naval forces in 1915. Early in February, 1915, there had been a change in the command of the German Battle Fleet, which had been given to Admiral Pohl, the former Chief of the Naval Staff, who had been instrumental in bringing on the German U-boat campaign. It had been assumed in Great Britain that this change would bring about a

“revival of activity in the High Seas Fleet.”¹ But, although Admiral Scheer has claimed greater activity for the German Battle Fleet, he has also made it clear that the Germans limited their advances to areas near their own waters. The defensive dispositions which had thus been imposed upon the British Fleet, as described, had a similar effect in restricting the advances of the British naval forces. In the words of Admiral Scheer, “The enemy thus left to us that area of the sea in which our movements took place, and we observed a similar method of procedure with regard to him, so that a meeting between the two fleets seemed very improbable.” Much less, of course, was there any probability of collecting German transports and taking them across for a landing of German troops on the British coast.

The needlessness of the alarm has been shown by the following description, from Admiral Scheer, of the real situation, at this stage, when British naval forces were so much occupied in guarding against invasion: “During the months of February and March, therefore, only two advances were made, while in the more favorable period of April and May there were four. But in none of these enterprises was there any encounter with the enemy. They were carried out in a westerly and north-westerly direction from Heligoland at a distance of about 100 to 120 nautical miles, thus presenting a considerably wider area for our airships, but they failed to locate the enemy.”

The German airships must be considered as auxiliaries of the German Fleet in the strategy of the World War.

¹ “As the spring advanced these indications became so strong that we were forced to infer that the change in the German command meant the inauguration of a new policy at sea.” — Sir Julian Corbett.

Admiral Scheer has explained this: "Their main task was scouting. That is why they were retained by the Navy; the Army had no use for them." In the course of the war 61 Zeppelins were assigned to the German Fleet. Consequently, the airship raids against England must be regarded as adjuncts of the German naval strategy, and they were so regarded by Admiral Scheer. The Germans undoubtedly believed that their aircraft bombardments of Great Britain would do a great deal of military damage. But it should be stated at once that these German aircraft did not accomplish any result that could have an effect, physical or moral, sufficient to sway the course of the World War.

At this stage, in 1915, the bombardments from the air were all by means of the Zeppelin dirigible airships. These huge gas-inflated bags were thought of high military value by the Germans at the beginning of the war, and a great deal of effort and expense had been devoted to them, in the belief that they would be effective means of bombardment. Attacks were made upon Paris and other cities, but it was evident that the obvious objective for such attacks was England. The short flight over the Channel was most free from interference in approach and retreat. But, even with this advantage, and before there was an organized defense against them, the airships were unable to locate targets of military value. Their efforts only attained haphazard drifting bombardments, and their raids accomplished nothing beyond useless destruction of civilian lives and private property.¹ No military or administrative damage was done.

¹ In 1915, about 170 were killed and 450 wounded in England by Zeppelin bombs.

The Germans have claimed that the Zeppelin attacks kept large numbers of troops in Great Britain, but, the truth is, these troops were to be kept in Great Britain anyway, to guard against a German invasion, as has been described. Whatever effect the incursions of the Zeppelins may have had in keeping alive this invasion bogey should of course be counted. But it is a fact that the hundreds of thousands of British troops were retained for the Home Defense, to guard against the supposed danger of actual landings of German troops, and the Zeppelins could not make this threat.

In striking the balance, the large expenditures of the British for anti-aircraft defense should also be counted. These included, aside from the men employed, aircraft, guns, and ammunition, all of which were needed in France. But, even with these considerations, it cannot be said that the Zeppelins were having any real effect upon the course of events which is being narrated. As the Germans persevered in these aircraft attacks throughout the period of the war covered by this volume, the reader must realize that these raids were being carried on, but also that these Zeppelin raids can be thus summed up, and dismissed, in any naval history of the World War.

As time went on and anti-aircraft guns were improved, and airplanes used in conjunction with them in defense, the vulnerability of the Zeppelins became a fatal defect, and they were practically abandoned by the Germans in offensive tactics. Airplanes were next used in many bombardments of Great Britain and London, but they also failed to gain military results, and should be included with the Zeppelins as negligible

factors in warfare from the point of view of winning results as means of German offensives for effective bombardments.

But although there was no reality in the invasion scare, yet the effect of the defensive preparations against it became a part of the depressing situation of 1915 in Great Britain. For the British, the revelations of weakness in the spring of 1915 had been a great shock, because there had been an optimistic confidence in Lord Kitchener, and a strong belief that the Allied offensives of 1915 would bring about the utter defeat of Germany. The failures of these offensives were so hopeless that there could be no disguising them. Especially was it a blow to the British people to find that the weakness of the British Army in artillery and munitions had been a grave defect.¹ These revelations brought about a revulsion of feeling and there was a crisis in the British Government, upon the widespread demand for a remedy. On May 19, the Prime Minister announced a new "National Ministry" made up from a coalition of parties.

By this change, Mr. Balfour succeeded Mr. Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty. Lord Kitchener remained at the War Office, but a bill was at once introduced to create a new department, a Ministry of Munitions (June 3, 1915). This was to take over from Lord Kitchener the important matter of control of munitions, and the energetic Lloyd George became the first Minister of Munitions. As has been stated, this was a great stimulus for carrying on the war.

¹ "The Shell Scandal."

CHAPTER VII

ITALY IN THE WAR. U-BOATS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

THE same critical month of May, 1915, saw the entrance of Italy on the side of the Entente Allies. To understand the strategic effect of this addition, it must be realized that Italy declared war against Austria-Hungary alone. This was the result of "the inflexible resolution of Italy to wrest from Austria-Hungary the irredentist regions, which Italy, at heart, has never ceased to claim as her own."¹ This longing for the return of the "unredeemed" Italian provinces, and the innate hostility against Austria-Hungary as the possessor of these provinces, had an influence that all the intrigues of Germany could not counteract.

At the outbreak of war, Italy had notified her Teutonic Allies that the Triple Alliance was defensive only, and had declared neutrality. However, the Italian people insistently demanded that the lost provinces should be wrung from Austria,² and finally all German influences were swept aside. With great outbursts of popular enthusiasm Italy declared war (May 23, 1915).

The Italian Army had been practically mobilized for a long time. It had been carefully prepared for war, and its Commander-in-Chief, General Cadorna, had already planned his campaign. His offensive was to be

¹ "Italy in the War," Thomas Nelson Page.

² The Entente Allies promised Italy all these, with wide acquisitions besides, in the secret treaty, the Pact of London, signed April 26, 1915.

carried out on the lines of the cherished ambitions of the Italian nation. When war was declared, General Cadorna at once undertook active operations to win the Trentino and Trieste. The enthusiasm of the Italian people was very great. The Italian Army was highly organized and had a very high reputation in Europe. Yet, in consequence of this use of this army, the entrance of Italy did not have a proportionate effect upon the military situation.

Italy was not at war with the Germans, nor with the Turks. But this was not the reason. The unfortunate fact was, that the Italians were unable to do enough harm to their own enemies, the Austro-Hungarians. Both of Cadorna's offensives were in difficult mountain country, where the nature of the terrain made operations slow and difficult. As Falkenhayn stated, "The hopes placed in the defensive strength of the mountainous territory on the Austro-Hungarian and Italian frontier were altogether fulfilled."¹ Against these strong defensive positions, the Italians were not even threatening enough to divert Austro-Hungarian troops from the destructive campaign against the Russians. It was a very unusual condition, that the entry of a fresh, powerful nation in the World War was not sufficient to bring help to the bad military situation of 1915, which, on the contrary, went from bad to worse in the ensuing months.

The entry of Italy had an important effect upon the disposition of the naval forces of the Entente Allies in the Mediterranean. Following the aims of Italy in the World War, the Adriatic was to be the area of operations for the Italian Fleet. After the signing of the

¹ "The German General Staff and its Decisions."

secret treaty of the Pact of London (April 26, 1915), which insured the entrance of Italy, a naval agreement was drawn up on May 10, 1915,¹ in which "the Adriatic and its borders, limited on the south by a line running from Cape Colonna to the island of Fano, near Corfu, is fixed as the field of action for the Italian Fleet. . . . Four British battleships and four British cruisers must, in accordance with this new agreement, leave the Dardanelles to go into the Adriatic, and to be replaced by four French battleships and four French armored cruisers. . . ." ²

By these means the Italian Fleet was strengthened into a safe superiority over the Austrian Fleet. The French were relieved of any responsibility for the Adriatic, except to patrol the Ionian Sea. The French battleships of their Mediterranean Fleet were to be assembled at Bizerta or Malta for overhauling, and the French cruisers and flotillas "were to assure as much as possible free navigation of the Mediterranean by seeking out submarines and their means of supply." ³ This last sentence summed up a sudden change for the worse that had taken place in the naval situation in the Mediterranean.

In fact, even though the naval forces of the Entente Allies in this area had just been reinforced by the Italian Fleet, yet in May, the very month of the declaration of war by Italy, the menace of enemy submarines unexpectedly became such an adverse factor

¹ "The new agreements which were drawn up May 10th and confirmed following a conference which took place the 27th of May, between the Duke d'Abruzzi and Admiral de Lapeyrère." — Report of Naval Committee, French Chamber of Deputies.

² Report of Naval Committee, French Chamber of Deputies.

³ Ibid.

that the naval situation in the Mediterranean had grown more unfavorable for the Allies, in spite of this new naval reinforcement. It was another phase of the malign destiny, which controlled the Entente Allies in 1905, that, not only on land but also in the Mediterranean, were the Allies worse off after the entrance of Italy than they had been before. On land, the Russian defeat was a disaster too great to be compensated by the addition of Italy's armies. In the Mediterranean, the dangers of the U-boat overshadowed the addition of Italy's Navy.

It is true that the Italian Fleet at once neutralized the Austro-Hungarian Fleet, so far as the control of the surface of the sea was concerned, and in the long run this was of great value. But in 1915 the Austro-Hungarian Navy was an inactive and negligible factor in the Mediterranean. Suddenly the unexpected offensive development of the enemy submarines brought about a more dramatic change in the Mediterranean than in any other area. As has been stated, the Germans had extended their offensive operations of U-boats to the Mediterranean, and in this theatre their success was at once startling.

On May 25 the British battleship *Triumph* was torpedoed by a submarine off Gallipoli,¹ and on May 27 the battleship *Majestic* met the same fate. The following quotations from Sir Ian Hamilton's "Gallipoli Diary" show the immediate effect upon his campaign: "Bad news confirmed. The Admiral came on board and between us we tried to size up the new situation and to readjust ourselves thereto. Our nicely worked out

¹ The British battleship *Goliath* had been torpedoed May 12, but this was by an adventurous Turkish destroyer.

system for supplying the troops has in a moment been tangled up into a hundred knotty problems. Instead of our small craft working to and fro in half mile runs, henceforth they will have to cover 60 miles per trip. Until now the big ocean going ships have anchored close up to Helles or Anzac; in future Mudros will be the only possible harbour for these priceless floating depots. Imbros, here, lies quite open to submarine attacks, and in a northerly gale becomes a mere roadstead. . . . By one month's close hammering we had made the tough *moral* of the 'Turks more pliant, when lo and behold, in broad daylight, thousands of their common soldiery see with their own eyes two great battleships sink beneath the waves and all the others make an exit more dramatic than dignified. Most of the Armada of store ships had already cleared out and now the last of the battleships has offed it over the offing; a move which the whole of the German Grand Fleet could not have forced them to make."

From this time, the Allied battleships were practically withdrawn from supporting operations. They were safeguarded at Mudros, and only destroyers and minesweepers harassed the 'Turks, until the fleet was reinforced by monitors, which were less vulnerable to torpedo attack. In accordance with this changed naval situation, transports and supply ships were no longer kept near Gallipoli. As many as possible of the large ships were withdrawn, and a service of supply was established between Alexandria and Mudros. From Mudros to Gallipoli the supplies for General Hamilton's forces were moved on barges and small craft, a difficult and dangerous task carried on largely at night.

All of this was a great change for the worse in the

situation of Sir Ian Hamilton's army. The British Commander-in-Chief had not been able to improve materially the positions of his separated forces on the Gallipoli Peninsula. There was no prospect of uniting these two parts of his command, and on May 31 his losses of British troops alone had already mounted to over 38,000. This gloomy situation was best described by the British General's telegram of June 8: "Without additional troops sufficient to provide for reliefs, as well as reinforcements, the men are undoubtedly getting worn out, and this will end in reducing our forces at Cape Helles to position of defenders in state of close siege, as is practically the case at Australian and New Zealand Army Corps already."

In the other areas of the Mediterranean, there was also no question of the fact that the naval control of the Entente Allies was impaired in May, 1915, in spite of the entrance of Italy. It was true that the French Fleet "had just been relieved by the Convention of May 10, 1915, from the surveillance of the interior sea, henceforth reserved for the Italian Fleet under the orders of the Duke d'Abruzzi, reinforced by the four British battleships and six French destroyers and six submarines."¹ Yet, even in the Adriatic, although the Austro-Hungarian Fleet was at once dominated by the strengthened Italian Fleet, the new factor in naval warfare asserted itself until, in the words of Thomas Nelson Page, "So effective, indeed, was the menace of the submarines in the Adriatic that it eventually controlled the method of warfare in that sea on both sides."

As to the main areas of the Mediterranean, the increased difficulties for the French Fleet have been thus

¹ Report of Naval Committee, French Chamber of Deputies.

described by the French naval report: "By contrast they have left him [the French Commander-in-Chief] all the responsibility of the lines of communication in the rear. He is no longer anything more than a sort of Commander of the Service of Supply, but under the most unfavorable conditions. . . . Until the spring of 1915 we had to face in this region only the Austrian submarines,¹ whose rôle was limited to the confines of the Adriatic, but beginning with the month of May, the German flotillas became each day more audacious in showing themselves there, and it will be seen that their operations rapidly increased."

¹ The French armored cruiser *Léon Gambetta* had been sunk April 27, 1915.

CHAPTER VIII

GERMANY FORCED TO ABANDON THE U-BOAT CAMPAIGN

IN contrast with the military results secured through the development of offensive submarine operations in the Mediterranean, the German U-boat campaign in the waters around Great Britain had not helped the cause of the Central Powers. In these waters, as has been described, the Germans had placed themselves in the position of attempting a widespread destruction, which they could not accomplish because they did not possess a sufficient number of U-boats capable of being used for the offensive. On the other hand, the Germans had also placed themselves in the position of having outraged the rights of neutrals to so great an extent that there was a revulsion against Germany, strong enough to force a change of policy at the time when the Germans were developing a more effective use of the U-boats.

In other words, the *Lusitania* case at once began to exert a repressing effect upon the German Government. This was not at first apparent to the outside world. It will be remembered that the first impression of the exchange of notes between the United States and Germany gave an appearance of successful equivocation on the part of the German Government — but this was not the true state of the case.

The United States had at once (May 13, 1915) sent the "American note protesting against the submarine

policy culminating in the sinking of the *Lusitania*; expecting Germany to disavow such acts and declaring the United States will not be expected to 'omit any word or act' necessary to maintain the rights of its citizens."¹ The German Government gave an evasive answer (May 28). The exchanges comprised a second note (June 9, 1915), with a reply from Germany, and a third note (July 21, 1915), which declared the last answer of the German Government "very unsatisfactory."

But the prevailing idea that this was a long drawn out ineffective correspondence on the part of the United States was far from being the truth. In reality, the fact was that these protests of the United States had actually dominated the German Government to the extent of forcing an abandonment of the German U-boat campaign as originally planned. There is no doubt of this, after reading the angry revelations of the disappointed Tirpitz.

"On May 15th we received the first American *Lusitania* Note, which demanded an expression of our disapproval of the torpedoing, and an indemnity. Weeks of discussion between the various departments of the Government followed. On May 31st there was a general meeting at Pless, to discuss the question, the Emperor presiding. Admiral von Müller informed Admiral Baehmann and myself immediately after he arrived that the Chancellor refused to be responsible for the campaign in its existing form. Von Treutler and General von Falkenhayn were of the same opinion as the Chancellor. The Chief of the Naval Staff and myself on the contrary maintained the view that it was technically impossible to

¹ "The United States at War," Library of Congress.

comply with the Chancellor's demand that the campaign should be so conducted as to avoid any political conflict, and that His Majesty would accordingly have to decide whether it was to be carried on or not. The Emperor agreed with our point of view and said that if the Chancellor would not accept the responsibility for the entire abandonment of the campaign, the existing order must stand. The result of the discussion was accordingly the issue of an order to the submarine commanders containing renewed and comprehensive instructions as to sparing neutral vessels (which had already been the subject of an earlier order), leaving untouched on the other hand the instructions for the sinking of all English vessels without exception."

"However, soon after, on June 2nd, the Chancellor wrote requesting the Chief of the Naval Staff to have large enemy passenger vessels spared. There had been no suggestion of this in the discussion of May 31st. Admiral Bachmann put forward his objections, but the Chancellor rejected them. Von Bethmann therefore, without our concurrence, appealed to the Emperor for a new decision as to what after all was the technical conduct of the campaign. On June 5th, in accordance with this appeal, a new order of the Emperor was given out that passenger vessels, even enemy vessels, were not to be sunk. No attention was paid to a telegram shortly setting out our objections, which the Chief of Staff and myself at the last moment despatched to the Emperor."

"The Chancellor had not the strength of mind to decide on the complete abandonment of the campaign, as he wanted to keep up the appearance of maintaining it, in order to save his face before public opinion at

home. In practice, however, after this order, it was impossible to attack larger vessels, as it was in virtually every case impossible for the submarine commanders to distinguish between passenger and cargo vessels. Both Admiral Bachmann and myself tendered our resignations on account of the course adopted by the Chancellor, but they were refused, in my case in a most ungracious manner."

These bald statements of Admiral Tirpitz are in line with the other revelations of the German leaders, written in the first disappointment of their stunning defeat. These open recriminations of the German leaders have drawn aside the veil from events that were going on behind the scenes, to a degree that is probably unique in history — and the Germans will never be able to expunge these records. From the above, it is evident that the first impatient judgment of the American *Lusitania* notes was all wrong, that, in fact, these protests upset the whole naval strategy of the Germans. Nothing could describe this disturbance of the naval plans of the German Government more forcibly than Tirpitz's statement, "We continued the campaign in a form in which it could not live and at the same time could not die."

But the *coup de grâce* was given by the additional intense resentment caused in the United States by the torpedoing of the White Star liner *Arabic* (August 19, 1915, sixteen victims, two of whom were Americans). In the crisis which followed, in the discussions of the German Government, the Chancellor "described the position as very grave, basing himself on a report from our Naval Attaché at Washington and a statement of Ambassador Gerard. He, the Chancellor, could not

stay forever on the top of a volcano.”¹ Admiral Scheer has thus described the additional effect of the sinking of the *Arabic*, after the U-boat campaign had been already “further hampered by an order not to sink any big passenger steamers, not even those of the enemy”:

“On August 19, 1915, a further incident occurred when the steamer *Arabic* was sunk by U-24; although the boat acted in justifiable self-defence against a threatened attack by the steamer, yet the prohibition with regard to passenger boats was made more stringent, for the order was given that not only large liners, but *all* passenger steamers must be warned and the passengers rescued before the ship was sunk. On this occasion too, when the answer to the objections raised by America were discussed, the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Bachmann, was not allowed to express his views. Consequently he tendered his resignation to His Majesty, which was duly accepted. Admiral von Holtzendorff was appointed in his place.”

“In consideration of the small chances of success, the U-boat campaign off the west coast of the British Isles was abandoned. The Chief of the Fleet, Admiral von Pohl, also asked to be released from his office if this last order concerning the passenger ships were insisted on, because he could not take the responsibility of issuing such instructions, which could only be carried out at great risk to the U-boats, in view of the fact that so many losses had occurred since the first limiting order had been published; further, he held it to be impossible to give up the U-boat campaign, which was the only effective weapon against England that the Navy possessed. His objections to the limitation of the U-

¹ “My Memoirs,” Admiral Tirpitz.

boat campaign were dismissed by the remark that he lacked full knowledge of the political situation."

Admiral Tirpitz had also tried to resign after being thus overruled by the Chancellor, and the following rebuke, in a Cabinet order from the German Emperor, showed how complete was the overturn in Germany: "On the other hand, we have in this and in many previous instances gained the conviction that co-operation between yourself and the Chancellor is impossible in naval questions touching on the domain of foreign politics, and this includes almost every question relating to the conduct of the war at sea. We refuse, however, most decidedly to release you from your position as Secretary of State for Naval Affairs."

In accordance, Admiral Tirpitz's memorandum of September 18, 1915, stated: "General position necessitates that for the next few weeks all risks should be avoided of breaches of regulation laid down for campaign. Order accordingly to suspend all submarine activities of any sort on west coast and in Channel, and to carry on in North Sea only in accordance with Prize Order. Practically complete cessation of all employment of submarines."¹

¹ "October 5. German Government regrets and disavows sinking of *Arabic* and is prepared to pay indemnities; orders issued to German submarine commanders are so stringent that a similar incident is out of the question." — "The United States at War," Library of Congress.

CHAPTER IX

MILITARY REVERSES OF 1915

THE enforced abandonment of the German Government's U-boat campaign, at the demand of the United States, was almost the only event of 1915 favorable for the Entente Allies. In the meantime, their military situation had grown worse in all areas. This unfavorable situation was an object lesson of the superiority in war of one group of allies, which had been unified by means of a strong central military control, over another group of allies with no coördination of control or of military efforts.

After the failure of the German régime of 1914, and its self-absorbed German military plan, the new régime in the German General Staff had made a vital part of its new strategy of 1915 the consolidation of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies under the control of the German General Staff. From this time on, the armies of the Central Powers were united under one command, and this multiplied their efficiency. The German Staff had even extended this control to the Turks.

Although, at the outset, Turkey had been separated from the Central Powers, in a military sense, yet the Germans had been able to take command of the Turkish forces. In the preceding volume of this work an account has been given of the extraordinary influence exerted upon Turkey by Admiral Souchon's German warships, which had been able to get into Constantinople.¹ In

¹ "The tragedy which had had its origin in what seemed at the time so small a thing." — Sir Julian Corbett.

the present volume, it has also been explained that the Turkish military forces had been organized under German command for the Dardanelles defense, as a result of the time given by the ill conceived and procrastinating conduct of that British campaign.

On the other hand, the Entente Allies had never progressed even to a semblance of united control. It has been shown that they had no practical plan for disputing the German naval supremacy in the Baltic, and their failure at the Dardanelles has been narrated. Consequently, Russia remained cut off from her allies, and throughout 1915 the poorly equipped Russian armies were fighting a hopeless losing battle against the well prepared Austro-German forces. For all practical purposes this was a separate war, which was destroying beyond repair the Russian resources in men and material.

Italy actually was fighting her own separate war ("nostra guerra") against Austria-Hungary. And it is a true description to state that, from a strategic point of view, the Western Front was also another separate war. More than this, the battle line in France was divided between two separate commands. It was not until the emergency of 1918 that Great Britain and France could agree upon the most necessary measure of a single command. In 1915, not only were the British and French at this great disadvantage, but their armies were at a standstill, on account of their inadequate preparations for an offensive. It was not until September, 1915, that the British and French were ready for any attempt to renew their offensive. In the intervening months, they were unable to do anything that could attempt to divert German troops from the hard pressed

Russians. By that time it was too late, as the Russian defeat had become a disaster.

It is hard to conceive of a more hopeless disjointed strategy than that of the Entente Allies in 1915, and, as has been shown, this unfortunate military situation of disconnected efforts was reflected in the naval situation.

The Russians had lost all of Galicia, and in July the Austro-Germans had made the great double attack, from the north and the south, which won all the Poland salient (Warsaw evacuated August 5, 1915). This Austro-German drive pushed remorselessly on, until, in September, the Russians were driven beyond Vilna and Pinsk. This was the most destructive campaign in history, as the Russian battle losses had been greater than the number of Allied troops engaged at the Battle of the Marne. The Russian losses in guns and material had also been correspondingly large. The most significant confession of total defeat was the downfall of the Grand Duke Nicholas. The Russian Commander-in-Chief, who had been regarded as an invincible military dictator, was sent to command the Russian campaign in the Caucasus, which was an echo of 1877, and a thing apart from the rest of the war.

In coördination with the main attacks of the Austro-German drive, German forces had overrun Courland. Libau and Windaw had been taken, and the Germans had won the Baltic coast almost to Riga. This had, of course, simplified the naval situation in the Baltic for the Germans. Admiral Scheer has stated this: "So far as the Fleet was concerned, the general situation of the war had altered very much to our advantage through

the successes achieved by the Army on the Eastern Front. For the Fleet the only object in the war lay now in fighting English power at sea, for there was no longer any question of a Russian landing on our Baltic coast. The situation, indeed, had veered round directly opposite, and the question was whether we should threaten the Russians with a landing."

Admiral Scheer has also described the measures taken to prepare German naval forces to move into the western Baltic, in case Great Britain should "attempt an entry into the Baltic in order to assist her Allies." But, as has been explained, nothing of the kind was contemplated by the British,¹ and there was no attempt to challenge the German naval control of the Baltic. As to Riga, there were extensive Russian minefields in the Gulf, and German naval operations against this Russian port must necessarily be in combination with the German Army. Preparations were made to give naval support, in case joint operations were called for, but nothing was undertaken by the Germans against Riga at that time, as "the Army had no troops available to support the entrance of the Fleet into the Gulf of Riga, and no importance was attached then to the possession of the town."²

In fact, the total of harm had been done to the Russians. To plough further into the vast expanse of the Russian Empire would have been a strategic error. After the Russian armies had been harried from Galicia and Poland, and driven to the Dvina in the north and

¹ "But the English had no intentions of altering their line of action; they continued to rely on the effectiveness of their barriers." — "Germany's High Sea Fleet," Admiral Scheer.

² "On account of the enormous area of that Empire, the cutting off of imports by sea could not inflict any mortal injury." — *Ibid.*

into Volhynia on the south, the best results for the Central Powers were to be won in the southeast, and the direct consequences of the Russian disaster were the entrance of Bulgaria and the overwhelming of Serbia.

CHAPTER X

BULGARIA IN THE WAR. SERBIA OVERWHELMED

AS a result of the military failures of the Entente Allies, which have been described, by the month of September, 1915, there was great tension in the Balkans, where Bulgaria was watching the course of events before deciding which side to take in the World War. The unbroken series of defeats for the Russians, and the evident ability of the Turks to defend Constantinople, had done great harm to the prestige of the Entente Allies throughout the East.

The influence of the Central Powers had been correspondingly increased, and it had become an easy task for the German representatives to induce Bulgaria to cast her lot with Germany at this time of victory. After the taking of Warsaw, the way was paved for an understanding between Germany and Bulgaria.¹ Not only was an alliance made between the Central Powers and Germany, but military plans were also perfected in advance, by which Serbia was to be assailed by combined operations of Austro-German and Bulgarian armies.

In the third week of September the Bulgarian mobilization took place. Greece had also mobilized, and it was at the instance of the pro-Ally Greek Premier, M. Venizelos, that, on September 24, Lord Kitchener was directed to bring before the Dardanelles Committee

¹ "The taking of Warsaw had made a particularly strong impression on her." — Ludendorff.

“the possibility of sending a British or Allied force to Salonica or farther in order to support Greece, if Greece should go to the assistance of Serbia in resisting an attack by the Austro-Germans and possibly Bulgarians.”

As early as July 22, 1915, General Sarrail had been recalled from the command of the Third Army to Paris, and the scheme of an “Army of the East” under his command had begun to take form. It had first developed into the idea of sending a French force to the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles, but at a conference at Calais of M. Millerand, Lord Kitchener, General Joffre, General French, and General Sarrail, it was decided that this organization must be postponed to await the result of the approaching French and British offensive in France. “This offensive began on September 25th, and in the meantime the Bulgarians had mobilized, and evidently an attack on Serbia was probable. Another element was thus introduced into the problem, namely, the consideration whether an Allied force should be sent to Salonica or elsewhere to help the Serbians.”¹

So threatening was the new danger in the southeast that the mission of the Army of the East was changed, and with this force included, the British and French Governments agreed to send to Salonica a joint army of 150,000 men.

For this Anglo-French force the name was retained of the Army of the East, and it was under the command of General Sarrail, as originally planned. The first troops of this army began to land at Salonica on October 5, and on October 7 only two divisions had been disembarked, one French and one British.

¹ Report, Dardanelles Commission.

Greece had changed to coolness toward the Entente Allies, and made a formal protest against their use of the port of Salonica. This protest was disregarded by the Entente Allies. On October 5 the Venizelos ministry had resigned, and Greece had adopted a policy of neutrality, still keeping the Greek Army mobilized against aggression. This changed attitude of Greece was not only caused by the German affiliations of King Constantine, but by the victorious and threatening position of Germany and her allies, on all fields. On the Western Front the much anticipated September offensive of the British and French armies had broken down with great losses, and again had failed to press the German defense hard enough to draw troops away from the threatening concentration in the southeast. Consequently, against the carefully planned joint operation of the Austro-Germans and Bulgarians, the case of Serbia was hopeless, as the campaign of invasion was under way before General Sarrail's Army could be gathered in strength sufficient for an attack in force.

General Mackensen, in command of the Austro-German army, had crossed the Danube and captured Belgrade on October 9. This force advanced to the south into Serbia, and there was also an invasion by Bulgarians from the east. (Bulgaria declared war against Serbia October 14, 1915.) Against this overpowering combination the Serbians could make no successful stand, and the whole country was quickly overrun. General Sarrail's Army, as it gathered strength, was only able to make a perfunctory advance against the Bulgarian left. There was no possibility of joining the Serbians, or even of diverting troops from the invading enemy forces. By the first week in De-

ember this Allied army also was under pressure from superior numbers, and General Sarrail was obliged to fall back upon Salonica.

The Allies had decided that Salonica should not be given up. After some friction with Greece, the Salonica zone was handed over to the Entente Allies. A wide area was intrenched, and from December, 1915, Salonica became a great fortified camp for the Allies, garrisoned by General Sarrail's Army and supplied by sea. Although Salonica was a refuge for large numbers of the defeated Serbians, there was much disappointment at the failure of General Sarrail's Army to help them in the field, and there is no denying that here, as on other occasions, the measures of the Allies had been taken far too late to accomplish the intended object. But it must be realized that, in the case of the Salonica force, there were good results, both immediate and ulterior, which amply justified this use of the Anglo-French force.

Placing this army at Salonica was most necessary when the fortunes of the Allies were at such a low ebb. Without this support, the situation of Greece would have been very critical. She would have been exposed to coercion and German influences. But, with the army at Salonica growing stronger, she was let alone by Austro-Germans and Bulgarians.

And, throughout the war, the presence of General Sarrail's force at Salonica continued to be a helpful factor for the Entente Allies. There was a great deal of unfavorable criticism of this policy, especially on account of the enforced idleness of the Salonica army for most of the time. It was true that there were very limited chances for the Anglo-French army to engage

in offensive operations. The Austro-Germans and Bulgarians were too strong in this region. But, outside of the guardianship of Greece, this army was always a threat, and its presence always meant that the Entente Allies had a strong hold upon the region of the Balkans. There were many instances in the World War where the armies of the Allies were unwisely used, but maintaining the Anglo-French army at Salonica was not one of these.

From this time, throughout the rest of the war, the service of supply of Salonica became another great and constant task for the naval forces and shipping of the Allies. Of course the establishment of this service was simplified by the fact that the Allies were withdrawing from the Dardanelles at the time they were constructing the intrenched camp at Salonica. As the French report expressed it, "The fleet of the Dardanelles was divided into two parts; that of the Dardanelles, properly called, had only to take care of the winding up of the undertaking; and that of Salonica was about to assume the new task which the Governments of the Allies had devised to rescue the Serbian Army and create a base of operations on the flank of the Balkan states."

On the other hand, the service of supply for Salonica had to contend with the increased activity and effectiveness of the enemy submarines. In regard to this the French Report is also unmistakable: "Nevertheless the number of accidents which happened after the beginning of September were all the more disquieting on account of the Salonica Expedition, which had just been decided upon, obliging us to operate a considerable number of transports from France and Egypt, giving more anxiety to the Navy Department as they were

realizing at last that the protection of these had become quite uncertain. . . . In October the blows redoubled." After the loss of the French transport *Admiral Hamelin*, on October 7, returning from Salonica, the Department had sent an anxious dispatch to the French Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean urging measures to insure better protection against the U-boat. Just before this, after strong complaints of the means at hand to cope with the submarine menace, Admiral Lampeyrère had resigned his command on account of ill health, and Admiral de Fournet had been made Commander-in-Chief of the French Fleet.

From this time the U-boats became a factor that always had to be reckoned with in Mediterranean waters, and it should be said that this area remained one of their most successful spheres of operation. They were not successful in stopping the transportation of men and the service of supply over these waterways, but they were able to harass these movements of Allied shipping, and to cause great losses. The constant effort of guarding against their inroads was a continual drain upon the naval resources of the Entente Allies.

As has been said, coping with the submarines had also become the principal task of the Italian Navy in its separate zone of operations, the Adriatic. The Austrian Fleet had remained passive, but the activities of the U-boats had increased. At the Serbian crisis, after Montenegro had also been overrun, and a great part of the Serbian Army with large numbers of civilian refugees had taken refuge in Albania, Italian shipping and naval forces rendered important service. Italian troops were taken to Durazzo, with food and supplies provided by the British and French in Italian ships.

The Serbians were thus given refuge on the west, as at Salonica on the east. Large numbers of the Serbian civilian refugees were transported to Italy.

This Italian occupation of Albania eventually assumed the proportions of an Italian army of over 200,000, and of course this was another element in the forces of the Entente Allies which must be maintained by Sea Power. Although this occupation aroused the jealousy of Greece, it added a factor of strength for the Entente Allies in the southeast, which counted in the final score. The same was true, in a much larger sense, of the Salonica army, the Army of the East under General Sarrail, and the maintenance of this force as a constant threat, with a decisive thrust in the final campaigns, must be considered one of the achievements of Sea Power for the Entente Allies. Throughout the rest of the war this service of supply was constantly maintained in the Mediterranean area, and, although its importance was often lost sight of in other events, yet this importance was proved in the result, and it must be given a prominent place in the naval history of the World War.

CHAPTER XI

DEFEAT AT THE DARDANELLES

(See Map at page 110)

WHILE the year of 1915 was thus running its course to the end, with an unbroken succession of military failures and defeats for the Entente Allies in all other areas, the hopeless tragedy of the Dardanelles was limping to its last acts of final failure. From the first impasse of the situation, after the landing, throughout the rest of the year, there was nothing that gave prospects of success. The Turks had been able to keep the British from making gains of any value, after Sir Ian Hamilton's army, fixed in its separated positions on the fringes of the Gallipoli Peninsula, had become involved in trench warfare.

At this period of the World War, the generals of the Entente Allies were baffled by trench warfare, which was a new problem for them, and they had allowed it to become "stabilized." This term was gravely in vogue, as if it must be a necessary condition of the tactics of the Allies, ignoring the best use of intrenching tactics developed in the Civil War,¹ and it thus remained, a restriction on the military operations of the Entente Allies, until all such ideas were overthrown by the German tactics of 1918.

But, in 1915, the perplexed British Commander-in-Chief at the Dardanelles was having the same experience

¹ See "Guide to the Military History of the World War," analysis of American tactics in the World War.

that was defeating the Allied commanders on the Western Front. Sir Ian Hamilton found that the trenches were inexorably consuming his forces, as fast as they were poured into them — and with no compensating advances toward gaining control of the ridge of the Peninsula. His battle losses in desultory attacks grew beyond all expectation, and there was also a constant heavy toll of sickness.

Consequently, June and July were months of continued uncompensated losses for the British Army. In August an attempt was made to turn the tide, and an account of this, and also of the ensuing course of events at the Dardanelles, should be given in this work. Although, in the faulty conception and execution of the whole Dardanelles project, the necessary coöperation of Army and Navy was lost, yet the Dardanelles Campaign, in all its aspects, must be considered essentially a part of the naval history of the World War.

In August, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton had been given a reinforcement of five divisions for the Dardanelles, and the British Commander-in-Chief decided to use these additional forces in accordance with the following plan, as described in his dispatch: "Reinforcement of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (the Anzac position), combined with a landing at Suvla Bay. Then with one strong push to capture Hill 305, and working from that dominating point, to grip the waist of the Peninsula." This plan, as carried out, comprised "three attacks, one at Helles, one at Anzac, and one at Suvla. These attacks were made by three distinct forces not in direct communication with one another."¹ The Report of the Dardanelles Commission stated that this

¹ Report, Dardanelles Commission.

plan of attack "was open to criticism. The country over which the attack had to be made was very difficult, especially at Anzac. In order to obtain if possible the element of surprise, the main advance of the Anzac force up the north-western spurs of Sari Bahr was undertaken at night, the risk of misdirection and failure being much increased thereby."

These operations began on August 6. The Helles attack encountered unexpectedly strong Turkish forces, and gained no success except to hold Turkish troops in battle. The British reinforcing troops were landed at Anzac without any trouble from the Turks. Neither was there any serious opposition to the landing at Suvla Bay. The attacks from Anzac and Suvla were to be in coördination, and "certain times were specified at which important points were to be occupied."¹ But these combinations were not successfully carried out. The advance from Anzac was not supported by a corresponding push from Suvla Bay,² where there was much confusion and delay, with a serious breakdown in supplying water to the troops.

The British attempted for several days to organize an advance, but the result was a failure; as after the landing in April, with exhausted troops scattered through difficult country and subjected to constant Turkish counter attacks. The Dardanelles Report has summed up the result by stating that Sir Ian Hamilton, although "confident of success" was again baffled by

¹ Report, Dardanelles Commission.

² "No progress of any importance had been made from Suvla, and there was nothing in the operations in that area to divert the Turkish reinforcements from Sari Bahr. Thus the counter attacks in that direction, which finally drove the British troops from the ridge, could be made in full strength." — Ibid.

the obstinacy of the Turkish resistance. Moreover, "the failure of night advances in a difficult and unexplored country, which formed part of the plan, led to heavy casualties¹ and temporary disorganization of the forces employed."²

Outside of any question of resistance by the Turks, the naval equipment for this landing of August had been greatly improved over that of April. A flotilla of motor lighters had been constructed, which were known as "Beetles." "They moved five knots an hour under their own engines, and carried 500 men, as well as stores of ammunition and water."³ This was a marked advance over the earlier landing. The monitors, which were by this time a part of the naval force, gave valuable support at times in shelling the Turks, and of course possessed the advantage of having specially devised protection, which made them less vulnerable to torpedoes and mines than were the battleships. But it should again be stated, as in the case of the battleships, that the fire of their naval guns could not dislodge the enemy from their intrenched positions and insure an advance of the military forces, even on the narrow Gallipoli Peninsula.

In considering the joint operation of the Army and Navy in the landing of August, 1915, it is apparent that one great cause of failure was the lack of a supply of water. The Dardanelles Report has stated, "The supply of sea-borne water was, however, specifically undertaken by General Headquarters in concert with

¹ Sir Ian Hamilton stated in his dispatch, "The 13th Division of the New Army, under Major General Shaw, had alone lost 6,000 out of a grand total of 10,500."

² Report, Dardanelles Commission.

³ Sir Ian Hamilton's Dispatch.

the Navy, and it rested with them to place the lighters in positions from which water could be delivered on to the beaches and to land the pack mules and filled water bags as required by the Officer commanding the IXth Corps." General Hamilton wrote in his dispatch: "As it turned out, and judging merely by results, I regret to state that the measures actually taken in regard to the distribution proved to be inadequate, and that suffering and disorganization ensued." Even more significant is the following from Sir Ian Hamilton's same dispatch: "At times I had thought of throwing my reserves into this stubborn central battle, where probably they would have turned the scale. But each time the water troubles made me give up the idea, all ranks at Anzac being reduced to one pint a day. . . . It will be understood, then, that until wells had been discovered under the freshly won hills, the reinforcing of Anzac by even so much as a brigade was unthinkable."

Again, after this landing of August, Sir Ian Hamilton was left with his army divided, and holding positions from which the British were unable to make a successful advance. There were costly attempts at different points in that month. But, after a series of actions ending August 29, the British Commander-in-Chief wrote in his dispatch: "My narrative of battle incidents must end here. From this date onwards up to the date of my departure on October 17th the flow of munitions and drafts dried up. Sickness, the legacy of a desperately trying summer, took heavy toll of the survivors of so many arduous conflicts. No longer was there any question of operations on the grand scale, but with such troops it was difficult to be down-hearted." General Hamilton wrote in a message to Lord Kitchener at this

time: "The total casualties including sick since 6th August amount to 40,000, and my total strength is now only 85,000, of which the fighting strength is 68,000. The French fighting strength is about 15,000. Sick casualties are becoming abnormal, chiefly owing to troops other than late arrivals being worn out with hardships and incessant shell fire, from which even when in reserve they are never free."

Affairs at the Dardanelles were in this hopeless condition when, on September 3, 1915, Lord Kitchener announced to the Dardanelles Committee "that the French Government had decided to send four Divisions against Turkey to the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles and wished their two Divisions on the European side to be replaced by British troops. Lord Kitchener said that he proposed to instruct Sir John French to send two Divisions from France for that purpose. The enterprise, if carried out by the French, might have materially assisted the operations in the Dardanelles, and in any case was inconsistent with the abandonment of the Gallipoli Peninsula."¹

This was the original idea of the mission of General Sarrail's Army of the East, as has been described, but, as has also been described, the crisis of the entrance of Bulgaria on the side of the Central Powers, and the assault on Serbia, diverted this force from the Dardanelles to Salonica, "and eventually the British Government was committed to sending a large force to co-operate with the French in that theatre. The possibility of having to send this force again raised the question of the evacuation of Gallipoli."² On Sep-

¹ Report, Dardanelles Commission.

² *Ibid.*

tember 26 Sir Ian Hamilton received a dispatch from Lord Kitchener, in which was the following: "Both France and ourselves have promised to send between us the troops asked for, viz., 150,000 men, and urgency is essential. It is evident that under these circumstances some troops will have to be taken from the Dardanelles to go to Salonica, but it must be clearly understood that there is no intention of withdrawing from the Peninsula or of giving up the Dardanelles operations until the Turks are defeated."

But, in this dispatch, Lord Kitchener discussed the possibility of withdrawing from the Suvla Bay positions and concentrating the British forces on a shorter line. This was the beginning of the end. "On October 14th the Government decided to recall Sir Ian Hamilton, and on October 20th General Sir Charles Monro was ordered to take over the command of the forces in the Mediterranean, and received written instructions to report 'fully and frankly' on the military position."¹

General Monro found the situation very unfavorable,² and on October 31 telegraphed to Lord Kitchener explaining that the Turkish flanks could not be attacked, and stating the difficulties of frontal attack, saying that "Naval guns could only assist to a partial degree." His conclusion was: "On purely military grounds, therefore, in consequence of the grave daily wastage of officers and men which occurs, and owing to the lack of prospect of being able to draw the Turks

¹ Report, Dardanelles Commission.

² "We merely hold the fringe of the shore, and are confronted by the Turks in very formidable entrenchments, with all the advantages of position and power of observation of our movements." — General Monro to Lord Kitchener, October 31, 1915.

from their entrenched positions, I recommend the evacuation of the Peninsula."

The effect of this telegram was notable: "Sir Charles Monro's opinion in favor of an evacuation made it necessary for the authorities at home to come to a decision of great gravity. On October 7th the War Committee had replaced the Dardanelles Committee, and on November 3rd both the War Committee and the Cabinet invited Lord Kitchener to go out to the Mediterranean in order to assist them in arriving at a final decision."¹

Lord Kitchener left on this mission, firmly opposed to the idea of giving up the Dardanelles operation, and with projects in mind for carrying it through to success. In a telegram to General Birdwood he stated: "I have seen Captain Keyes, and I believe the Admiralty will agree to making naval attempt to force the passage of the Straits. We must do what we can to assist them, and I think that as soon as our ships are in the Sea of Marmora we should seize the Bulair isthmus and hold it so as to supply the Navy if the Turks still hold out." The fact that this idea should be "held very strongly . . . *after* the failure of the military operations in August"² was in line with lack of joint naval and military strategy, which had been the curse of the undertaking from the first. The Army and the Navy had been like the two little figures, the woman and the man, which were signs of fair and foul in the old weather indicators. When one figure was out, the other was in. With the early naval attacks, there were no army attacks. With the army attacks, there were no naval

¹ Report, Dardanelles Commission.

² *Ibid.*

attacks. After the army attacks had been brought to a standstill, another naval attack was proposed!

On November 15 Lord Kitchener reported to the Prime Minister, and in this telegram he plainly showed the effect of his first inspection of the actual locality, as did Sir Ian Hamilton. "The country is much more difficult than I had imagined, and the Turkish positions at Achi Baba and Kalid Bahr are natural fortresses of the most formidable nature, which, if not taken by surprise at first, could be held against the most serious attack by larger forces than have been engaged, even if these forces had proper lines of communication to support them. This latter want is the main difficulty in carrying out successful operations on the Peninsula." He stated: "Careful and secret preparations for the evacuation of the Peninsula are being made." And he hoped that "the troops would carry out this task with less loss than was previously estimated." Later in the same day, "Lord Kitchener telegraphed further to the Prime Minister that Admiral de Robeck would like to retain Cape Helles, even if Suvla and Anzac were evacuated."

At this time Lord Kitchener had an alternative project for using the army, being "greatly concerned as to the difficulty of defending Egypt, in the event of an evacuation of the Peninsula."¹ This was "a landing at Ayas Bay in the neighborhood of Alexandretta."² On November 19 the Prime Minister telegraphed to Lord Kitchener: "His Majesty's Government had decided against the proposed expedition to Ayas Bay as a result of their conference in Paris with the French Government, and Naval and Military authorities, and after

¹ Report, Dardanelles Commission.

² *Ibid.*

consideration of the maritime position in the Mediterranean." After receiving this message, Lord Kitchener on November 22 telegraphed that "evacuation seemed inevitable," and advised giving up Suvla and Anzac, "while Cape Helles should be held for the present. The retention of Cape Helles would enable the Navy to maintain the advantages already gained, still threaten the seizure of the Straits, and also give greater facilities for the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac."¹ November 23 the War Committee recommended evacuation, without retention of Cape Helles, and this recommendation was brought before the Cabinet.

The scheme of a naval attack was still advocated, while the British Cabinet was considering the question of evacuation. The Report of the Dardanelles Commission has stated: "It must here be mentioned that on November 25th Sir John de Robeck left the Mediterranean on sick leave, and his command was taken over by Vice-Admiral Wemyss. From November 25th to December 8th Vice-Admiral Wemyss, with remarkable pertinacity, advocated a renewal of the naval attack in a series of telegrams to the First Lord of the Admiralty." Vice-Admiral Wemyss' final telegram of December 8 was a strong appeal for the naval attack, and, after reciting the dangers of German extension in the East, ended as follows: "The logical conclusion, therefore, is the choice of evacuation or forcing the Straits. I consider the former disastrous tactically and strategically, and the latter feasible, and, so long as troops remain at Anzac, decisive. I am convinced that the time is ripe for a vigorous offensive, and I am confident of the result."

¹ Report, Dardanelles Commission.

“Meanwhile the condition of the forces on the Peninsula was aggravated by a blizzard of exceptional severity which raged on November 26th, 27th, 28th, and 29th. Two hundred and eighty men were drowned in the trenches at Suvla and many were frozen to death as they stood. Sixteen thousand cases of frost bite and exposure had to be evacuated, 12,000 from Suvla, where the positions were most exposed, and 2,700 and 1,200 from Anzac and Helles respectively.”¹ After this, on December 1, Sir Charles Monro pressed Lord Kitchener for a final decision, pointing out that it was “essential to take advantage of every fine day from now.” On December 3 General Monro again expressed his doubt of the value of naval assistance, “in respect of naval co-operation, the character of the terrain on the Peninsula is such that naval guns cannot reach the Turkish positions.”

The naval project was vetoed on December 10. “As the Admiralty were not prepared to authorize the Navy, single-handed, attempting to force the Narrows and acting in Sea of Marmora, cut off from supplies, the decision of the Government to evacuate Suvla and Anzac would not be further questioned by the Admiralty in view of the individual and combined appreciation of the responsible Generals, and the great strain thrown on naval and military resources by the operations in Greece.”² On December 7 the Cabinet had “decided to evacuate the positions at Suvla and Anzac only and to retain that at Cape Helles.”³

The last form of Admiral Wemyss’ proposal, to continue the effort to win the Dardanelles, comprised a

¹ Report, Dardanelles Commission.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

12,000
2,700
1,200

military attack upon Achi Baba, with the support of bombarding warships. The following is from Admiral Wemyss' telegram of December 13, 1915, to the Admiralty: "The capture of Achi-Baba position does not seem beyond our powers. The G. O. C. 8th Corps attributes the capture of trenches on November 15 with insignificant loss, to a great extent, to the support offered by a Naval Squadron consisting of one specially protected cruiser and three monitors who, after careful registration, used indirect fire without the assistance of spotting by aeroplanes, rendered impossible by high wind."

"Fifteen miles of heavy net is available here now; with this it will be possible to guard an area off the left flank, where battleships will be able to lie and support the army in a sustained attack."

"Once Achi-Baba is in our hands, we shall be in the position desired last April and the attack on the Narrows can be continued with every hope of success."

Aside from any question of continuing the campaign, this extract from Admiral Wemyss' telegram is of great interest, as showing the changes to new conditions for a naval bombardment. The need for an area guarded by nets is especially significant.

Admiral Wemyss has stated: "In answer to this I received a personal telegram from the First Lord informing me that, though he agreed with my views, the possibility of the capture of Achi-Baba was a military and not naval problem and that the Generals had unanimously arrived at the conclusion that it could not be taken by direct attack. This was the last effort on my part to shape the course of events and there

only remained to bow to the decision of the Government.”¹

There had been gloomy anticipations of great losses when the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac should be undertaken.² But nothing of the kind happened in the actual event.

The evacuation was very well planned, and carried out by excellent coöperation between the Army and Navy. The men, guns, and stores were gradually withdrawn. The last embarkation was on the night of December 19, and “by 5.30 A.M. on Monday, December 20th, the last man had quitted the trenches.”³ The only losses received were in an attack, at Cape Helles, made as a precautionary diversion on December 20. Cape Helles was not retained long. The Report of the Dardanelles Commission stated, the General Staff “recommended that the Gallipoli Peninsula should be entirely evacuated, and with the least possible delay. We have indicated that the retention of Cape Helles had been advocated mainly on naval grounds. Vice-Admiral Wemyss and Commodore Keyes held a different opinion, which was strengthened after the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac by the consideration of heavy wastage occurring daily in the VIIIth Army Corps. From December 20th to January 7th the casualties incurred amounted to 345 killed, 1,178 wounded, a total of 1,523 or a daily average of 18 killed and 62 wounded. Vice-Admiral Wemyss therefore advised evacuation unless the Achi Baba position could be captured, and this Sir Charles Monro considered im-

¹ “The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign.”

² “The Headquarters Staff had calculated the possible losses entailed in this operation at 30,000.” — *Ibid.*


³ Report, Dardanelles Commission.

practicable. On December 23rd the War Committee decided to evacuate Cape Helles, and this decision was approved by the Cabinet on the 27th. The evacuation was completed on January 8th." The same admirable organization and conduct was notable in this second evacuation, and there were no losses of any account.

Thus ended the tragedy. At the first it was a great opportunity missed, through the failure of any strategic conception of the undertaking. It was continued by a blundering series of attempts, which only gave ample time and warning for the defense. All that can be said for the undertaking was that it contained Turkish forces. But, when it is realized that the Allied losses in killed, wounded, and missing were 110,000, with 96,000 admitted to hospital, and a loss of 79,600 tonnage of warships, it will be evident that it caused a fearful consumption of Allied resources. Outside of this great wastage of men and material, the failure at the Dardanelles had a far reaching bad effect upon the prestige of the Entente Allies, and was a strong influence upon the unfavorable situation in the East.

THE DARDANELLES

- (1) British landings on the Beaches Y, X, W, V (April 24/25, 1915).
- (2) Landing of Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, at "Anzac," at the same time.
- (3) Landing of French troops on Asiatic side, at the same time.
- (4) British landing at Suvla Bay (August 6 7, 1915).
- (5) Krithia and Achi Baba, Turkish positions which were never attained.
- (A) Main Allied Base on island of Lemnos.
- (B) U-boats in the Straits (May, 1915) which came out and sank two battleships, and from this time kept at a distance the Allied warships and service of supplies.



CHAPTER XII

SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF 1916

(See Map at page 117)

THE end of 1915 had thus marked a year of military reverses for the Entente Allies. The Allies had not won success in any of their offensives, from which so much had been expected. On the other hand, as has been narrated, the Germans had been able to carry out their plan of holding the Allied armies in the West, while they won the great campaign against the Russians, followed by the accession of Bulgaria and conquest of Serbia.

As will be seen on the map, the siege of the Central Powers had been raised by this break-through, and the "Bridge to the East" had been won. This newly gained wide strip of territory connected the Central Powers with Turkey and the East.¹ Outside of this great advantage of joining hands with an ally formerly cut off from the Central Powers, one of the great ambitions of Germany seemed on the point of being realized, the scheme of "Mittel Europa." The foundations of this Germanic edifice had been built upon the possibilities of control through the Bagdad Railroad, originally projected as a line from the Levant to the Persian Gulf, enlarged into a far reaching scheme of railway systems reaching from the North Sea through Mesopotamia. From this had grown the great

¹ "The railway running to Constantinople was opened on January 16, 1916." — Ludendorff.

Pan-Germanic Plan which was one of the creeds of Germany.

This Teutonic desire to control the Near East was only a modern form of one of the oldest ambitions in the world. Seizure of this source of power by some rival had long been the dread of Great Britain. In fact, it was the desire to combat any such control on the part of Russia that had led the Victorian statesmen to persist in their anti-Russian policies, which kept the Russians shut off from the sea, and even went to the extent of building up the German Empire as a buffer against Russia. It was an ironical nemesis to follow these policies of Palmerston, Disraeli, and Salisbury, that, at the beginning of 1916, the result of their British foreign policies was to isolate Great Britain's own ally, for such had Russia become. And it was the German Empire, a bitter enemy in 1916, that had pushed Russia back and had become the menace in the Near East.

This reversal of all the cherished ideas of these British statesmen had come to pass, and their own protégé, the German Empire, was the enemy that had consolidated the great strip of territory from Germany, through Austria-Hungary, the Balkan States, and Asia Minor, to the East. But, like most bugbears of European politics before the World War, a wrong interpretation had been given to this, and, in the study of the history of the World War, the gain to Germany should be considered from the military and naval point of view. As has been emphasized in this book, the German domination of Constantinople and the great waterway to the Black Sea was the real menace, and it has been shown that failures to win control of the Dardanelles and the Baltic were the two great abate-

ments in the sea power of the Entente Allies. This German control in the Near East was, therefore, most harmful in its restraint from the use of the sea, a far more important matter than the restraint of commerce by means of the German railway system of Mittel Europe, which must be a use of artificial means to an end.

Not even with the domination of Germany assured, could commerce, when forced to use these artificial conditions of land transportation, compete with trade over the great natural lanes of the sea. As Admiral Mahan had pointed out, in a discussion of this railway system, it was a case of "The perennial conflict between land and water transport, between natural and artificial conditions, in which victory is likely to rest, as heretofore, with nature's own highway, the seas." This was the keynote of his argument as to the first project of the railway from the Levant to the Persian Gulf, and these fixed conditions, against a railroad in competition with waterways, are multiplied by increased length. Keeping this in mind, it will be evident that even German imperialism would have had a hard problem to solve in dominating commerce throughout these vast areas by means of the railroad from Berlin to the East, in competition with seaborne commerce.

But, as military results, the effects of the Teutonic victories in 1915 cannot be exaggerated. Instead of being hemmed in by enemies, the Teutonic Allies had thrust back their foes in the East, and the great areas of territory won had also consolidated their forces, insuring administration and supplies from a central control. It must be admitted that Germany had won about all that she needed in the East, and, if she could

hold this and gain a decision against her enemies on the West, her way would be clear to victory. This was a great strategic opportunity for the Central Powers, and it was all the more obvious because the Germans knew, from the tests of the failure of Allied offensive power in the fall of 1915, that, if a German offensive were planned against any sector on the Western Front, the Allied armies would not be strong enough to launch a counter offensive early in 1916. The measure of the Italian strength had also been taken in 1915.

Consequently, the military plan of the Central Powers was the reverse of that of 1915. The Teutonic Allies were to hold their conquests in the East, while a concentration of German forces was to attack on the Western Front, and strengthened Austro-Hungarian armies were to coöperate by an offensive against the Italians.

In the countries of the Entente Allies the defeats of their armies in 1915, especially the failures of the supposedly crushing British and French offensives of September, had brought about political and military changes. The three military dictators had not survived these defeats, which had again proved that the preparations of the Allies had not been adequate to cope with the greater scale of the Teutonic strategy of 1915. As has been stated, the Grand Duke Nicholas had been sent to the Caucasus. General Joffre was still in command of the French armies, but he was no longer all-powerful and was soon to relinquish personal direction of the French troops. In Great Britain Lord Kitchener was also no longer supreme at the War Office. It had become evident that his personal assumption of all responsibilities had not worked well, and a General

Staff was constituted with General Robertson as Chief-of-Staff. Valuable as the services of each of the three leaders had been in 1914, the warfare of 1915 had outgrown the military conceptions of any of them.

In Great Britain, especially, the reaction from the optimism of the first of the year 1915 had so great an effect upon the people that, at last on January 5, 1916, the Military Service Bill was introduced, and Great Britain obtained conscription, the most necessary means for fighting the war of a nation. The delay of a year and a half had been most costly in failure to produce forces sufficient to meet the demands of the World War. In fact, this experience of Great Britain in recruiting, even with every means of arousing popular enthusiasm, proved that voluntary enlistment would never suffice to assemble the man-power of a nation for a national war. At the end of January, 1916, it was thus assured that Great Britain would have a national army, but the ill effects of the delay were still to be felt, because the new army would not be in the field until the middle of the year, and this meant that the British were not strong enough for an offensive on the Western Front until July 1, 1916. In the meantime, the German offensive on the Western Front was planned for February, 1916.

In both Great Britain and France the popular reaction from unexpected defeats resulted in a more energetic production of munitions and supplies, but the calculations of the German Command proved to be correct, so far as concerned the impossibility of an Allied counter attack in the first months of the German offensive of 1916 at Verdun.

Verdun had been chosen as the region for the Ger-

mans "to attempt an offensive to bring about a decision,"¹ because Falkenhayn, the German Chief of Staff, realized that it was the place where the French must stand and fight. This destructive contact was then the aim of the new German strategy, after realizing the errors of the German strategy of 1914, and the causes of their victory in 1915. The success of the Russian campaign had demonstrated the disastrous effects of a break-through with heavy artillery, and in the winter of 1915-1916 the efforts of the Germans were concentrated upon preparations for another great offensive, by means of the use of masses of heavy artillery with infantry, as in the victory over the Russians, against the salient of Verdun. This dangerous concentration of heavy guns and troops was successfully made without being estimated by the French, and the element of surprise was thus attained, as the Allies did not look for any offensive that would be different from the fighting of the past on the Western Front.

This was a most threatening situation for the French, and the first German assaults (February 21, 1916) were destructive, almost to the extent of disaster. But, in their confidence in their tactics of a break-through with heavy artillery, the Germans carried out their operations on so narrow a sector that their offensive was smothered. The small margin, by which total defeat was averted from the French, showed the menace, if anything approaching the German tactics of 1918 had been adopted. In consequence, the Verdun battle became a protracted struggle of months, causing great losses to the French, but involving the Germans in infantry fighting which brought even heavier losses to the

¹ Ludendorff.

THE SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF 1916

MITTEL EUROPA

(This Map is diagrammatic only)

Shaded areas controlled by Central Powers.

— Battle Fronts neutral frontiers.

The Entente Allies had failed in all their attempted offensives in 1915, and the Central Powers had raised the siege by their break-through in 1915. By the accession of Bulgaria and conquest of Serbia they had established the Mittel Europa of the Pan-Germans.


The railways on the map show the projected systems of the "Pan-Germanic Plan," and the annexationist scheme of a great Germanic Confederation is also shown (the boundaries of the territory to be annexed are indicated on the map by the lines of small crosses). The shaded areas show the territory actually controlled by the Central Powers — a great increase over that at the beginning of 1915.

For the first part of 1916 the Entente Allies were unable to plan any offensives, except in the Caucasus, as the new British armies would not be ready, and the Russian armies had been badly shattered in 1915.

The Central Powers planned two offensives:

(A) German attempt to break through at Verdun:

(B) Austro-Hungarian offensive against Italy.



Germans. In this deadly duel between the French and the Germans, the first months of 1916 passed on the Western Front, with the British powerless to render assistance, as they were waiting for their new army raised by conscription.

In addition to their military plans for 1916, the Germans had also planned to make offensive use of their naval forces, an account of which will be given in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XIII

RENEWED PROJECT FOR U-BOAT WARFARE

AT the beginning of the year, 1916, the Germans had at length realized that it was necessary to make a greater use of naval forces in coöperation with the military strategy of Germany. The far reaching harm done by Sea Power, through the domination of the British Navy, had become evident. Admiral Scheer had succeeded Admiral Pohl in command of the German High Sea Fleet early in January, 1916, and he has thus expressed the change in German policy: "The conviction that English maritime power was a serious menace to our capability of resistance seemed to make it imperative that, if a successful issue of the war were to be expected, it must be waged more energetically against that adversary."

In addition, there was a growing demand in Germany that there should be some return for what had been spent upon the German Fleet in the years preceding the war. This last was again emphasized by Admiral Scheer: "If the utility of our High Sea Fleet were not made more distinctly manifest, then its deeds were not sufficient to justify its existence and the vast sums exacted from the resources of our people for its maintenance. The principal task stood out clearly defined — to punish England in such a way as to deprive her speedily and thoroughly of the inclination to continue the war. That might be expected if success could

be achieved either by a blow at her sea power centred in her Navy, or at her financial life — preferably both.”

“The ways and means of effecting this were the U-boat trade-war in the North Sea and on the open seas, aerial warfare and aggressive action of the High Seas forces in the North Sea.” The new German naval Commander-in-Chief has stated that these factors were to be “operated in combination,” but he has left no doubt of the fact that unrestricted use of the submarine was planned to be the main essential of this new German naval strategy of 1916: “When in January, 1916, I took over the command of the Fleet I considered it my first task to ascertain what weapons against England lay at my disposal, as especially to make sure whether, and in what way, the U-boat campaign against English trade was intended to be carried out. On February 1 the Chief of the Naval Staff assured me that the unrestricted U-boat campaign would be inaugurated on March 1. All preparatory work for the operations of the Fleet were based on this assumption.”

The German naval authorities were strongly in favor of this unrestricted use of the submarine. Admiral Tirpitz, who had maintained that the first U-boat campaign in 1915 was ill conceived and premature, was convinced that the beginning of 1916 was the right time, as the Germans had developed the U-boats both in efficiency and in numbers. He has stated that “the army command requested a conference on the question of the submarine campaign, which was held at the Ministry of War on December 30th, 1915, and January 5th, 1916. General von Falkenhayn stated that now that Bulgaria had come in on our side, he was ready to

accept unrestricted submarine warfare, if the navy guaranteed success."

In respect to this last, the following two paragraphs, from a Memorandum of the German Chief of the Naval Staff, are well worth studying:

"But if a new unlimited U-boat campaign is inaugurated on the principle that all shipping in the War Zone may be destroyed, then there is a definite prospect that within a short time, at most six months, England will be forced to make peace, for the shortage of transports and the consequent reduction of exports and imports will become intolerable, since prices will rise still more, and in addition to this England's financial position will be seriously threatened. Any other end to the war would mean grave danger for Germany's future economic life when we consider the war on German trade that England has planned and from which she could be deterred only by such a defeat as the U-boats could inflict."

"The United States are not in a position to lend England effective aid against a new U-boat campaign by providing her with tonnage. In view of the ever-increasing burdens imposed by the war, it is not to be supposed that the United States will afford England financial support for an indefinite period. Such support would, moreover, be of no avail in an unrestricted U-boat campaign against English trade, as it could not prevent a scarcity of essential goods or make it possible for the English to carry on their export trade."

To quote again from Admiral Tirpitz, "At the meeting at the Ministry of War I explained that the campaign was both possible and practicable. In place of the former declaration of war zone, I recommended a

sort of embargo on commercial traffic to and from England. Admiral von Holtzendorff described the opening of such a campaign as the salvation of the navy, but recommended that it should not be begun until March 1st. Falkenhayn, Holtzendorff, the Minister for War, Wild von Hohenborn, and myself were entirely at one, both as to the opening of the campaign, and as to the date of opening.”

With the military and naval authorities thus in accord, Admiral Scheer has stated: “Judging by the assurance given me, I took it for granted that the Government had learnt a lesson from the events of 1915, and that it would not again give way if objections were raised, but would on the contrary then proceed with the intensified form of U-boat warfare. We had far greater means at our disposal now to give emphasis to our threats. . . .”

“In order to gain assurance in the use of U-boats and secure a basis for the activity of the Fleet, I went, in February, to Berlin to a conference with the Chief of the Naval Staff, in which Prince Henry of Prussia, Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic forces, also took part.”

“The result of this conference was the decision to come to close grips with England. Our chief maritime elements were to be centred absolutely in the North Sea, and the greatest restriction put on all active measures in the Baltic.¹ Shortly afterwards an unrestricted U-boat warfare was to be instituted and the Naval Command was to make the necessary preparations. March 1 was the date on which it was to begin. . . .”

¹ It will be noted that the lack of effective British harassing naval attacks in the Baltic permitted the Germans to do this.

These German statements have left no doubt of the changed naval policy of Germany, with a resolve to make an aggressive use of all elements of the German Fleet. Of course this was the result of the developments and tentative operations of 1915, but, in contrast to the isolated and unconcerted attempts of that year, the new strategy of 1916 planned a coördinated offensive of all the German naval forces. It must, however, always be kept in mind, as proved by the foregoing statements of the German leaders, that the main reliance of the Germans, in their original naval plans of 1916, lay in unrestricted U-boat warfare.

In preparing for this change to an offensive use of the Germany Navy, it was obvious that, as Admiral Scheer expressed it, "The first and most important task was the safety of the German Bight." The German Admiral has described at length a new organization of light forces for this purpose: "The aim of the organization was to keep the Bight clear by means of aeroplanes, out-post flotillas, mine-sweeping formations, and barrier-breakers, and regular reconnaissance, guard, and mine-sweeping service was established. The outpost-boats were to form a support for the active protective craft in the North Sea, be sufficiently strong to meet a surprise hostile attack and always ready to pick up at sea any forces returning to harbour. The command of the protective services was, as hitherto, retained by the Chief of Reconnaissance. The actual aerial reconnaissance in the vicinity was undertaken by aeroplanes and airships from the stations at List, on the island of Sylt, Heligoland, and Borkum. The North Sea Outpost Flotilla, the Coast Defence Flotilla from the Ems, and boats of the Harbour Flotilla, were ready for guard

service; their duties consisted chiefly in driving away enemy submarines."

These concerted means were used to overcome the constant efforts of the British submarines and minelayers, and to permit the German minefields to be pushed out in a widened circle, thus providing a greater area for disposing naval forces in the Bight, which formed the outwork of the German bases. The British had spared no pains to block in this outwork, by the use of submarines and laying great minefields, and Admiral Tirpitz has described the dangers of the German craft engaged in this task: "We gradually developed a most exciting and dangerous minesweeping service, which cost us many losses, but nevertheless fulfilled its task in the main up to the end of the war."

Admiral Scheer has thus described the results of these measures: "Heligoland, which at the beginning of the war was our advanced outpost, had thus assumed the character of a point of support in the rear, from which radiated a free zone extending over a radius of 120 nautical miles."

"Even though security from enemy attacks was necessary and called for immediate action, nevertheless a still more important duty was that of attacking and injuring the enemy. To this end various enterprises were started. Foremost among these were nocturnal advances by light forces in the boundary area of the German Bight in order to destroy enemy forces stationed there, the holding up of suspicious craft and readiness to afford help to airships raiding England, which always took place at night. These advances were carried out by several flotillas led by an escorting cruiser. They were supported by a scouting division of

light cruisers sent either to the Ems or to a certain quadrant in the North Sea. The battle-cruisers were told off to the Schillig Roads, or deployed in line at sea; all other outpost ships were held in strictest readiness, and all measures were taken to insure the speedy intervention of vessels lying in the Roads. In this way, the entire Fleet was kept in a certain state of tension, and unvarying alertness in view of eventualities at sea was maintained in order to be prepared at once to take part in the proceedings.”

This last sentence should be noted, as it meant that the new German Commander-in-Chief had aroused the German Fleet from “the decline in morale brought about by the long previous inactivity of the fleet,”¹ and had brought it into a condition of high efficiency by constant exercise and drill.

With the German Navy thus prepared to take the offensive, Admiral Scheer summed up the situation as follows: “The employment of the U-boats was of fundamental importance in our warfare against England. They could be used directly against English trade or against English naval forces. The decision in the matter influenced the operations very considerably. It was not advisable to embark on both methods simultaneously, as most probably neither would then achieve success. Also the poor success resulting from our U-boat action on English warships in the North Sea seemed to point to a decided preference for trade-war. In military circles, there was no doubt that success in trade-war could only be looked for if the U-boats were

¹ “Scheer accordingly took measures, and successful measures, to deal with the decline in morale brought about by the long previous inactivity of the fleet.” — Admiral Tirpitz, “My Memoirs.”

empowered to act according to its own special methods; any restrictions in that respect would greatly reduce the chances of success. The decision in the matter lay in the political zone. It was therefore necessary that the political leaders should recognize what we were compelled to do to achieve our aim."

CHAPTER XIV

THE HALT CALLED BY THE UNITED STATES

WITH the German Navy thus prepared for an offensive, founded upon unrestricted use of the U-boats, and only waiting for the decision of the Imperial Government as to the date for beginning operations, there existed a situation which now affords most interesting study. The leading German military and naval authorities were so impressed by the strides in the development of the submarine, that they were united in their belief that unrestricted U-boat warfare would be a decisive factor in the World War. Consequently, they demanded that this should be the naval strategy of Germany, in spite of risks of protests as in 1915. But the Imperial Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, in 1915 had seen the writing on the wall,¹ and opposed this naval strategy, which he was convinced would be sure to arouse the hostility of the United States. Consequently, the early months of 1916 must be considered as a period of debate between these two factions.

With the Chancellor in opposition, the original date for beginning the campaign of unrestricted U-boat warfare was abandoned. Admiral Scheer has stated: "My suspicion that the date of March 1 would not be ad-

¹ "Once we had shelved the question of our moral right to carry on the U-boat campaign, because of the American demands made in the name of humanity, it became increasingly difficult to take it up again later in an intensified form, if this should prove necessary:— That is the key to the continued opposition of the Imperial Chancellor to the initiation of a mode of warfare which could have dealt an effective blow at England." — Admiral Scheer.

hered to was confirmed on the occasion of H. M. the Emperor's visit on February 23. . . . The Emperor shared the political doubts which the Government had advanced, and wished to avoid a break with America." The German naval Commander-in-Chief remained firmly convinced of the necessity for the U-boat campaign. "From this point of view I endeavored to combat the tendency to give way, which the Chief of the Naval Staff betrayed when dealing with political objections. . . . On March 4 the decisive session at General Headquarters took place, and the Chief of Staff informed me of the result as follows: 'For military reasons, the unrestricted U-boat campaign against England, which alone promises full success, must begin without fail on April 1. Till then the Imperial Chancellor must set in motion all political and diplomatic machinery to make America clearly understand our position, with the aim and object of securing our freedom of action.'"

Admiral Tirpitz became chagrined, because the U-boat campaign was postponed at a conference "without his being summoned."¹ He has stated: "On March 8 I reported sick, and immediately received the request, sent over by telegraph, to hand in my resignation. . . . On March 17 I received my dismissal, being succeeded by Admiral von Cappelle. In the summer of 1915 a decided supporter of the submarine campaign, he was now compelled, before accepting office, to undertake to support the Chancellor in all naval political questions of which the submarine campaign was regarded as one."

In the meantime, the German U-boats were only to

¹ "No, His Majesty has not commanded the presence of the Secretary of State." — "My Memoirs," Admiral Tirpitz.

be used in accordance with what Admiral Scheer called "principles that were militarily unsound."

While this question was in discussion, there was an increase of naval activity, aside from minelaying which had been practised by both sides on a large scale. The Germans had continued to scatter mines off the British coasts. The British were attempting to block off the Channel and the German Bight. Although, at this stage, there was nothing approaching the mine barriers of later periods of the war, yet there were heavy losses from mines, and minesweeping had become a constant necessity on an unexpectedly large scale, which was a correspondingly heavy drain upon naval energies. Especially for the British Navy was it an ever present task, which kept busy an incredible number of small craft.

At this time, the Germans sent out raiders of commerce disguised as merchantmen. The first of these was the most successful, the *Moewe*, a steamship of about 4500 tons, carrying good guns, with false sides to look like a tramp steamer. She had slipped out of the German naval base, with U-boat escort, and had succeeded in getting into the North Atlantic. There for two months she was able to destroy commerce, taking fifteen ships, sending the steamer *Appam* with captured crews into Norfolk February 1, 1916, and escaping safely into the Jade on March 4. The *Moewe* made a still more successful raid in 1917, when she captured 27 ships and again got home safely. A second raider to go out, the *Greif*, was caught at once off the Shetlands by two British armed auxiliaries, *Alcantara* and *Andes*, and the light cruiser *Cornus*. The *Greif* had deceived by her disguise the *Alcantara*, and had overpowered her by sudden gunfire, sinking her; but the

Andes and *Cornus* sank the *Greif*. There were other isolated cases of German raiders of this kind, but they did not have much effect upon the naval war, although the successful cruises of the *Moewe* showed possibilities for inflicting serious damage by these means.

In the first months of 1916, the Germans were also persevering with their airship attacks, and Admiral Scheer evidently still considered them factors in naval strategy. But as has been stated, they were not accomplishing results, and the German Admiral has given shocking testimony as to their vulnerability to enemy attacks and to accident. He stated that, of 61 Zeppelins assigned to the German Fleet in the course of the war, 17, with their whole crews, were destroyed by the enemy, 28 were lost by accidents, and 6 had to be put out of service as useless.

Admiral Scheer has stated: "One of the first enterprises of the newly-drawn-up programme was an encounter during the night of February 10-11 with English guardships off the Dogger Bank: they were in all probability stationed there in connection with our airship raids. . . ." This was a sortie of three German destroyer flotillas, and the British craft encountered were "the 10th Sloop Flotilla operating from the Humber under the orders of the Rear Admiral of the East Coast."¹ Of these the *Arabis* was sunk. At the news, the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Rosyth, and the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron left Harwich. The Grand Fleet also came out from its bases to rendezvous in the North Sea. But the German destroyers had put back to the Bight.

(On March 5 the German High Sea Fleet "carried out

¹ Lord Jellicoe.

the first of its greater enterprises, partaking of the nature of a more extended advance,"¹ and this was notable as it meant the beginning of a naval policy of bringing out the German Battle Fleet from its bases, in attempts to take British naval forces at an advantage. Admiral Scheer's account of his plan showed clearly this intention: "The idea prompting this move was to attack the enemy light forces that were constantly reported in the Hoofden, and thus attract support from the English harbors to the south, and if possible force them between the pincers formed by our advanced cruisers and the Main Fleet following in the rear." With the German naval forces were airships, which bombarded England; and 12 U-boats were stationed off the southeast coast of England in support.

No enemy forces were encountered. "The expedition, therefore, was only useful for the purpose of practising unity of command, and the handling of individual ships under circumstances likely to arise during an offensive engagement of any big unit."² Admiral Scheer has stated that bad weather intervened in March and interfered with further operations "for a time." But on March 25, with very unfavorable weather and high seas running, the British in turn made a brisk attack upon the German naval outposts. This operation was carried out by the Harwich force to support an airplane attack on the German Zeppelin hangars at Tondern. The bad weather was too much for the British aviators, who were forced to come down. The British naval forces sank two German fishing steamers, which were on outpost service. The destroyer *Medusa* was damaged by collision and abandoned on

¹ Admiral Scheer.

² *Ibid.*

account of the heavy sea. The weather remained stormy, and on the night of March 25 Commodore Tyrwhitt in the *Cleopatra* rammed a German destroyer, but came in collision with the *Undaunted*, which was with difficulty towed in for repairs. This operation of the British light forces had been covered by battle cruisers and the battleships of the Grand Fleet, but they did not encounter any enemy forces.

Admiral Scheer wrote in regard to the removal of Admiral Tirpitz: "This change in the conduct of the Naval Department, in particular, gave rise to grave fears as to the prompt carrying out of resolute and adequate U-boat warfare. At the beginning of March the decision in this connection had again been postponed for four weeks. The Fleet was therefore bound all the more to aim at active operation against the enemy, and every attention was given to that purpose by the new Fleet Command."

With the question of the unrestricted U-boat campaign still being debated, there suddenly happened an event which settled this question. On March 24, 1916, the French Channel steamer *Sussex*, carrying 436 passengers, among them 75 Americans, was torpedoed without warning by a German U-boat, when crossing from Folkestone to Dieppe. Over 40 lives were lost, three Americans having been injured. The *Sussex* was towed into Boulogne. By this attack, the Germans had created the very situation that would bring to a head the intense feeling which had grown up in the United States, following the sinking of the *Lusitania*. The result was so prompt and peremptory a demand from the United States that the German Government yielded at once.

At first the German Government attempted to deny torpedoing the *Sussex*, but this evasion was of no avail. The reply of the American Government left no room for doubt. Of this Admiral Tirpitz wrote: "To our Note of April 10th, the incorrectness of which in fact was proved by the Americans, there followed the well-known American bullying Note of April 20th. . . ."

This American Note of April 20, 1916, was an ultimatum to Germany, which stated: "Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect abandonment of this present method of submarine warfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether."

When actually brought face to face with this ultimatum from the United States, the Imperial Government capitulated.¹ Admiral Scheer has stated: "As a result of this Note, presented on April 20, 1916, our Government decided to give in and sent orders to the Naval Staff to the effect that submarine warfare was henceforward to be carried on in accordance with Prize Law. This order reached the Fleet by wireless telegraphy when it was on the way to bombard Lowestoft. As war waged according to Prize Law by U-boats in the waters around England could not possibly have any success, but, on the contrary, must expose the boats to the greatest dangers, I recalled all the U-boats by wireless, and announced that the U-boat campaign against British commerce had ceased."

Again, as in 1915, this abandonment of the German

¹ "The *Sussex* Note was a decisive turning point of the war, the beginning of our capitulation." — Admiral Tirpitz, "My Memoirs."

U-boat campaign was not understood by the Entente Allies. There was too prevalent an idea that it had been brought about by the limitations of the U-boats themselves, instead of the truth that this campaign had been dropped to avoid a break with the United States. This error led to underestimating the danger from the submarines, and also to the costly mistake of thinking that the measures taken against the U-boats had been sufficient to curb their menace. It was too hastily assumed that the traps, nets, chasers, "Q" ships,¹ etc. had been able to dominate the U-boats. But this was not at all the case. On the contrary, the U-boats were being steadily improved, their scope of operations was being increased, and the Germans were growing more expert in handling them.

The mistake was also made of not remaining awake to the fact that, in spite of the enforced abandonment of this campaign at the demand of the United States, there yet remained a constant and insistent demand in Germany for unrestricted U-boat warfare, especially from the naval and military leaders, and at any favorable turn illegal submarine warfare would be resumed. Admiral Scheer stated that, when the German Emperor approved "the interruption of the U-boat campaign against commerce," and directed "that the U-boat weapon should meanwhile be vigorously used for mil-

¹ "Before turning to the events of 1916, it is of interest to notice the work of the 'decoy ships,' known later by the name of 'Q' ships, fitted out at Scapa during the year 1915. These vessels, five in number, were designed to sink submarines by inducing the latter to close them for the purpose of attack by gunfire or by torpedo. The same system was employed in southern waters, and was developed greatly during the year 1917. . . . They worked on a route that was freely used by merchantships and altered their appearance according to their route so as to give them the look of vessels usually trading in that route." — Admiral Jellicoe, "The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916."

itary purposes," there was this significant addition to the message: "The order to resume the U-boat campaign against trade would be given when the political and military situation should demand it."

There is no mistaking this expression of the spirit in which unrestricted submarine warfare was abandoned by the Germans, and the American Ambassador at Berlin did not fail to see this danger for the future. Mr. Gerard has written: "I, however, immediately warned the Department that I believed that the rulers of Germany would, at some future date, forced by public opinion, and by the von Tirpitz and Conservative parties, take up ruthless submarine war again, possibly in the autumn but at any rate about February or March, 1917." This proved to be sound judgment on his part as to the intentions of the German Government, but there is no question of the fact that the Entente Allies were lulled into a false security that was afterwards costly for them, and the unexpected efficiency of the U-boats in 1917 was a disastrous surprise which found the Allies unprepared.

CHAPTER XV

THE NEW GERMAN NAVAL STRATEGY

(See Map at page 166)

THE enterprise of the German High Sea Fleet, which Admiral Scheer was about to undertake when he was notified of the abandonment of unrestricted U-boat warfare, was to be directed against the British coast. As actually carried out, this operation marked an enforced change of naval strategy and naval tactics on the part of the German Commander-in-Chief, who has stated: "It was left to me until further notice to employ the U-boats in purely military enterprises."

The objects of this sally of the German Fleet have been thus given by Admiral Scheer: "On April 24, Easter Monday, the Fleet put out on an important enterprise which, like that in the beginning of March, was directed towards the Hoofden, but was to be extended farther so as to force the enemy out of port. I expected to achieve this by bombarding coastal towns and carrying out air raids on England the night the Fleet went out. Both these actions would probably result in counter measures being taken by the enemy that would give our forces an opportunity to attack. . . . The news we had obtained from the enemy announced strong enemy forces in the northern section of the North Sea under the Norwegian coast; forces had also been sighted in the Hoofden and harbours on the south-east coast of England so that an opportunity would probably occur for our Fleet to push in between

those two divisions of the enemy Fleet and attack with equal strength that section which should first present itself. It was, therefore, obvious that the most suitable direction for attack would be towards the south-east counties of England. If the enemy then wished to cut off our return he would have to move into the neighborhood of Terschelling Bank, where the waters were favorable for offering battle. With luck we might even succeed in attacking the enemy advancing from the Hoofden on both sides; on the south with the forces told off to bombard the coast and on the north with the Main Fleet."

Admiral Scheer has claimed that Lowestoft and Yarmouth were "important military points of support for the enemy," and that "the destruction, therefore, of the harbours and other military establishments of both of these coastal towns was a matter of great military importance, apart from the object of the bombardment in calling out the enemy." This last significant phrase, in connection with what has been quoted above from Admiral Scheer, should be emphasized as showing the trend of the changed German naval strategy, after the German Navy had been baulked in its original naval plan for 1916, and the U-boats, instead of being the main factor by means of unrestricted warfare against commerce with support of the Battle Fleet, had been reduced to the part of being a military adjunct of the Fleet. In this new strategy of the German Navy there was this object, in the words of Admiral Scheer, "to induce the enemy to take counter-measures which would afford us an opportunity to engage part or the whole of his Fleet in battle under conditions favorable to ourselves." There

was always present the hope that the German Battle Fleet would be able to take British naval forces at a disadvantage, and this hope was the great incentive which always lay behind the revised German naval strategy of 1916.

For the fleet operation of April, 1916, the German naval Commander-in-Chief has given the following dispositions of his forces, which are of much interest in view of this new German naval strategy: "All the available High Sea forces were assembled, including Squadron II (the German predreadnoughts), and the Chief Commander of the Naval Corps in Flanders was enjoined to keep his available U-boats in readiness. The Naval Corps also offered to station two U-boats east of Lowestoft to facilitate the advance; they did excellent service in assisting the bombardment. The U-boats at the disposal of the High Sea Command were placed in a position to attack the Firth of Forth and the southern egress from the Firth was closed by a U-minelayer. Eight of the newer airships were selected for the raid and three older ones were ordered to hold themselves in readiness on the second day in rear of the fleet for reconnoitring. If at all possible the bombardment was to take the towns by surprise at daybreak, in order to prevent counter-measures by the enemy, such as calling up submarines from Yarmouth to protect the coast. The forces intended to accompany the cruisers had to endeavour to keep, not actually in the Hoofden, but in the open waters west and north of Terschelling Bank in case it should come to a fight, as that was the only position where liberty of action in all eventual developments could be ensured. The bombardment of both the coastal towns was entrusted to

the battle-cruisers. They were supported by Scouting Division II and two fast torpedo flotillas (VI and IX). The Main Fleet, consisting of Squadrons I, II and III, Scouting Division IV, and the remainder of the torpedo flotillas was to accompany the battle-cruisers to the Hoofden until the bombardment was over, in order, if necessary, to protect them against superior enemy forces." Admiral Scheer also stated: "Simultaneous air-raids on Southern England would offer the advantages of mutual support for the airships and the sea forces. The airships would reconnoitre for the forces afloat on their way to and fro, while the latter would be able to rescue the airships should they meet disaster. It was also hoped there might be an opportunity for trade-war under prize conditions."

All these German forces started at noon April 24. At 4 P.M. "the movement received an unwelcome set back," as the battle cruiser *Seydlitz*, flagship of the advance forces intended for the bombardments, struck a mine in the route "which had been searched and swept last on the night of the 22nd and 23rd and had been constantly used by light forces on their night patrols." The *Seydlitz* was damaged forward and rendered unfit for the operation, though she was able to steam 15 knots and returned to the German base, escorted by two destroyers and an airship. The flag of Rear Admiral Bödicker was transferred to the *Lützow*.

"In consequence of this accident," and as submarines were reported at the time, Admiral Scheer changed his course "to take the route along the coast of East Friesland." Shortly before daybreak, on April 25, Admiral Scheer received a report from his airships that they had raided Norwich, Lincoln, Harwich,

and Ipswich, and "were then in the act of returning home." The German battle cruisers, thereupon, moved in to bombard Lowestoft. They were sighted by Commodore Tyrwhitt, then at sea with the Harwich Force, and he reported the presence of these German ships to Admiral Jellicoe, who received the report at 4.06 A.M. This was followed, at 4.20 A.M., by information from the Admiralty to Admiral Jellicoe "that the enemy was bombarding Lowestoft, and that the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron was in touch with the enemy's ships."

Admiral Jellicoe was then at sea, having taken the Grand Fleet out from its bases the evening before, after sending the Fifth Battle Squadron (Four 25 knot battleships of *Queen Elizabeth* class) to reinforce the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had been weakened for the time by the absence of the *Australia* and *New Zealand*, damaged by colliding in a dense fog two days before, when three destroyers and the battleship *Neptune* had also been in collision.

Admiral Jellicoe's command was steering to southward when the first report was received of the enemy. Of this the British Admiral has written: "The report at once influenced the direction of the sweep, and the Battle Fleet increased to full speed, and shaped a course to pass down the searched channel to the westward of the German minefield to support the Battle Cruiser Fleet and the 5th Battle Squadron, which proceeded at full speed on a course designed to intercept the enemy battle cruisers during their expected return passage to their ports." At 5.40 A.M. Admiral Jellicoe received information from the Oldsburch wireless station that the German battle cruisers were "in sight steaming eastward."

The German battle cruisers had bombarded Lowestoft.¹ "A north-west course was then taken to proceed with the bombardment of Great Yarmouth and to engage the ships reported by the *Rostock*." These were the British light cruisers and destroyers which had been reported in touch with the enemy, and they could do nothing but retreat from the German ships. After bombarding the two coast towns, Admiral Scheer's whole command withdrew to the German bases, and the British Grand Fleet did not get contact with the enemy. Admiral Scheer wrote: "The only hope now left was that enemy forces might be encountered off Tersehelling. As we drew near to that zone, the Fleet was constantly obliged to evade submarine attacks, but no other enemy forces were met."

Repairing the damage to the *Seydlitz*, and necessary repairs to the condensers of the engines of the powerful battleships of Squadron III, postponed operations of the German Battle Fleet until the latter half of May, 1916, and, in the meantime, activities against Great Britain were confined to airship raids.

The British, in turn, on May 4, 1916, attempted a bombardment of the Tondern Zeppelin sheds by means of seaplanes on two carriers, *Vindex* and *Engadine*, and this operation is of interest as an early use of these craft, which the British Navy had in service since 1915, "but without much success, owing to the difficulty experienced in getting seaplanes to rise from the water except in the finest weather."² The two seaplane

¹ "This was carried out at a distance from 100-130 h. m. Excellent results were observed in the harbour and the answering fire was weak." — Admiral Scheer.

² Admiral Jellicoe. The *Campania*, a Cunard Liner and the first airplane carrier of any size, after "investigating the difficulties attending the use of

carriers were convoyed by cruisers and destroyers to a position just north of the Horn Reef, at dawn on May 4, after two minelayers had spread minefields, the night before, on the expected route of enemy vessels by the Horn Reef and the route passing the West Frisian Islands. The same night nine British submarines were sent to positions, three each off the Horn Reef, the Vyl Lightship, the Terschelling Bank. The British Battle Cruiser Fleet, was in position to give support near the Horn Reef, and the Grand Fleet was also in support north of the Battle Cruiser Fleet.¹

“On the morning of the 4th the conditions for sea-planes seemed from the Battle Fleet to be ideal, but, once more, the difficulty of getting these machines to rise from the water was experienced, a slight sea being sufficient to prevent all, except one, from carrying out the attack. This one sea-plane reported having dropped bombs on the objective. The remainder were damaged by the sea.”² An observing German airship was damaged by the gunfire of two British light cruisers, and was compelled to descend near one of the British submarines near the Vyl Lightship. The destruction of this airship was completed by the submarines, which rescued seven of the crew. No enemy ships were en-

aircraft from ships as then fitted,” had been sent to Liverpool “to improve the arrangements for flying off from the decks . . . these were not completed until the late spring of 1916.”

¹ Admiral Jellicoe has made the following interesting note: “The list of ships absent from the Fleet on this occasion owing to refit, repair, or to being engaged on other operations is given below; it is useful as showing the reduction that takes place in the nominal numbers comprising a watching fleet at any given moment: Battleships, *Ajax* and *Dreadnought*; battle cruisers, *New Zealand*, *Australia*, *Invincible*; cruisers, *Black Prince*, *Warrior*, *Donegal*; light cruisers, *Southampton*, *Gloucester*, *Blonde*; destroyers, twelve.”

² Admiral Jellicoe.

countered, and the British naval forces returned to their bases.

In writing of this period, Admiral Scheer has admitted that, "against the airship raids over England, it was obvious that latterly the defensive measures had become much more effectual." But he also wrote that "the Fleet made good use of the airships for all reconnoitring purposes in connection with important enterprises, which gained in value through coöperation with the U-boats and on which all the more energy had to be expended since the trade-war by the U-boats had been stopped since the end of April."

But one important point should always be kept in mind, in regard to this use of U-boats as military adjuncts of the Battle Fleet. Contrary to opinion at the time, the Germans had not progressed to plans for making tactical use of their submarines as a part of the actual manoeuvres of a fighting fleet. The study of the Germans had been devoted to "consideration as to what would be the most desirable way to station U-boats off enemy harbours; how they could be used in the form of movable mine-barriers, as flank protection, or otherwise render assistance."¹

Admiral Scheer's reasons, for not making tactical use of the U-boats with the German fleet, should be quoted: "Tactical coöperation would have been understood to mean that on the Fleet putting out to sea with the possibility of encountering the enemy, having the fixed intention of leading up to such an encounter, numbers of U-boats would be present from the beginning in order to be able to join in the battle. Even as certain rules have been evolved for the employment of cruisers and

¹ Admiral Scheer.

torpedo-boats in a daylight battle to support the activity of the battleship fleet, so might an opportunity have been found for the tactical employment of the U-boats. But no preliminary work had been done in that respect, and it would have been a very risky experiment to take U-boats into a battle without a thorough trial. The two principal drawbacks are their inadequate speed and the possibility of their not distinguishing between friend and foe." This statement is unmistakable, as to the attitude of the German Navy in the Spring of 1916, and all other ideas should be put out of the mind of the student of naval operations in the World War.

After the repairs of the *Seydlitz* and the battleships of Squadron III had been completed, the German Battle Fleet was again ready for operations in force, and Admiral Scheer on May 18 issued orders for another movement of the Battle Fleet. This sally of the German High Sea Fleet was destined to bring on the Battle of Jutland.

CHAPTER XVI

THE BRITISH NAVAL STRATEGY OF 1916

THE preceding chapters have related the developments of naval strategy in 1916, from the German point of view and from the statements of the German leaders, which do not leave any doubt as to the attitude of the German Navy at the time of the Battle of Jutland. Before describing the situation which brought about the great naval action, it would be profitable to give also the point of view of the British Navy, and this has been set forth by the British Commander-in-Chief. As has been stated in the first volume of this work, Admiral Jellicoe should not be considered merely as an individual officer, but as representing the prevailing doctrines in the British Navy.

Admiral Jellicoe has very ably and clearly stated these convictions:¹ "It may not be out of place here to touch upon the general naval situation in the spring of 1916. What were the strategical conditions? To what extent was it justifiable to take risks with the Grand Fleet, particularly risks the full consequence of which could not be foreseen owing to the new conditions of naval warfare?"

"The Grand Fleet included almost the whole of our available capital ships. There was very little in reserve behind it. . . ."

Admiral Jellicoe then gives figures comparing the

¹ "The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916," Admiral Jellicoe.

strength of the opposing fleets in 1805 with the strength in 1916, and he continues:

“A consideration of these figures will show that the situation at the two periods under review was very different, in that, in 1805, the force engaged at Trafalgar was only a relatively small portion of the available British fleet, whilst in 1916 the Grand Fleet included the large majority of the vessels upon which the country had to rely for safety.”

“Earlier in the war, at the end of October, 1914, I had written to the Admiralty pointing out the dangers which an intelligent use of submarines, mines and torpedoes by the Germans, before and during a fleet action, would involve to the Grand Fleet, and had stated the tactics which I had intended in order to bring the enemy to action in the shortest practicable time and with the best chance of achieving such a victory as would be decisive. I stated that with new and untried methods of warfare, new tactics must be devised to meet them.”

“I received in reply an expression of approval of my views and of confidence in the manner in which I proposed to handle the fleet in action.”

“Neither in October, 1914, nor in May, 1916, did the margin of superiority of the Grand Fleet over the High Seas Fleet justify me in disregarding the enemy's torpedo fire or meeting it otherwise than by definite movements reduced after most careful analysis of the problem at sea with the fleet and on the tactical board.”

“The severely restricted forces behind the Grand Fleet were taken into account in making the decision. There was also a possibility that the Grand Fleet might

later be called upon to confront a situation of much wider scope than that already existing.”

Admiral Jellicoe's letter of October 30, 1914, to which he refers in the above, and the British Admiralty's note of formal approval (November 7, 1914), will be found in full in the Appendix of this work.¹ They form the basis of the arguments, which are here quoted from Admiral Jellicoe's book, and these must be accepted as the carefully thought out conclusions which guided the British Commander-in-Chief at the time, because Admiral Jellicoe, himself, has given them as explaining his conduct of the British Battle Fleet in the Jutland action.

When we read this letter of Admiral Jellicoe to the British Admiralty, with his account of the difficulties of the task of the Commander-in-Chief of the first great Battle Fleet which was compelled to encounter the many new dangers of naval warfare, and his estimate of their influence upon the manoeuvres of fleets, it is possible to understand why the so called “defensive” school came into existence in the British Navy. Again it should be emphasized that the views thus stated by Admiral Jellicoe were not alone his own convictions, but they were the policies for control of the Battle Fleet approved and adopted by the British Admiralty.

This led to the attitude that far reaching results had been attained by the one great established condition, the superiority of the British Fleet over that of the enemy, and the consequent contention that it was more important than anything else to defend the superior British Fleet from impairment. It will be evident to

¹ Page 313.

the reader that these arguments looked to the British Fleet alone, that, for instance, Admiral Jellicoe, in discussing the "reserve behind the British Battle Fleet," did not state the fact that there was absolutely no reserve behind the German Battle Fleet.¹ But these British doctrines must be quoted in the form given by Admiral Jellicoe, because they set forth the motives of the strategy and tactics of the British Fleet in the Jutland action.

Admiral Jellicoe has again, so clearly as to be unmistakable, in another paragraph of his book, emphasized this strong influence upon his mind: "A third consideration that was present in my mind was the necessity for *not leaving anything to chance in a Fleet action, because our Fleet was the one and only factor that was vital to the existence of the Empire*, as indeed of the Allied cause. We had no reserve outside the Battle Fleet which could in any way take its place, should disaster befall it or even should its margin of superiority over the enemy be eliminated." (The italics are Lord Jellicoe's.)

In addition to these strategic considerations, Admiral Jellicoe has stated many advantages in construction and equipment possessed by the German fleet, which offset the great superiority of the British Grand Fleet. He has dwelt upon the greater armor protection of the German ships, and upon their heavier torpedo armament, with other elements of better construction and equipment. He has written: "There was yet one other matter of great importance, namely the vulnerability

¹ Outside of the large number of British predreadnought battleships, the Entente Allies also could rely upon the French, Russian, and Italian Fleets. There was practically nothing in the German Navy but the High Sea Fleet, and the Austrian Fleet was contained by the Italian Fleet.

of the ships of the two Navies in regard to underwater attacks. Here the Germans possessed a very real advantage, which stood them in good stead throughout the war. It arose from two causes:

1. The greater extent of the protective armour inside the ships, and in many cases its greater thickness.

2. The greater distance of this armour from the outer skin of the ship and the consequent additional protection to under-water attack afforded thereby." In explaining these advantages possessed by the weaker German fleet Admiral Jellicoe has also revealed disappointing conditions in backwardness of methods on the part of the British Navy. There was not alone the lack of modern methods in range-finding and director fire-control, but also in torpedo attack and defense, and in preparation for night actions. It is something of a shock to read that the stronger British fleet went into the Jutland battle with a handicap in these essentials that became a factor to prevent a decisive action.

He also emphasized the greater number of torpedoes carried by the German destroyers and the consequent ability of the German fleet to make torpedo attacks stronger than its proportionate force in comparison with the British fleet. Lord Jellicoe stated that this possible strength of torpedo attacks on the part of the Germans had been recognized as an adverse factor: "The probable tactics of the German fleet had been a matter of almost daily consideration, and all our experience and thought led to the same conclusion, namely, that retiring tactics, combined with destroyer attacks, would be adopted by them."

Admiral Jellicoe's statement of the advantages pos-

sessed by a retiring fleet is in itself an interesting comment on the British tactics for the action.

“(a) The retiring fleet places itself in a position of advantage in regard to torpedo attack on the following fleet. The retiring fleet also eliminates, to a large extent, danger of torpedo attacks by the following fleet.”

“(b) Opportunity is afforded the retiring fleet of drawing its opponent over a mine or submarine trap.”

“(c) Smoke screens can be used with effect to interfere with the observation of gunfire by the following fleet.”

“(d) Consideration of moral effect will force the stronger fleet to follow the weaker, and play into the hands of the enemy.”

“The reasons which make it necessary to be more cautious when dealing with the attack of under-water weapons than with gun attack are the greater damage which one torpedo hit will cause, which damage may well be fatal to many ships, in most cases compelling the ships to reduce speed and leave the line of battle.”

Again, as in Admiral Jellicoe's other discussion of his views, these conclusions were drawn from looking at the dangers to the British Fleet alone, not for a counter against the German Fleet by subjecting it to the same dangers from British torpedo attacks. But these lines of reasoning should also be quoted in Admiral Jellicoe's own terms, as doctrines prevailing at the time, and they unquestionably had the tendency to concede a superiority in torpedo attack to the Germans, and to impose caution upon the stronger British Fleet in following up a retiring enemy fleet.

The views and arguments of Admiral Jellicoe are clearly expressed, and the British Commander-in-Chief

has written with a sincere conviction that they gave a sound basis for his conduct in the action, having been approved by the British Admiralty. Consequently, they merit all due consideration, and should be understood, in respect to their guiding influence upon British battle tactics, before studying the events of the Battle of Jutland.

CHAPTER XVII

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — THE FIRST CONTACT

(See Map at page 166)

FOR the convenience of the reader, authorities quoted in this account of the Battle of Jutland are indicated in the text as follows: Admiral Jellicoe (J), Vice Admiral Beatty (B), Admiral Scheer (S).

THE operation of the German High Sea Fleet, for which orders had been issued on May 18, 1916, was originally planned to be an attack upon the British coast. For some time after the action brought about by this sortie, there were tales of other mysterious German objects — to cover the escape of a force of raiders, to get ships out of the Baltic, etc. But all of these theories have been abandoned, and this movement of the German Battle Fleet has been recognized as the natural sequence of the operations that had gone before.

It is also a fact that the preceding operation, against Lowestoft and Yarmouth, had especial effects upon both sides which should be noted. In Great Britain it had caused a demand for better protection by the British Fleet, and the First Lord of the Admiralty had given assurance to the nation. Admiral Jellicoe's "opinion was asked by the Admiralty as to the steps which could be taken to minimize the danger of a recurrence of such raids on the unfortified towns on the south-east coast as that of the 25th. Although they inflicted no military damage, they were undoubtedly a great annoyance owing to the alarm of the inhabitants, and might result in much loss of life. I suggested that the placing of the 3rd Battle Squadron in the Humber

or in the Thames might act as a deterrent, and in any case would make it necessary for the enemy to bring heavy ships, which would give us an opportunity of inflicting injury by submarines or by ships of the Grand Fleet, if, by good fortune, we happened to be cruising sufficiently far to the southward at the time." (J) Admiral Jellicoe pointed out that this force would be of use "in the unlikely event of landing raids," also as support for the Harwich Force, and the Grand Fleet could spare these older battleships since the arrival of the 5th Battle Squadron, five new ships of the *Queen Elizabeth* Class.¹ "The proposal was adopted, and the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron sailed for the Humber on the 29th (April), en route to the Medway. . . . The Admiralty also stationed some of the monitors in the more important undefended ports." (J)

The effect of this, and its influence upon the Germans,² was clearly reflected in the plans of Admiral Scheer³ for his coming offensive. "The object of the next undertaking was a bombardment of the fortifications and works of the harbour of Sunderland which, situated about the middle of the East coast of England, would be certain to call out a display of English fighting forces as promised by Mr. Balfour." (S) This influence was also most apparent in Admiral Scheer's original

¹ The *Queen Elizabeth* of this class was in refit, as will be stated, and absent from the Squadron.

² "The operation against Lowestoft on 23 and 24 April of this year had the effect which our war plan intended it to have." (S)

³ "Wherefore Mr. Balfour, the First Lord of the Admiralty, felt called upon to announce publicly that should the German ships again venture to show themselves off the British coast, measures had been taken to ensure their being severely punished." (S)

order of May 18, 1916, which was as follows: "The bombardment of Sunderland by our cruisers is intended to compel the enemy to send out forces against us. For the attack on the advancing enemy the High Sea Fleet forces to be south of the Dogger Bank, and the U-boats to be stationed for attack off the East coast of England. The enemy's ports of sortie will be closed by mines. The Naval Corps will support the undertaking with their U-boats. If time and circumstances permit, trade war will be carried on during proceedings."

After giving the proposed distribution of cruisers and destroyers, Admiral Scheer has stated: "Sixteen of our U-boats were told off for the positions of attack, with six to eight of the Flanders boats. On May 15 they started to reconnoitre in the North Sea, and from May 23 to June 1 inclusive were to remain at the posts assigned to them, observe the movements of the English forces, and gain any information that might be of use to the Fleet in their advance; at the same time they were also to seize every opportunity to attack. Provision was also made for the largest possible number of our airships to assist the enterprise by reconnaissance from the air. The fact that the U-boats could only remain out for a certain period put a limit to the execution of the plan. If reconnaissance from the air proved impossible, it was arranged to make use of the U-boats, and so dispense with aerial reconnaissance." (S) The U-boats were "to sweep through the northern portions of the North Sea, and to take up positions off the enemy's main bases: i.e., Humber, Firth of Forth, Moray Firth and Scapa Flow. . . . The Naval Corps (Flanders) gladly undertook to block the British Naval Ports in the Hoofden in a similar manner." (S)

Again in his report Admiral Scheer emphasized the object of his undertaking: "to compel the enemy to put to sea, by making an advance with our Fleet, and to give battle under conditions favorable to us."

"As the weather each day continued to be unfavorable and the airship commander could only report that it was impossible to send up any airships," (S) the German Admiral changed his plan to an advance towards the Skagerrak. Of this change, the explanation in Admiral Scheer's report should be studied: "For the North-Westerly advance (the attack on the British coast) extended scouting by airships was indispensable, as it would lead into an area where we could not let ourselves be drawn into an action against our will. There was less danger of this in the Northerly advance, for the coast of Jutland afforded a certain cover against surprise from the East, and the distances from the enemy's bases were greater. Aerial reconnaissance, although desirable here also, was not absolutely necessary. . . . The weather on 30 May showing no signs of change and it being impossible to keep the submarines off the enemy ports any longer, I decided to abandon the North-Westerly advance, and to carry out that towards the North, if necessary, without the assistance of airships."

Consequently, in the ensuing operation, it should be kept in mind that Admiral Scheer's Battle Fleet was neither accompanied by U-boats nor airships. This was contrary to reports at the time,¹ but it was the fact. Of the U-boats, disposed in coöperation as explained, Admiral Scheer has stated in his report: "The reports

¹ ". . . although many submarines were present. . . ." — Admiral Jellicoe, Report.

gave no indications of the enemy's intentions." In regard to the German coöperating airships, Admiral Scheer's report has finally disposed of them for the day of battle, by stating that, "between 2.00 and 4.00 P.M." May 31, five ascended "for the purpose of long-distance reconaissance in the sector between North and West from Heligoland. They did not succeed in taking any part in the action which developed soon afterwards, nor did they observe anything of our Main Fleet or of the enemy, nor did they hear anything of the engagement. . . ."

These German airships on May 31 scouted not only to northward, in the direction of the battlefield, but also to westward of Admiral Scheer's area of operation. But, whatever influence this might have upon Admiral Scheer's conduct was set at nought in the actual event, because, as stated above by Admiral Scheer, German airship reconaissance on May 31 was a failure. This failure to give any information to the German Commander-in-Chief came from two causes: first, the fact that weather conditions remained so unfavorable that the airships were unable to leave until they were many hours too late; secondly, because the conditions of low clouds and atmospheric visibility made observation impossible. Even the one airship that passed over the battlefield did not see or hear anything of the battle.

Knowing these facts, as to the U-boats and aircraft, it is evident that the effect of these German auxiliary forces on the course of the Battle of Jutland was negligible.

In his report Admiral Scheer has stated his plan of operations as follows: "The Senior Officer of Scouting Forces, Vice-Admiral Hipper, was ordered to leave the

Jade at 4 A.M.¹ on 31 May, with the I and II Scouting Groups, the 2nd Leader of Destroyers in the *Regensburg* and the II, VI and IX Destroyer Flotillas, and to push on to the Skagerrak, keeping out of sight of Horns Reef and the Danish Coast, to show himself before dark off the Norwegian coast, so that the British would receive news of the operation, and to carry out a cruiser and commerce warfare during the late afternoon and the following night off and in the Skagerrak.”

“The Main Fleet, consisting of the I, II and III Squadrons, IV Scouting Group, 1st Leader of Destroyers in the *Rostock* and the remainder of the Destroyer Flotillas, was to follow at 4.30 A.M., to cover the Scouting Forces during the operation, and to meet them on the morning of 1 June.”

“The Channel swept by our Mineseeking Forces to the West of Amrum Bank, through the enemy mine-fields, enabled the High Sea Forces to reach the open sea in safety.”

On May 31, 1916, the British Battle Fleet was also in the North Sea. It had left its bases the day before, not only “in pursuance of the general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea” (J), but because the Admiralty had given special instructions, after receiving information of enemy activity. There had been indications of the German dispositions of submarines, which were the preliminaries of this operation. “But its precise nature still remained obscure and there was nothing tangible to indicate that it was part of a large operation to be carried out in direct con-

¹ It must be understood that wherever German times are *quoted*, they are two hours later than G. M. T. All times given in text and all British times are G. M. T.

junction with the High Sea Fleet. By May 28th, however, it became clear that some considerable movement was afoot.”¹ The Admiralty Blue Book has stated: “On 30th May, 1916, the Admiralty received news which pointed to early activity on the part of the German Fleet. The Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, and the Vice-Admiral Commanding Battle Cruiser Fleet were informed accordingly by telegram. The Admiralty also informed the Commander-in-Chief that eight enemy submarines, which they had reason to believe had recently sailed from German ports, were probably in the North Sea. Admiralty telegram No. 434 of 30th May, 1916, time of origin 1740, sent to the Commander-in-Chief and repeated to the Vice-Admiral Commanding Battle Cruiser Fleet, contained the following instructions:—‘You should concentrate to Eastward of Long Forties ready for eventualities.’”²

But it must not be thought that the British information as to enemy activity included definite news of the movement of Admiral Scheer’s High Sea Fleet, which has been described.³ Instead of anything of the kind, the British Admiralty’s historian has stated: “On this occasion, in the absence of any indications that the Germans had changed their policy, neither the Admiralty nor Admiral Jellicoe had any reason for altering the established policy.” Sir Julian Corbett has also stated that, “although it was thought he (Admiral Scheer) had sailed that morning, our directional wireless up till noon could only indicate that the battle

¹ “Narrative of the Battle of Jutland,” British Admiralty’s “Official Narrative.”

² Admiralty Blue Book: “Battle of Jutland.”

³ “The position still remained obscured, but steps were taken to meet the contingency.” — “Narrative of the Battle of Jutland.”

fleet was still in the Jade. Thus Admiral Jellicoe, who was informed of this by the Admiralty, had no special reason to expect the chance of an action. The natural deduction from the information he had was that another of the now familiar cruiser raids was on foot, and that, as before, the battle fleet was preparing to cover the retirement. This being so, there was nothing to call for a modification of his dispositions." These statements have made it evident that the British did not have information of the operation involving the whole German High Sea Fleet.

In his report Admiral Jellicoe has stated that "in accordance with the instructions contained in their Lordship's telegram No. 434 of 30th May, Code Time 1740, the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea on 30th May, 1916."

"The instructions given to those portions of the fleet that were not in company with my flag at Scapa Flow were as follows:—To Vice Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, with Second Battle Squadron at Invergordon:—Leave as soon as ready. Pass through Lat. $58^{\circ} 15' N.$, Long. $2^{\circ} 0' E.$, meet me 2.0 P.M. tomorrow 31st, Lat. $57^{\circ} 45' N.$, Long. $4^{\circ} 15' E.$ Several enemy submarines known to be in North Sea. Acknowledge. 1930 Code Time."

"To Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty, Commanding the Battle Cruiser Fleet at Rosyth, with the Fifth Battle Squadron, Rear Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas in company: Urgent, Priority. Admiralty telegram 1740. Available vessels, Battle Cruiser Fleet, Fifth Battle Squadron and T. B. D.s including Harwich T. B. D.s proceed to approximate position Lat. $56^{\circ} 40' N.$, Long. $5^{\circ} 0' E.$ Desirable to economize T. B. D.'s fuel. Pre-

sume you will be there about 2.0 P.M. tomorrow 31st. I shall be in about Lat. $57^{\circ} 45' N.$, Long. $4^{\circ} 15' E.$ by 2.0 P.M. unless delayed by fog.”

“Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, *Chester* and *Canterbury* will leave with me. I will send them on to your rendezvous. If no news by 2.0 P.M. stand towards me to get in visual touch. I will steer for Horn Reef from position Lat. $57^{\circ} 45' N.$, Long. $4^{\circ} 15' E.$ Repeat back rendezvous. 1937 (Code Time).”

In pursuance of these orders to designated rendezvous, Admiral Jellicoe's command¹ left Scapa at 9.30 P.M. (May 30); Admiral Jerram's command left Cromarty at 10 P.M.; Admiral Beatty also left Rosyth at 10 P.M. with his battle cruisers and attendants, followed by Admiral Evan-Thomas' Fifth Battle Squadron from Rosyth at 10.40 P.M.² “The Fleet had been slightly delayed” (J) by examining vessels, and at 2 P.M. May 31 “was about 18 miles to the northwest” (J) of the designated location, being actually in Lat. $57^{\circ} 57' N.$, Long. $3^{\circ} 45' E.$

Admiral Jellicoe's Battle Fleet was in divisions “in line ahead disposed abeam to starboard in order 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, divisions screened by the Fourth, Eleventh and Twelfth Flotillas; Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron three miles ahead of the battle fleet; cruisers and destroyers sixteen miles ahead of the battle fleet, spread eight miles apart on a line of direction

¹ “Only the *Royal Sovereign*, recently commissioned, the seaplane carrier *Amanian*, and three destroyers were left behind.” — “Narrative of the Battle of Jutland.”

² Of the Rosyth forces, the *Queen Elizabeth*, the name ship of the class, was absent from the Fifth Battle Squadron, being under refit. Of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the *Australia*, flagship of the Second Battle Cruiser Squadron, was also absent, refitting at Devonport.

N. 40° E., and S. 40° W.,¹ attached cruisers on the flanks; Third Battle Cruiser Squadron *Chester* and *Canterbury* about twenty miles ahead; the whole steering S. 50° E., zigzagging, with a speed of advance of fourteen knots." (J)

Vice-Admiral Beatty's command, Battle Cruiser Fleet and Fifth Battle Squadron, were at the same time (2 P.M. May 31) in Lat. 56° 46' N., Long. 4° 40' E., course N. by E., speed 19½ knots. *Lion* and First Battle Cruiser Squadron in single line ahead, screened by *Champion* and 10 destroyers; Second Battle Cruiser Squadron in single line ahead, three miles E. N. E. of *Lion*, screened by six destroyers of the Harwich Force; Fifth Battle Squadron in single line ahead five miles N. N. W. of *Lion*, screened by *Fearless* and 9 destroyers; Light Cruiser Squadrons (11 ships) forming a screen astern 8 miles S. S. E. from *Lion*, ships spread on a line of direction E. N. E. to W. S. S., five miles apart.² With the light cruisers was the seaplane carrier *Engadine*,³ and the *Yarmouth* acted as linking ship between the *Lion* and the screen of light cruisers.

At this time the German Fleet was moving on its northerly sweep, as described, and the advance force under Vice Admiral Hipper was to the east of Vice Admiral Beatty's force. This German Reconnaissance Force of five battle cruisers was in single line ahead, with screening destroyers in attendance, and five

¹ In order from East to West: *Cochrane*, *Shannon*, *Minotaur* (F), *Defence* (F), *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Black Prince*; *Warrior* astern of *Defence*; *Hampshire*, linking ship 6 miles astern of *Minotaur*; a destroyer with each cruiser.

² In order from West to East: *Southampton* (F), followed by *Birmingham*, *Nottingham* followed by *Dublin*, *Falmouth* (F), *Birkenhead* followed by *Gloucester*, *Inconstant* followed by *Cordelia*, *Galatea* (F), followed by *Phaeton*.

³ Between *Gloucester* and *Cordelia*.

cruisers,¹ each with attending destroyers, spread out in semicircle ten miles ahead and on the flank. Admiral Scheer's main force, the German High Sea Fleet, was following in support at a distance of about fifty miles.

The *Elbing*, the west wing cruiser of the German advance force, had sent a destroyer to examine a steamer, and "some single enemy ships" (S) were reported at 2.28 P.M. The *Galatea*, east wing cruiser of the British advance force, had reported this presence of enemy ships at 2.20 P.M. This was the first contact that led to the Battle of Jutland.

It will be apparent that, although the movements of the British and German fleets had been of a different nature,² each had resulted in a similar disposition of forces. In each case there was an advance force at a considerable distance from the main force that was to give it tactical support. On the British side the distance separating the advance force from the main body was about seventy miles, and the corresponding distance on the German side was about fifty miles.

In this regard, it should be made clear to the reader that the subsequent difficulties, which were experienced in concentrating the British forces, did not arise from the distance between Vice Admiral Beatty's command and the British Grand Fleet, but from faulty information.

¹ In order from West to East: *Elbing*, *Pillau*, *Frankfurt*, *Wiesbaden*, *Ragensburg*.

² The British Fleet, initially divided, had been ordered to assemble at a designated point after some preliminary scouting by the advanced force. The German Fleet, initially concentrated, was intentionally divided, the main force to "follow and cover the Scouting Forces" which were not primarily in search of the enemy but had a definite offensive task to perform.

This disposition of the British force was one that had often been used in "its periodical sweeps of the North Sea" (J) with the logical objects of finding the enemy and imposing superior forces. Unfortunately the errors in the estimated and reported positions of both the advance force and the main body at 2 P.M., together with subsequent errors and failures in the transmission of reports by radio, caused a confusion and lack of co-ordination of the several elements of the combined British Fleet which had serious consequences, in no wise due to the initial tactical disposition. In view of these errors, it cannot be said that there was sufficient preparation for using the whole of Admiral Jellicoe's command as parts of one great manoeuvre.

The accompanying tables¹ show the strength of the fighting ships of the opposing fleets. It will be seen at once that the British naval forces were far superior. And, also, the condition existed that the British advance force (6 battle cruisers, 4 dreadnoughts) was superior to the German advance force (5 battle cruisers), the British main force (24 dreadnoughts) superior to the German main force (16 dreadnoughts, 6 predreadnoughts).

The comparative speed of these naval forces should also be considered as an element in the tactical situation. The fleet speed of the whole British advance force was 25 knots, which was the speed of the four battle-ships of the *Queen Elizabeth* class. If the British battle cruisers were used as a separate force, their fleet speed was 27 knots. The fleet speed of the German advance force was 26½ knots. The fleet speed of the British main force was 20 knots, and that of the German main

¹ Pages 164-166.

force was 17 knots, as the dreadnoughts of the High Sea Fleet had been eked out with Squadron II of predreadnought battleships which had only that speed.

These contrasting makeups of the opposing fleets must be kept in mind, when studying the action, and also the weather conditions of May 31, 1916. The day of the battle was cloudy, but the sun shone through the clouds most of the time. At no time was there anything approaching a sea. Visibility was reported as good in the first stages of the action, but later in the afternoon, there being little wind, mist and smoke hung heavy over the surface of the sea.

THE BRITISH GRAND FLEET AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
MAKE-UP AND ARMAMENT OF THE BATTLE FLEET

1 Div.	2 Div.	3 Div.	4 Div.	5 Div.	6 Div.
2 <i>King George V</i> (F) 10 13.5-inch	3 <i>Orion</i> (F) 10 13.5-inch	1 <i>Iron Duke</i> (FF) 10 13.5-inch	5 <i>Benbow</i> (F) 10 13.5-inch	6 <i>Colossus</i> (F) 12 12-inch	7 <i>Marlborough</i> (F) 10 13.5-inch
<i>Ajax</i> 10 13.5-inch	<i>Monarch</i> 10 13.5-inch	<i>Royal Oak</i> 8 13-inch	<i>Bellerophon</i> 10 12-inch	<i>Collingwood</i> 10 12-inch	<i>Revenge</i> 8 15-inch
<i>Centurion</i> 10 13.5-inch	<i>Conqueror</i> 10 13.5-inch	4 <i>Superb</i> (F) 10 12-inch	<i>Temeraire</i> 10 12-inch	<i>Nephtun</i> 10 12-inch	<i>Hercules</i> 10 12-inch
<i>Erin</i> 10 13.5-inch	<i>Thunderer</i> 10 13.5-inch	<i>Canada</i> 10 14-inch	<i>Vanguard</i> 10 12-inch	<i>St. Vincent</i> 10 12-inch	<i>Agincourt</i> 14 12-inch

- 1 Fleet Flagship — Flag of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Commander-in-Chief.
- 2 Flagship of Vice Admiral Sir W. Ferran, Commanding 2nd Battle Squadron.
- 3 Flagship of Rear Admiral A. C. Leveson, Rear Admiral in 2nd Battle Squadron.
- 4 Flagship of Rear Admiral A. L. Duff, Rear Admiral in 4th Battle Squadron.
- 5 Flagship of Vice Admiral Sir Dovecot Sturdee, Commanding 4th Battle Squadron.
- 6 Flagship of Rear Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt, Rear Admiral in 1st Battle Squadron.
- 7 Flagship of Vice Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, Commanding 1st Battle Squadron and second in command of the Grand Fleet.

From Scapa Flow also, attached to Grand Fleet, Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, under Rear Admiral Hood:

← *Invincible* 8 12-inch *Inflexible* 8 12-inch *Indomitable* 8 12-inch

This Squadron was sent ahead, and eventually joined up with Vice Admiral Beatty.

THE GERMAN HIGH SEA FLEET AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
MAKE-UP AND ARMAMENT OF THE BATTLE FLEET

← Squadron III	Squadron I	Squadron II
4 <i>König</i> (F) 10 12-inch	2 <i>Ostfriesland</i> (F) 12 12-inch	3 <i>Deutschland</i> (F) 4 11-inch
<i>Grosser Kurfürst</i> 10 12-inch	<i>Thüringen</i> 12 12-inch	<i>Pommern</i> 4 11-inch
<i>Markgraf</i> 10 12-inch	<i>Helgoland</i> 12 12-inch	<i>Schlesien</i> 4 11-inch
<i>Kronprinz</i> 10 12-inch	<i>Oldenburg</i> 12 12-inch	<i>Schleswig-Holstein</i> 4 11-inch
5 <i>Kaiser</i> (F) 10 12-inch	6 <i>Posen</i> (F) 12 11-inch	7 <i>Hannover</i> (F) 4 11-inch
<i>Prinz Regent Luitpold</i> 10 12-inch	<i>Rheinland</i> 12 11-inch	<i>Hessen</i> 4 11-inch
<i>Kaiserin</i> 10 12-inch	<i>Nassau</i> 12 11-inch	
1 <i>Friedrich der Grosse</i> (FF) 10 12-inch	<i>Westfalen</i> 12 11-inch	

¹ Fleet Flagship — Flag of Admiral Scheer, Commander-in-Chief.

² Flagship of Vice Admiral Schmidt commanding Squadron I.

³ Flagship of Rear Admiral Mauve commanding Squadron II.

⁴ Flagship of Rear Admiral Behnke commanding Squadron III.

⁵ Flagship of Rear Admiral Nordmann.

⁶ Flagship of Rear Admiral Engelhardt.

⁷ Flagship of Rear Admiral Lichtenfels.

MAKE-UP AND ARMAMENT OF THE BRITISH
ADVANCE FORCE UNDER VICE
ADMIRAL BEATTY

	<i>Lion</i> (F) Battle Cruiser	8 13.5-inch
	First Battle Cruiser Squadron	
↑	<i>Princess Royal</i>	8 13.5-inch
	<i>Queen Mary</i>	8 13.5-inch
	<i>Tiger</i>	8 13.5-inch
	Second Battle Cruiser Squadron	
	<i>New Zealand</i>	8 12-inch
	<i>Indefatigable</i>	8 12-inch
	Fifth Battle Squadron — Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas	
	<i>Barham</i> (F)	8 15-inch
	<i>Valiant</i>	8 15-inch
	<i>Warspite</i>	8 15-inch
	<i>Malaya</i>	8 15-inch

MAKE-UP AND ARMAMENT OF GERMAN ADVANCE
FORCE UNDER VICE ADMIRAL HIPPER

(RECONNAISSANCE FORCE)

	First Scouting Group (Battle Cruisers)	
↑	<i>Lützow</i> (F)	8 12-inch
	<i>Derfflinger</i>	8 12-inch
	<i>Seydlitz</i>	10 11-inch
	<i>Moltke</i>	10 11-inch
	<i>Von der Tann</i>	8 11-inch

NAVAL STRATEGY WHICH LED TO THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND


- (A) Torpedoing of the *Sussex* (March 26, 1916) which brought forth an ultimatum from the United States, and Germany surrendered as to the U-boats.
- (B) German Naval raid on Lowestoft (April 25, 1916).

JUTLAND OPERATIONS

- (1) Admiral Scheer's original object of attack for his proposed operation of May, 1916.
- (2) German U-boats stationed off the British coast, to act in conjunction with this proposed operation.
- (3) German airships, prepared to act in conjunction with this proposed operation. But these airships were kept on the ground by unfavorable weather, and their inability to cooperate caused Admiral Scheer to change his plan.
- (4) Sortie of German Fleet to northward, in consequence of this change of plan (May 30, 1916).
- (5) Admiral Jellicoe's main Battle Fleet leaving Scapa and Moray (May 30, 1916) for rendezvous of May 31, 1916.
- (6) Vice Admiral Beatty's British advance force leaving Rosyth (May 30, 1916) for rendezvous of May 31, 1916.

POSITIONS AT 2 P.M., MAY 31, 1916

- (7) Vice Admiral Hipper's German advance force.
- (8) Admiral Scheer's German main Battle Fleet.
- (9) Vice Admiral Beatty's British advance force.
- (10) Admiral Jellicoe's British main Battle Fleet.
- (11) Harwich Force, kept in port on afternoon of May 31, 1916.



CHAPTER XVIII

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — THE BATTLE CRUISER ACTION

(See Map at page 249)

AFTER the first contact between the British and German advance forces had occurred, as described in the preceding chapter, both advance forces turned toward one another, and a naval action became imminent. Admiral Scheer reported: "Our cruisers gave chase." Admiral Beatty stated in his report: "At 2.20 P.M. reports were received from *Galatea* indicating the presence of enemy vessels to the E. S. E., steering to the Northward. The direction of advance was immediately altered to S. S. E., the course for Horn Reef, so as to place my force between the enemy and his base."

"After the first report of the enemy the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons changed their direction and without waiting for orders spread to the East, thereby forming a screen in advance of the Battle Cruiser Squadron by the time we had hauled up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy Light Cruisers at long range. In the meantime the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron had come in at high speed and was able to take station ahead of the Battle Cruisers by the time we turned to E. S. E., the course on which we first engaged the enemy. In this respect the work of the Light Cruiser Squadrons was excellent and of great value." (B)

Vice Admiral Beatty had soon realized that he was in contact with heavy enemy ships. In his report of the action he stated: "From a report from *Galatea* at 2.25 p.m. it was evident that the enemy force was considerable and not merely an isolated unit of Light Cruisers." Thereupon, "at 2.45 p.m.," (B) Vice Admiral Beatty ordered the seaplane carrier *Engadine* to send up a seaplane "and scout to N. N. E." (B) Of this Vice Admiral Beatty stated in his report: "Owing to clouds it was necessary to fly very low," and "in order to identify 4 enemy Light Cruisers" the seaplane had to fly within 3000 yards at a height of 900 ft., under fire of these cruisers' guns. This British seaplane was not able to identify Vice Admiral Hipper's German battle cruisers, which were present.¹ Still less was there anything approaching a wide observation that would inform Vice Admiral Beatty of the German main force, which was then moving to the north to support the German advance.

This quest was the only use of aircraft by the British Fleet in the whole action. Consequently, in view of the small result on the part of the British, and also in view of the failure of the German aircraft, which has been described, it is only a true statement of the case to say that the course of the Battle of Jutland was practically uninfluenced by aircraft, and this should be remembered when studying the action.

From the German side, as their advance force approached, Vice Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers were sighted by Vice Admiral Hipper at 3.20 p.m., "two

¹ "Engine trouble forced her to descend, and the *Engadine* picked her up while the battle cruisers passed swiftly on to the eastward." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

columns of large ships steering about East bearing about West: they were soon recognized to be 6 battle cruisers." (S) As has been stated, the five German battle cruisers were already in single line ahead.

In the meantime, a message from the *Galatea* (2.39 P.M.) had informed Vice Admiral Beatty of "a large amount of smoke as from a fleet, bearing E. N. E." (B) ¹ This had "made it clear," Vice Admiral Beatty stated in his report, "that the enemy was to the Northward and Eastward, and that it would be impossible to round the Horn Reef without being brought into action."

Consequently, Vice Admiral Beatty, at this time, not only had information that "the enemy force was considerable" (B), with the probable presence of heavy ships, but he was also placed where the enemy force must engage him in order to round Horn Reef. Thus Vice Admiral Beatty, at this early stage, was in an interposing position, where he was sure of an engagement; and it was also a fact that he had attained this advantageous position without the use of high speed on his part. For, at this stage, his speed had been only 19½ knots.

At 2.33 P.M. he had made general signals: "Admiral intends to proceed at 22 knots." "Raise steam for full speed and report when ready to proceed." Upon receipt of the information from the *Galatea*, "course was accordingly altered to the Eastward and Northeastward." (B) At 2.52 P.M. Vice Admiral Beatty made signal for a southeasterly course. At 3 P.M. he sig-

¹ 2.39 P.M. *Galatea* to S. O. B. C. F. "Urgent. Have sighted large amount of smoke as though from a fleet bearing E. N. E. My position is Lat. 56° 50' N. Longitude 5° 19' E." (Received in *Iron Duke* 2.35 P.M.)

naled to the Second Light Cruiser Squadron: "Prepare to attack the van of the enemy." At 3.01 P.M. he made general signal to alter course to East. At 3.12 P.M. he made general signal: "Admiral intends to proceed at 23 knots," and a minute later signaled for a northeast course. At 3.20 P.M. he made general signal: "Admiral intends to proceed at 24 knots," and at 3.21 P.M., to all squadrons, "My position Lat. $56^{\circ} 48'$ N., Longitude $5^{\circ} 17'$ E. Course N. E., speed 23 knots."

At 3.27 P.M. general signal was made: "Assume complete readiness for action in every respect." At 3.30 P.M. Vice Admiral Beatty, in his own words, "increased speed to 25 knots and formed Line of Battle, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with Destroyers of the 13th and 9th Flotillas taking station ahead." (B) At this time course was changed to east, "the enemy being sighted at 3.31 P.M. They appeared to be the 1st Scouting group of five Battle Cruisers." (B)

Vice Admiral Beatty then "turned to E. S. E., slightly converging on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards, and formed the Ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke." (B) Of this situation, as the fleets converged, Admiral Scheer stated in his report: "The enemy deployed towards the South and formed line of battle. The Senior Officer of Scouting Forces followed this movement (which was exceedingly welcome, as it afforded us the possibility of drawing the enemy on to our Main Fleet)." In fact, the trend of the action was thus in the direction of the advancing German High Sea Fleet, although this could not be apparent to Vice Admiral Beatty at the time.

Vice Admiral Beatty has written in his report his

estimate of the situation at this stage: "The visibility was good, the sun behind us, and the wind S. E. Being between the enemy and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically good." The essentials of this existing situation can be easily understood. The advance forces of the two fleets were in contact. Vice Admiral Hipper's mission must be to maintain the contact, and draw the British advance force toward the German Battle Fleet, so that, if possible, a superior German force could be brought to bear upon it, in accordance with the German hope to engage the enemy "at a disadvantage." Vice Admiral Beatty's mission was, on the other hand, to force action against the inferior detachment of the enemy and destroy it before it could be reinforced.

This situation brought about an action of which "the mean direction was S. S. E." (B), while a portion of Vice Admiral Beatty's force, the Fifth Battle Squadron, under the immediate command of Rear Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, "who had conformed to our movements, were now bearing N. N. W., 10,000 yards" (B). This statement of Vice Admiral Beatty meant that the Fifth Battle Squadron, in conforming to his changes of course, had not been closed to his British battle cruisers, but had remained separated from them by 10,000 yards. Consequently, it will be readily seen that, when the action developed to the south-southeastward, these four powerful *Queen Elizabeth* dreadnoughts, which were thus so far distant to the north-northwestward, were in no position to be effective in the ensuing fight which moved toward the opposite direction.

As a result of this situation, in a tactical sense, Vice Admiral Beatty's command was divided at the time

he engaged the enemy, and his whole force could not be imposed upon his enemy without slowing down his battle cruisers. The reason for this will be evident to the reader. At the increased speed they were using, it was too late to unite the two separated parts of his command, because the interval of 10,000 yards still existed at the actual time of engaging. Vice Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers at this very time had increased speed to 25 knots, which was the full speed of the *Queen Elizabeth* class composing the Fifth Battle Squadron. Consequently, the speed of the Fifth Battle Squadron was not sufficient to close the gap, and the four *Queen Elizabeth* battleships remained separated from Vice Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers by this wide interval.

But, in prewar calculations of strength, Vice Admiral Beatty's superiority in numbers of battle cruisers had been considered as conferring a superiority of 36 to 25 over his enemy.¹ On this basis of calculation, he was, therefore, justified in believing that, with only his six battle cruisers, he would be able to dominate the five German battle cruisers.

Against these six British battle cruisers, which were turning to offer battle on southeasterly courses, in the very direction of the approach of the German High Sea Fleet, Admiral Scheer has stated that Vice Admiral Hipper's five German battle cruisers "advanced in quarter line to within effective range, opening fire at 3.49 P.M. (G. M. T.) at a range of about 13,000 metres (14,217 yards)." (S) Vice Admiral Beatty has stated

¹ In the ratio of the squares of the numbers of units involved, all ships being considered as of equal strength. In addition, four of the British battle cruisers carried 13.5 inch guns while the Germans had nothing heavier than 12 inch.

in his report: "At 3.48 P.M. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards,¹ both forces opening fire practically simultaneously. . . . Course was altered to the southward and subsequently at intervals, to confuse the enemy's fire control; the mean direction was S. S. E., the enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500 yards."

It followed inevitably from the situation which has been described, with the mean direction S. S. E., that the Fifth Battle Squadron under Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas was not a factor of importance in this stage of the battle. Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas has stated in his report that at first only German cruisers were in range; that, even after being brought nearer by "altering course gradually to the southeastward," "at 4.06 P.M. fire was opened at an estimated range of 19,000 yards. At 4.08 P.M. a signal was made for Fifth Battle Squadron to concentrate in pairs on the two rear enemy ships." It is established that these two rear German ships were only slightly injured in this part of the action, although also under fire from the British battle cruisers. This fact has provided a determining test, from which it is clear that, as the natural result of the wide separating interval which has been described, the Fifth Battle Squadron cannot be said to have exerted much influence upon the enemy. Consequently, this phase of the battle must be considered as being, for all practical purposes, an action between Vice Admiral

¹ Gunnery Records of British Battle Cruisers given in Jutland Blue Book (*Princess Royal*, 3.55, 13,900) show that ranges closed rapidly at this time, explaining discrepancies in the reports of the two commanders. It is also evident that at the beginning the British overestimated the ranges, and the British Admiralty's official "Narrative" has stated: "The opening range has been variously estimated, and was probably about 15,300 yards."

Beatty's six British battle cruisers, and Vice Admiral Hipper's five German battle cruisers.

As has been previously stated, Vice Admiral Hipper's object must be, while maintaining touch with Vice Admiral Beatty's force, to draw it toward the German Battle Fleet to a position where the united German force might be imposed upon the British detached force. But, with Vice Admiral Beatty in the early interposing position which has been described, it must be here emphasized that the course was not open to Vice Admiral Hipper merely to flee to his reinforcement. On the contrary, it was necessary for him to fight his way against this interposing British force to a junction with the German Battle Fleet. Admiral Scheer has given Vice Admiral Hipper the credit for drawing the detached British force to the High Sea Fleet, as the German Commander-in-Chief has stated: "We had succeeded in bringing some of the enemy to action and in drawing them to our Main Fleet." This was in line with the hopes of the Germans, which have been pointed out, to engage British naval forces "at a disadvantage," but, as will be seen in the event, this was a questionable claim so far as any result was concerned.

Both the British and the German Commanders-in-Chief had been informed of the situation, as it developed for their detached advance forces from their contact with one another. The *Galatea's* signals had been taken in on Admiral Jellicoe's flagship, followed by Vice Admiral Beatty's identification of the five German battle cruisers, and at 3.55 P.M. this message was received from him: "Urgent. Am engaging Enemy. My position Lat. 56° 53' N., Long. 5° 31' E." Admiral Jellicoe had thereupon signaled his intention to proceed

at 20 knots, and Rear Admiral Hood's Third Battle Cruiser Squadron was given the order (4.05 P.M.) "Proceed immediately to support B. C. F.," at position stated above, "course S. 55° E. at 3.50 P.M."

Admiral Scheer stated in his report: "At 2.28 P.M. (G. M. T.), when about 50 miles west of Lyngvig, the first information was received of the sighting of enemy light forces, and at 3.35 P.M. (G. M. T.) the first report came to hand that enemy heavy forces were in sight. The distance between the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces and the Main Fleet was at this time about 50 miles. On receipt of this report, line of Battle K. 312 (Single Line ahead in the sequence Squadron III, Squadron I, Squadron II) was closed up and the order 'Clear for Action' was given." This was followed by the message, at 3.45 P.M., that Vice Admiral Hipper "was engaged with 6 enemy battle cruisers on a South-Easterly course," (S) which was leading the action in the direction of the approach of the High Sea Fleet, and Admiral Scheer's comment was significant: "The task of the Main Fleet was now to relieve the materially weaker battle cruisers as quickly as possible, and to endeavor to cut off a premature retreat of the enemy."

Consequently, the tactical situation existed that the British advance force was moving away from its main force, but the German advance force was drawing nearer its approaching main force at a rate of over forty miles an hour. And this situation must be kept in mind, when considering the ensuing action between the British and German battle cruisers. This action was the first real test of the types. The only other clash between battle cruisers, the Dogger Bank chase, had not provided such a test, as it was fought at long ranges

and broken off under the circumstances which have been related in the preceding volume of this work.

Before the Battle of Jutland, the odds in favor of Vice Admiral Beatty would have been considered almost prohibitive, but it was the British Battle Cruiser Fleet which suffered. In his report Admiral Jellicoe wrote: "But it is also undoubted that the gunnery of the German battle cruisers in the early stages was of a very high standard. They appeared to get on to their target and establish hitting within two or three minutes of opening fire in almost every case, and this at very long ranges of 18,000 yards."¹ Vice Admiral Beatty wrote in his report: "For the next ten minutes² the firing of the enemy was very rapid and effective. *Lion* was hit repeatedly, the roof of Q turret being blown off and the turret disabled at 4 P.M. Immediately afterwards *Indefatigable* was hit by three shots falling together. The shots appeared to hit the outer edge of the upper deck in line with the after turret. An explosion followed, and she fell out of line sinking by the stern. Hit again by another salvo near A turret, she turned over and disappeared." As Sir Julian Corbett has written, "In a moment all trace of her was gone" — 57 officers and 960 men. The *Indefatigable* was the last ship in Vice Admiral Beatty's line of battle, and Admiral Scheer stated that she "was sunk with a violent explosion by the fire of the *Von der Tann*."

The *Lion* had a narrow escape from destruction by a similar explosion, as, after her turret had been

¹ As has been stated, this estimate of the opening ranges, taken from Vice Admiral Beatty's report, was exaggerated.

² "It was now close on four o'clock. A large barque with all sails set was lying becalmed between the two fleets." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

wrecked with the loss of nearly the whole of the guns' crew, it was only the presence of mind of a mortally wounded officer¹ that made it possible to close the magazine doors, and flood the magazine before she was blown up by the fire which was started. A photograph of the *Lion*, taken in the action just after this injury, shows flames shooting up from the wrecked Q turret higher than the mast.²

At the time of this quickly developed effectiveness of the German gunfire, which had resulted at once in the serious damage to the *Lion* and the loss of the *Indefatigable*, Vice Admiral Beatty turned away, "to confuse the enemy's fire control, and to open the range till by 4.05 the German guns could no longer reach, and Admiral Hipper ceased fire."³ This turnaway had opened the range from 14,600 yards at 4.05 P.M.⁴ to 21,000 yards at 4.12 P.M.⁵ But at this latter time (4.12 P.M.) "course was altered at S. E. to close the enemy."⁶

It is important for the reader to realize that, by this stage of the action, the condition was established that Vice Admiral Hipper was succeeding in fighting his way toward the approaching German main fleet, instead of being forced away from this German reinforcement by the interposing British force. On the contrary, as described above, it was the British force that had been obliged to give ground instead of Vice Admiral Hipper's German force. This meant that Vice Admiral Beatty was not succeeding, by means of his battle cruisers

¹ Major F. W. J. Harvey, R. M. L. I., who received the Victoria Cross after death.

² Taken from H. M.-S. *Ledyard* about 4.08 P.M., published in "The Fighting at Jutland."

³ Sir Julian Corbett.

⁴ Captain's Report H. M. S. *Lion*.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

alone, in overwhelming the German battle cruisers, which had put up so strong a fight that they were holding their own on courses that insured a prompt junction with Admiral Scheer's Battle Fleet.

It was here that the wide separating interval, which had prevented the Fifth Battle Squadron from exerting its force upon the enemy, had been unfortunate for the British. The preceding narrative has shown that this wide interval had put the Fifth Battle Squadron in a position which made impossible a concentration of the fire of Vice Admiral Beatty's whole force at the early stages of the engagement. The changes of courses were allowing the four *Queen Elizabeth* battleships to reduce this interval, but it was then too late, as there was not anything approaching a concentration of the fire of the whole British advance force until too late to prevent Vice Admiral Hipper from joining the German Battle Fleet.

Admiral Evan-Thomas reported that, the British battle cruisers "altering course gradually to the south-eastward, the enemy also turned to the southeastward, which enabled the Fifth Battle Squadron to gain on them." Consequently, and for the first time, Vice Admiral Hipper discovered the presence of the Fifth Battle Squadron. The German report stated: "The gunnery superiority and advantageous tactical position were distinctly on our side, until 4.19 P.M. (G. M. T.) a new squadron, consisting of 4 or 5 ships of the *Queen Elizabeth* class, with a considerable superiority in speed, appeared from a northwesterly direction, and took part in the action with an opening range of about 20,000 metres (21,872 yards)." This additional enemy force was immediately reported by Vice Admiral Hipper to

the approaching German High Sea Fleet, and Admiral Scheer at once abandoned a movement he had begun with the object of edging to the west "in order to bring the enemy between two fires." (S) Admiral Scheer stated: "The position of the I Scouting Group, which was now opposed by 6 battle cruisers and 5 battleships,¹ might become critical. In consequence everything depended on effecting a junction with the I Scouting Group as soon as possible: I therefore altered course back to North." (S)

Of the lull in the battle cruiser action, which was the result of the British battle cruisers opening the range after the sinking of the *Indefatigable*, it is interesting to note that Vice Admiral Beatty wrote in his report: "It would appear that at this time (after 4.08 P.M.) we passed through a screen of enemy submarines," and he also gave details of periscopes and torpedoes sighted from vessels of his command. As has been stated, it is now known there were no German submarines present.²

Soon afterwards, twelve British destroyers, "having been ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when opportunity offered, moved out at 4.15 P.M. simultaneously with a similar movement on the part of the enemy. The attack was carried out in the most gallant manner and with great determination. Before arriving at a favorable position to fire torpedoes, they intercepted an enemy force consisting of a Light Cruiser and

¹ As evidently shown by this quotation from Admiral Scheer, it was at first thought by the Germans that the Fifth Battle Squadron consisted of five ships.

² "Torpedo tracks were stated to have been seen about this time, one passing under the *Princess Royal* and another missing the *Lion*, but these reports must be regarded as suppositions." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

15 Destroyers." (B) Admiral Scheer's report stated that the advent of the *Queen Elizabeth* battleships had compelled the German cruisers, with accompanying destroyers, "to haul off to the East," and this German light force engaged was the *Regensburg* with destroyers of the II Flotilla, and the IX Flotilla, which had been "ordered to proceed to relieve the pressure on the battle cruisers." (S)

"A destroyer action resulted at very close range (1000-1500 metres)." (S) Two German destroyers (V27, V29) were sunk by gunfire, and the rest "were forced to retire on their Battle Cruisers . . . having their torpedo attack frustrated." (B) The British destroyers were put into a "position unfavorable for torpedo attack" (B) by this engagement, "owing to some of the Destroyers having dropped astern during the fight." (B) Eight of the British destroyers had discharged torpedoes at the enemy battle cruisers, which the German battle cruisers "successfully evaded by turning away a few points." (S) Two of the British destroyers, *Nestor* and *Nomad*, were stopped by gunfire, and afterwards sunk by the German Fleet in the chase to the northward, as will be described.

This clash of British and German light forces provided an immediate object lesson as to the value of both the offensive and counter offensive use of destroyers and light cruisers as screens for capital ships. Although in attack and counter attack the British and German destroyer forces largely neutralized each other, so far as torpedo attack was concerned, it is to be noted that the British destroyers, which played the offensive rôle, succeeded in firing torpedoes and thus in forcing the enemy battle cruisers to manoeuvre to avoid them.

For the battle cruisers the action was then being renewed, after the break that had followed the sinking of the *Indefatigable* and Vice Admiral Beatty's turnaway, which had opened the range and caused a cessation of fire, as described. Both Vice Admiral Hipper and Vice Admiral Beatty had turned inwards, toward one another, and were drawing together again into an engagement (Gunnery Record: *Princess Royal*, 4.15-28, 18,500; *Tiger*, 4.17-10, 18,100). After 4.20 P.M. the ranges were closed rapidly (Gunnery Record: *Princess Royal*, 4.31-15, 13,000; *Tiger*, 4.30-55, 13,400), and the interchange became a very hot fire. Of this phase Vice Admiral Beatty wrote his report: "From 4.15 to 4.43 P.M. the conflict between the opposing Battle Cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character." He added: "The 5th Battle Squadron was engaging the enemy's rear ships, unfortunately at very long range." And this statement of the British Commander was a measurement of the slight effect the distant *Queen Elizabeth* battleships were able to exert upon the action between the British and German battle cruisers. Vice Admiral Beatty also stated that, at this stage, the British "fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that of the enemy depreciating considerably." But the very next paragraph of his report told of another British battle cruiser overwhelmed by German gunfire and meeting the same fate that had destroyed the *Indefatigable*. The following is Vice Admiral Beatty's description of this loss: "At 4.26 P.M. there was a violent explosion in *Queen Mary*; she was enveloped in clouds of grey smoke and disappeared. From the evidence of Captain Pelly, of *Tiger*, who was in station astern, corroborated by Rear Admiral Brock

in *Princess Royal* ahead, a salvo pitched abreast of Q turret, and almost instantly there was a terrific upheaval and a dense cloud of smoke through which *Tiger* passed barely 30 seconds afterwards. No sign could be seen of *Queen Mary*. Eighteen of her officers and men were subsequently picked up by *Laurel*.”¹

The advancing German High Sea Fleet was then drawing near. Admiral Scheer stated in his report: “At 4.32 P.M. (G. M. T.) sighted the ships in action” — and the German Commander-in-Chief then knew that his advance and his main body would be able to join forces. Of this junction Admiral Scheer wrote: “The German Main Fleet appeared on the scene just in time to bring help to the Scouting Forces, which were engaged with the enemy in considerably superior strength.” The first intimation Vice Admiral Beatty received of the approach of the German Battle Fleet was a sudden message from the cruiser *Southampton* (4.33 P.M.): “Battleships S. E.” This was followed by another message (4.38 P.M.): “Urgent. Priority. Have sighted enemy battlefleet bearing approximately S. E., course of enemy N. My position Lat. 56° 34' N., Long. 6° 20' E.” Both the British Admiralty’s historian and the Admiralty’s subsequent “Narrative of the Battle of Jutland” have made it clear that the advent of the German High Sea Fleet was unexpected for the British.²

Sir Julian Corbett has thus described the surprise of the encounter: “So startling a development was scarcely

¹ “Two such successes were beyond anything the Germans had reason to expect.” — Sir Julian Corbett.

² “Ten minutes earlier (4.33) Commodore Goodenough, Commanding the 2nd Light Cruiser *Southampton*, which was then nearly two miles ahead of the *Lion* on her port bow, suddenly sent the surprising signal that battle-ships were in sight southeast of him.” — *Ibid.*

credible. Admiral Beatty had still no reason to think Admiral Scheer had left the *Jade*,¹ but there was the signal, and it was immediately confirmed by the *Champion*, who was also ahead and supporting her destroyers. What was to be done? Admiral Beatty, who since 4.30 had been inclining away from the enemy to open the range, turned at once to port direct for the position where the apparition had been reported, while Admiral Evan-Thomas held on, firing heavily on the German battle cruisers as they turned away before the destroyer attack. Wholly unexpected as Admiral Scheer's arrival was, all doubt was quickly at an end."

Vice Admiral Beatty stated in his report: "The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 P.M. the enemy's Battle Fleet was sighted S. E. Course was altered 16 points in succession to starboard,² and I proceeded on a northerly course to lead them towards the Grand Fleet. The enemy battle cruisers altered course soon afterwards, and the action continued."

Vice Admiral Hipper had also ordered his battle cruisers "to turn in succession to a North-Westerly course, thereby ensuring that he would be at the head of his cruisers in the next phase of the action." (S) This joining up of the German advance and German main forces had been quickly accomplished, by the course of the battle cruiser action leading to the direction of the

¹ "Admiral Scheer's appearance probably came as something of a surprise, for only a few hours before Admiral Beatty had seen an intercepted signal from the Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief stating that directionals placed the enemy flagship in the *Jade* at 11.10 A.M. . . ." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

² Vice Admiral Beatty's signals were: 4.40 P.M. S. O. B. C. F. General by Flags: "Alter course in succession 16 points to starboard." 4.43 P.M. S. O. B. C. F. to destroyers by Flags: "Recall."

approach of the German Battle Fleet, and Admiral Scheer could write in his report: "At 4.45 P.M. (G. M. T.) the III and I Squadrons were able to open fire, and the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces placed himself and his ships at the head of the Main Fleet."

After the turn in succession of Vice Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers to northward, and with the whole united German Fleet pressing on in pursuit, "the 5th Battle Squadron were now closing on an opposite course and engaging the enemy Battle Cruisers with all guns." (B) The report of Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas, in command of these four *Queen Elizabeth* battleships, was most interesting concerning this phase of the battle: "At 4.21 P.M., the enemy opened fire on the Fifth Battle Squadron, *Barham* being hit at 4.23. From 4.21 P.M. to 4.40 P.M., firing was intermittent, owing to the great difficulty of seeing the enemy. At 4.40 P.M. enemy destroyers were observed to be attacking, and were driven off by our light cruisers and destroyers attached to the Battle Cruiser Fleet. The Squadron was turned away by 'Preparative Flag,' and torpedoes were observed to cross the line — one ahead and one astern of *Valiant*, the second ship. About this time the Fifth Battle Squadron was heavily engaged with the enemy battle-cruisers.¹ *Lion* and battle-cruisers were observed to have turned to the Northward, and the enemy battle-cruisers to have turned away. At 4.50 P.M. *Lion* approached the Fifth Battle Squadron steering to the Northward, with the signal flying to the Fifth Battle Squadron — 'Turn 16 points in succession to starboard'; this turn was made after our

¹ Signal 4.40 P.M., S. O. 5th Battle Squadron, General, "Concentrate in pairs from the rear."

battle-cruisers had passed at 4.53, and the Fifth Battle Squadron altered course a little further to starboard to follow and support the battle-cruisers. During this turn, it appears that the *Malaya*, the last ship of the line, sighted the enemy's battle fleet; it was sighted by *Barham* approximately S. S. E. a few minutes after she had steadied on her Northerly course."

Vice Admiral Beatty's report, concerning this stage, should also be studied. After stating, as quoted, that the Fifth Battle Squadron was "closing on an opposite course and engaging the enemy Battle Cruisers with all guns," Vice Admiral Beatty continued: "The position of the enemy Battle Fleet was communicated to them, and I ordered them to alter course 16 points. (Signal S. O., B. C. F., to 5th B. S., 4.48 P.M., Flags, 'Alter course in succession 16 points to starboard.')

Led by Rear Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, M. V. O., in *Barham*, this Squadron supported us brilliantly and effectively. At 4.57 P.M. the 5th Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and came under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy." (B)

In his report of the action, Vice Admiral Beatty thus highly praised Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas for his support at the stage of the turn to northward. But the execution of this turn, as it was carried out with the delay in turning the Fifth Battle Squadron to the north, resulted in bringing Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas' battleships under the fire not only of the German battle cruisers but also of the leading German battleships, and the Fifth Battle Squadron suffered severely from this concentration of gunfire.

At the emergency of the sudden and unexpected appearance of the German Battle Fleet, Vice Admiral

Beatty's signals had been by flags only.¹ His first general signal from the *Lion* for the 16 points turn (4.40 P.M.) was not seen on the *Barham*. The 4.48 P.M. flag signal to the Fifth Battle Squadron for the turn was not seen until 4.50 P.M., when the British battle cruisers were passing the Fifth Battle Squadron on an opposite course after Vice Admiral Beatty's turn to northward. It was only after the Fifth Battle Squadron had held on and turned later, as described, that Vice Admiral Beatty signaled (5.01 P.M.) "Prolong the line by taking station astern." It will be evident that, at 5.01 P.M. after Vice Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers had been so long on a northerly course, the British line could only be prolonged with a wide interval separating the Fifth Battle Squadron from the British battle cruisers. Consequently, Vice Admiral Beatty's command was still divided on its northerly course, as it had been in the fight to southward.

¹ The radio of the *Lion* had been wrecked. Vice Admiral Beatty's message to Lord Jellicoe telling of the advent of the German Battle Fleet was relayed via the wireless of *Princess Royal*, as will be explained in the following chapter. But Vice Admiral Beatty's signals from the *Lion*, in the ensuing stage, were by flags and searchlight.

CHAPTER XIX

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — THE GERMAN FLEET UNITED

(See Map at page 249)

AFTER the German advance force and German main force had thus joined, and the whole united German Battle Fleet was pursuing Vice Admiral Beatty's British advance force to northward, evidently, from this time, the object of the British must be to seek to join up their own separated naval forces and to impose their own united superior strength upon the weaker enemy. As quoted in the last chapter, Vice Admiral Beatty stated this object, "to lead them towards the Grand Fleet."

At the unexpected advent of the German Battle Fleet, Vice Admiral Beatty had sent the following message to Admiral Jellicoe (4.45 P.M. S. O. B. C. F. to C.-in-C. via *Princess Royal* W/T): "Urgent. Priority. Have sighted Enemy's battlefleet bearing S. E. My position Lat. 56° 36' N., Long. 6° 4' E." (Received by C.-in-C. as "26-30 Battleships, probably hostile, bearing S. S. E., steering S. E.")¹ At 4.48 P.M. *Southampton* had signaled (to S. O., B. C. F., C.-in-C. W/T): "Urgent. Priority. Course of Enemy's battlefleet, N., single line ahead. Composition of van *Kaiser* class.

¹ "Unfortunately it became mutilated in transmission, and as received by the Commander-in-Chief reported the enemy to be steering south-east." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

However, it will be noted that this was soon corrected by *Southampton's* message (4.48 P.M.) giving detailed information.

Bearing of centre, E. Destroyers on both wings and ahead. Enemy's Battle Cruisers joining battlefleet from Northward. My position Lat. $56^{\circ} 29' N.$, Long. $6^{\circ} 14' E.$ "

Upon the first information, at 4.47 P.M., Admiral Jellicoe had sent out a general signal: "Enemy's battlefleet is coming North." And at 4.51 P.M. he had sent to the British Admiralty: "Urgent. Fleet action is imminent." In his report Admiral Jellicoe wrote: "At 5 P.M. the position of affairs was as follows:—*Iron Duke's* position:—Lat. $57^{\circ} 24' N.$, Long. $5^{\circ} 12' E.$, course S. E. by S. speed 20 knots, in company with main battle fleet force, cruisers spread, destroyers screening. *Lion's* position Lat. $56^{\circ} 42' N.$, Long. $5^{\circ} 44' E.$, course N. N. W., speed 25 knots, in company with the Fifth Battle Squadron and First and Second Battle-Cruiser Squadrons. Enemy battle-cruisers bearing from *Lion* approximately E. S. E. seven miles; enemy battlefleet from *Barham* about S. S. E. nine miles."

And Admiral Jellicoe also completed the picture by stating this other condition of the situation: "At the time of the turn of Sir David Beatty's force to the northward the *Iron Duke* and the *Lion* were over 50 miles apart, and closing at a rate of about 45 miles per hour."

This general situation must be grasped, in all its true meaning, before studying the ensuing events. The tendency has been to treat the different phases of the great naval battle too much as if they were separate actions, but, in order to get the true perspective, all these events should be considered as component parts of one great manoeuvre. The outstanding fact was that, at this stage, a broad situation was being de-

veloped which was almost beyond the hopes of the British.¹ With the whole great British Battle Fleet out in the North Sea, the German Battle Fleet was also out in the North Sea, by its own act far away from the refuge of its bases. Not only that, but, by bringing out Squadron II of predreadnoughts, Admiral Scheer's fleet speed was reduced to the inferior speed of 17 knots. Casting aside all details, this constituted the established condition that the German weaker fleet of inferior speed was to give battle to the British Battle Fleet — and, for the Germans, evasion by flight alone would be impossible. The problem for the British was thus simplified to the stated object of imposing upon the enemy the contact of their stronger fleet of superior speed. Yet a combination of unfavorable circumstances, including methods, tactics, and weather conditions, prevented a decision. This is the underlying tragedy of the Battle of Jutland, and this is why all the accounts have to deal with explanations and justifications.

One condition unfavorable to the British was being developed at this stage, when Vice Admiral Beatty's force was seeking a junction with the Grand Fleet. It was stated, in the chapter treating of the dispositions of naval forces before the action, that the coördination between the separated parts of the British Fleet was less effective. This drawback became marked, after the shifts of courses and movements in action of Vice Admiral Beatty's force, and of its attendant cruisers.

¹ "It was the first time it (the German Battle Fleet) had been seen since the momentous hour when the war began, and with Admiral Jellicoe's battle fleet hurrying down only 50 miles away, the door of a great opportunity seemed at last to be on the point of opening." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

“The position of the enemy by latitude and longitude, as reported from time to time to the *Iron Duke*, was consequently incorrect.” (J) This brought about “the difference in reckoning between the battlefleet and battle-cruiser fleet” (J), which was, as a matter of fact, an error far to the eastward in the location of Vice Admiral Beatty’s approaching force. Admiral Jellicoe stated that, “when contact actually took place it was found that the positions given were at least twelve miles in error compared with the *Iron Duke’s* reckoning.” The British Admiralty’s official “Narrative” has stated: “This was the cumulative effect of the following errors: —

(a) First, the *Iron Duke’s* real position was $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles ahead (that is to south-eastward) of her reckoning.

(b) Second, the *Lion* was actually some $6\frac{3}{4}$ miles to westward of her reckoning.”

It is needless to say that this counted against using the British Fleet as a joint force of manoeuvre, and continued to be a harmful element in the situation.

Even the ships of Vice Admiral Beatty’s command were not being concentrated. For, as has been explained, after these ships of the British advance force had turned on their northerly courses, Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas’ Fifth Battle Squadron again remained separated from the British battle cruisers by an interval. Sir Julian Corbett has stated: “By the time his turn to the northward was completed he was some three miles astern of the battle cruisers and nearly abreast of the *König*, so that he at once became engaged with Admiral Scheer’s van squadron, as well as with Admiral Hipper.” The Fifth Battle Squadron was thus fighting a rear guard action against the pursuing German Fleet; and

Admiral Scheer stated that it "thereby played the part of cover for the badly damaged cruisers."

But in consequence of being thus exposed to a concentration of German gunfire,¹ the Fifth Battle Squadron suffered heavy damages. "The *Barham* had hardly turned before she was badly hit by a heavy shell which caused many casualties and wrecked her wireless gear."² The Admiralty's historian added: "The casualties of the Fifth Battle Squadron were chiefly suffered in this period. The *Barham* had 28 killed and 37 wounded, *Malaya* lost 63 killed and 33 wounded. For over half an hour she bore the brunt of the fighting." Sir Julian Corbett also stated of the *Malaya*, which was the rear ship³ and naturally had the worst of it, that she "was twice so badly hit below the water line that she began to list."

It is interesting to note that, at this stage when exposed to such destructive German gunfire, the Captain of the *Malaya* reported: "It was decided to fire the 6-inch guns short to make a screen, but before this was done the whole starboard battery was put out of action by shell bursting there."⁴

As the pursuing German ships pressed on to the northward, they passed at close range the two British destroyers *Nomad* and *Nestor*, which had been disabled

¹ "In so doing, however, they came very much nearer to our Main Fleet and we came on at a firing distance of 17 km. or less." — Admiral Scheer.

² Sir Julian Corbett. Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas stated in his report that a shell at 4.56 P.M. wrecked the auxiliary W/T and another at 5 P.M. put out the main W/T.

³ Order of Fifth Squadron in action was *Barham*, *Valiant*, *Warspite*, *Malaya*.

⁴ ". . . devastating guns and crew and starting a fire amidst the havoc it had wrought." — Sir Julian Corbett.

before the turn, as related in the preceding chapter. With them were two other destroyers, *Nicator* and *Petard*. The *Nomad* and *Nestor* were quickly finished by the German gunfire, but the *Nicator* and *Petard* were able to escape, after discharging torpedoes at the German ships. One of these torpedoes¹ struck the German battle cruiser *Seydlitz* (4.57 P.M. G. M. T.),² but "so well was she constructed that she was able to carry on."³

The German report, of this stage of the action, stated: "The fighting which now ensued developed into a stern-chase; our reconnaissance forces pressed on the heels of the enemy battle-cruisers, and our Main Fleet gave chase to the *Queen Elizabeths*.⁴ Our ships in Squadron III attained a speed of over 20 knots, which was also kept up on board the *Kaiserin*. Just before fire was opened she had succeeded in repairing damage to one of her condensers. By the *Friedrich der Grosse*, the Fleet Flagship, 20 knots was achieved and maintained. In spite of this, the enemy battle-cruisers succeeded soon after 5.00 P.M. (G. M. T.) in escaping from the fire of Scouting Division I. The *Queen Elizabeths* also made such good way that they were only under fire from the ships of Scouting Division I and of the Fifth Division (First Half of Squadron III)." (S)

The British account is in accord with the above, that Vice Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers were only inter-

¹ "Three came from the *Petard*, the last of which, fired at about 4.50, hit the *Seydlitz*." — Sir Julian Corbett.

² Time given by German Admiralty.

³ Sir Julian Corbett. This was a vindication of Admiral Tirpitz's policy of strong construction, which was described in the preceding volume of this work.

⁴ Admiral Scheer's words were "*Queen Elizabeth* and the ships with her." As has been stated, *Queen Elizabeth* was not in the battle.

mittently engaged.¹ There had been one heavy hit on the *Lion*, "giving rise to a fire which, but for the closed magazine door, would have put an end to her."² Vice Admiral Beatty was making use of the superior speed of his battle cruisers to draw ahead.³ He stated in his report that, after "the action continued on a Northerly course," he changed courses toward Admiral Jellicoe's Battle Fleet, which was hastening to his assistance. Vice Admiral Beatty wrote: "At 5.35 P.M. our course was N. N. E. and the estimated position of the Grand Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the North-Eastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards."

The German account stated: "Meanwhile, the previously clear weather had become less clear; the wind had changed from N. W. to S. W. Powder fumes and smoke from the funnels hung over the sea and cut off all view from north and east. Only now and then could we see our own reconnaissance forces." (S) Admiral Jellicoe and Vice Admiral Beatty both reported these conditions as disadvantageous for the British because "a strong light, to westward" (J) silhouetted their ships, while the enemy were frequently blotted out of sight. Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas, in command of the Fifth Battle Squadron reported: "The enemy ships were constantly obscured by mist and were only seen at intervals."

¹ "In the mist and the resulting confusion of smoke Admiral Beatty once more lost sight of the enemy, and for about six minutes firing ceased." — Sir Julian Corbett.

² Sir Julian Corbett.

³ "As Admiral Beatty ran out of range firing became intermittent, and within eight minutes ceased altogether. At 5.10 he reduced to 24 knots and made his way northward to join the main fleet." — Ibid.

Sir Julian Corbett has stated: "Admiral Evan-Thomas was unable, in spite of his superior speed, to increase the range, and all his squadron remained under a heavy fire, which they returned as well as the bad light permitted." After Vice Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers had drawn away and were changing course to northeastward, as described, Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas reported, concerning his four *Queen Elizabeth* battleships, that "at about 5.25 P.M. the signal was made to increase to utmost speed, and course was altered a little to starboard to support the battle cruisers."

At this time the British had discovered, as Admiral Jellicoe emphasized in his report, that the German ships showed "a speed much in excess of that for which they were nominally designed," (J) and it was difficult for the *Queen Elizabeth* battleships to draw clear of the pursuing German battleships. But Admiral Scheer wrote in his report: "As at 5.20 P.M. (G. M. T.) the fire of the I Scouting Group and of the ships of the V Division seemed to slacken, I was under the impression that the enemy was succeeding in escaping, and therefore issued an order to the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces, and therewith the permission to all vessels, for the 'general chase.'" The truth was, the situation of the German Scouting Forces was being affected by the fact that Vice Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers had drawn ahead at full speed, and were changing course to northeastward, with the Fifth Battle Squadron conforming to this change, as has been explained.

Admiral Scheer's written appreciation of this situation was very clear and explicit: "Owing to the superior speed of Beatty's cruisers, our own, when the order

came to give chase, were already out-distanced by the enemy's battle-cruisers and light craft, and were thus forced, in order not to lose touch, to follow on the inner circle and adopt the enemy's course. Both lines of cruisers swung by degrees in concentric circles by the north to a north-easterly direction. A message which was to have been sent by the Chief of Reconnaissance could not be dispatched owing to damage done to the principal and reserve wireless stations on his flagship. The cessation of firing at the head of the line could only be ascribed to the increasing difficulty of observation with the sun so low on the horizon, until finally it became impossible. When, therefore, enemy light forces began a torpedo attack on our battle-cruisers at 5.40 P.M. (G. M. T.), the Chief of Reconnaissance had no alternative but to manoeuvre and finally bring the unit round to S. W. in an endeavor to close up with the Main Fleet, as it was impossible to return the enemy's fire in any purpose. I observed almost simultaneously that the admiral at the head of our squadron of battle-ships began to veer round to starboard in an easterly direction. This was done in accordance with the instructions signalled to keep up the pursuit. As the Fleet was still divided in columns, steering a north-westerly course as directed, the order 'Leaders in Front' was signalled along the line at 5.45 P.M. (G. M. T.), and the speed temporarily reduced to 15 knots, so as to make it possible for the divisions ahead, which had pushed on at high pressure, to get into position again. As long as the pursuit was kept up, the movements of the English gave us the direction, consequently our line by degrees veered round to the east."

By these means, and especially through the turn

which thus early closed Vice Admiral Hipper's battle cruisers to the German Battle Fleet, Admiral Scheer's whole command was more in hand than had been believed, at this time when Vice Admiral Beatty and Admiral Jellicoe were about to join forces. It is also probable that this turn of the German battle cruisers,¹ and these alterations of speed and direction, increased the difficulties in locating the German ships of which Admiral Jellicoe wrote in describing this phase of the action. Certainly it is established that Vice Admiral Beatty's force was bringing to the British Commander-in-Chief very poor information as to the location of the pursuing German ships.

With the German battle cruisers thus closed to his Battle Fleet, Admiral Scheer's command was in a formation favorable for executing a manoeuvre, which had been specially prepared and rehearsed for use in the event of sudden contact with a superior enemy force — the very emergency that was approaching. And, in order to comprehend the ensuing events, it is most necessary that this carefully prepared German manoeuvre should be understood,² as the German Commander-in-Chief made it an important part of his battle tactics in the ensuing stages of the greater naval action.

This German rehearsed manoeuvre was a simultaneous "swing-around" (S) of all the ships of a fleet, to turn the line and bring it into an opposite course, executed under the cover of dense smoke screens for

¹ This turn of the German battle cruisers had been observed by the British in the mist, but not until some time after it was being carried out, as Admiral Jellicoe placed it "between 6 and 6.15."

² "It bears all the marks of a preconcerted design. The prospect of meeting the British fleet must often have presented itself to the German Commander-in-Chief." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

concealment.¹ Admiral Scheer has emphasized the pains that had been taken to develop the ability to carry out this manoeuvre, which had before been considered impracticable for a fleet in action. "At our peace manoeuvres great importance was always attached to their being carried out on a curved line and every means employed to insure the working of the signals." (S)

This last statement, that these rehearsed German "swing-arounds" were always "carried out on a curved line," should be kept in mind. It will be evident that this described situation, in itself, with the German line closed and veering to the eastward, provided the conditions that would make the simultaneous turn, to get away from enemy gunfire, a ships-right-about, instead of a turn to the left. This ships-right-about would at once make the direction of the German line a counter march to westward. It is easy to see what a baffling move this would become, if hidden by smoke screens and unsuspected by the enemy. The German Admiral was certainly justified when he wrote that "the trouble spent was now well repaid," as it was an example of the value of ably prepared methods, which have always been vindicated by results in naval warfare.²

In view of this, it is very interesting to read Admiral Scheer's comments, in his book, on the position of his flagship and his control of the long line of ships in battle: "A position in the centre or at a third of the line

¹ "A fight on parallel courses with a fleet greatly superior was out of the question. There was only one course to pursue — to turn away — and in each case the manoeuvre is repeated. A flotilla attacks, a smoke screen is thrown up, and the fleet turns away altogether." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

² "But this swing around of the whole fleet on a curved line had been constantly practised by Admiral Scheer in manoeuvres, and it now stood him in good stead." — *Ibid.*

(according to the number of units) is more advantageous. In the course of events the place of the eighth ship in the line for the flagship has been tested and approved of. During the whole time that fighting was going on I had a clear look-out over the whole line and was able to signal with great rapidity in both directions. As the fighting line of the warships was more than 10 km. long, I should not have been able to overlook my entire line from the wing, especially under such heavy enemy firing."

This last sentence points the sermon that, when considering the Battle of Jutland, we must not think in the old terms of small dimensions, but we must picture the long miles of battle lines wreathed in smoke and mist, the vast areas of manoeuvre, and the many new complications of modern naval tactics and weapons. With the conditions existing at this phase of the action as described, the reader will have the key to what has been wrongly considered the mystery of the ensuing stages of the action. It was a mystery only because these conditions had not been understood, and a mass of distorted versions had been given out, which became of no value. Keeping these actual conditions in mind, as to the situation when the British were about to join forces, the ensuing events of the action will take their right places in the picture, of which the essential should be visualized as follows.

In this widespread field of manoeuvre, for which no comparison can be found in former naval actions, Admiral Jellicoe's British Battle Fleet was drawing near, and attempting to join forces with Vice Admiral Beatty's British advance force, which was being pursued to the northward by the whole united German

force. For the British Commander-in-Chief there was uncertainty, not only as to the location of the approaching British ships, but also as to the location of the enemy¹ — and this uncertainty was unfavorable for concentrating his whole overpowering force against the enemy. For the German Commander-in-Chief, his whole united fleet was in hand, well disposed to carry out his long rehearsed method of turning away in a concealing smoke screen when suddenly confronted by a superior enemy force.

¹ “The conditions were much more difficult. Two great fleets were approaching one another wrapped in mist and with only a limited time to make most momentous decisions. Positions had to be rapidly plotted, and there was no time available to check or confirm them, but though a considerable amount of information did come in, it was deemed to be too confusing to give any definite information of the enemy’s position.” — “Narrative of the Battle of Jutland.”

CHAPTER XX

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — THE BRITISH EFFORT TO UNITE FORCES

(See Map at page 249)

AT this crucial time, when Admiral Jellicoe's Grand Fleet was hastening to join up with Vice Admiral Beatty's force, the difference in reckoning, which has been described, was so great that the British Commander-in-Chief was moving only in the general direction of the engaged ships, not to a point of junction. In addition, the fact must again be emphasized that the British service of information was not providing a remedy for this serious defect in British co-ordination. For Vice Admiral Beatty's advance force, as it drew northward in its running fight with the Germans, was all the time failing to give the British main force adequate information of the positions of the enemy. Due allowance must be made for the fact that the radio of the *Lion* had been wrecked, and the *Barham* was in the same case. Yet there were plenty of other ships in Vice Admiral Beatty's command with undamaged ability to signal, especially his light forces whose principal mission, at this stage, must be to obtain and give information.

But the information given by the British advance force, as it fled to the northward to join the British main force, was sadly inadequate when measured by the urgent necessities of this situation. It was clearly

shown that the British were lacking in service of information, at the very time when information was most needed.

Under these conditions of uncertainty in information, an efficient junction of the two separated British forces could only have taken place through a miracle of luck. In the actual event, as a result of this uncertainty, there was a delay in joining the two British forces against the enemy at the very critical time when a prompt concentration of all forces was the main object for the British.

As a first effect of this vague idea of the whereabouts of the enemy, Rear Admiral Hood's Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, which had been sent out in advance to join Vice Admiral Beatty, had overrun far to the eastward. Admiral Jellicoe stated in his report: "It is apparent that the Rear Admiral Commanding, Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, was misled by the difference in reckoning between the Battle Fleet and Battle Cruiser Fleet and had gone too far to the eastward, actually crossing ahead of the two engaged battle cruiser squadrons until meeting the enemy advance cruisers."

This first meeting with the German cruisers of Vice Admiral Hipper's screen was at 5.30 P.M., when one of Rear Admiral Hood's attending cruisers, *Chester*, "which was five miles N. 70° W. of the Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron, reported to *Invincible* by searchlight that she had heard firing and seen flashes of gunfire to the southwestward and turned to investigate." (J) At 5.32 P.M. Rear Admiral Hood's other attending cruiser *Canterbury* had also signaled: "Can see flashes ahead." At 5.36 P.M. the *Chester* had sighted an enemy cruiser

with destroyers. They engaged "at about 6000 yards" (J), and, after other enemy cruisers had appeared, the *Chester* "turned to N. E., chased by the enemy ships, which had obtained the range and were inflicting considerable damage on her." (J) ¹ "At 5.40 P.M. the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, which until then had been steering about S. by E., sighted enemy cruisers to the westward and turned to about N. N. W." (J) with the cruiser *Canterbury*. These British ships engaged at 5.52 P.M. "three enemy light cruisers which were then administering heavy punishment" (J) to the *Chester* and four attending British destroyers (*Shark*, *Acasta*, *Ophelia*, and *Christopher*).

The German ships, thus encountered and engaged (*Frankfort*, *Wiesbaden*, *Pillau*, *Elbing*), were light cruisers of Scouting Division II, the screen of Vice Admiral Hipper's battle cruisers. Of this encounter, the German account has stated: "The group was at once heavily fired on, returned the fire, discharged torpedoes, and turned in the direction of their own fleet." (S) These German cruisers had been reinforced by the 12th and 9th Half Flotillas of destroyers. Smoke screens were thrown out by the Germans, and torpedo attacks were made. "To avoid them Admiral Hood had to turn away, and the enemy was soon lost in the mist" ² — but not before the German cruisers suffered damage. "In spite of the fog the *Wiesbaden* and *Pillau* were both badly hit. The *Wiesbaden* (Captain Reiss) lay in the thick of the enemy fire, incapable of action." (S) On the British side, in this clash, the de-

¹ "Within five minutes she had three of her guns disabled; the majority of the guns' crews were lying dead or wounded. . . ." — Sir Julian Corbett.

² Sir Julian Corbett.

stroyer *Shark* was sunk, and the destroyer *Acasta* "severely damaged." (J)

At 5.40 P.M. Admiral Jellicoe had received from the cruiser *Minotaur* the message: "Report of guns heard South." This British cruiser was one of the screen of the Grand Fleet, "cruisers in the screen being eight miles apart, centre of the screen bearing S. E. by S." (J) The center was *Defence* with *Warrior* astern, the other ships of the First Cruiser Squadron, *Edinburgh* and *Black Prince* in order to starboard, and the Second Cruiser Squadron, *Minotaur*, *Shannon*, *Cochrane*, in order to port. "It should be noted that, owing to the decreasing visibility, which was stated in reports from the cruisers to be slightly above six miles, the cruisers on the starboard flank had closed in and were about six miles apart by 5.30 P.M." (J) The cruiser *Hampshire* was linking ship.

Shortly after reporting gunfire, the *Minotaur* sighted ships in the mist. These were the British Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, but they were very nearly fired upon by their own countrymen. "The conditions were very difficult for making out ships." (J) The Second Cruiser Squadron had been ordered to form single line ahead on the *Minotaur*, and signal had been made "to engage the enemy; but before fire was opened they replied to the challenge and were identified as the ships of the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, engaged with the enemy and steering to the westward." (J)

At 5.50 P.M. the cruisers on the right flank of the screen (First Cruiser Squadron) "had come in contact with enemy cruisers." (J) "At 5.52 P.M. Rear Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, in *Defence*, signalled that the battlefleets would shortly be engaged." (J) The Second

Cruiser Squadron, which had station on the port side of the screen, thereupon made a sweep to the eastward, to ensure that no enemy minelayers were at work in that direction," (J) and eventually the Second Cruiser Squadron was to take up a deployment station on the van of the Battle Fleet.

Admiral Jellicoe's powerful Battle Fleet was at this time drawing near, continuing "on the course south-east by south at a speed of 20 knots, in divisions line ahead disposed abeam to starboard, columns eleven cables apart," (J) the divisions in order as numbered from port to starboard. The light cruisers of the Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron were "stationed three miles ahead of the Battle Fleet." (J) "The destroyers also were still disposed ahead in their screening formation, as it was very desirable to decide on the direction of deployment before stationing them for action." (J) The following sentence, from the Admiralty's official "Narrative," has given a striking picture of this time of uncertainty: "From 5.0 P.M. to 5.30 there was silence for half an hour. No reports had come in. The Battle Fleet was ready to deploy; its guns were manned, and every man was at his station. The mists had come down, and the columns were becoming grey and ghostly."

The "plot," made for Admiral Jellicoe in the *Iron Duke* from reports that had been received, indicated that the British Battle Fleet "might meet the High Sea Fleet approximately ahead and that the cruiser line of the Battle Fleet would sight the enemy nearly ahead of the centre." (J) Admiral Jellicoe has written that it was not advisable to place "great reliance" (J) on the positions given by ships "which had been in action

for two hours and frequently altering course.” (J) But he was evidently taken by surprise when the wide discrepancy was revealed, as he also wrote: “I realized this, but when contact actually took place it was found that the positions given were at least twelve miles in error compared with the *Iron Duke’s* reckoning. The result was that the enemy’s Battle Fleet appeared on the starboard bow instead of ahead, as I had expected, and contact also took place earlier than was anticipated.” (J)

In addition to this difference of twelve miles in reckoning, Admiral Jellicoe was being hampered by the difficulty of obtaining information as to the position of the enemy ships, even after the two parts of his command had drawn together and contacts had actually been established. At 5.45 P.M. the *Comus* had also reported gunfire, “and shortly afterwards flashes of gunfire were visible bearing south-south-west although no ships could be seen.” (J) “At about 5.50 P.M.” (J) Admiral Jellicoe received a wireless from the *Defence*, reporting ships in action sighted “bearing south-south-west and steering north-east. There was, however, no clue as to the identity of these ships.” (J)

The British Commander-in-Chief, “in view of the rapid decrease in visibility,” (J) had ordered that the rangefinder operators should take ranges on bearings in every direction, in order “to ascertain the most favorable bearing in which to engage the enemy should circumstances admit of a choice being exercised.” (J) The report was “that the visibility appeared to be best to the southward.” (J) In his perplexing uncertainty as to the situation, Admiral Jellicoe signaled (5.55 P.M.) to the *Marlborough*, flagship of Rear Admiral Burney

leading the starboard wing division: "What can you see?" The reply was: "Our Battle Cruisers bearing S. S. W., steering East, *Lion* leading ship." "Further reply from *Marlborough*" (J) was: "5th Battle Squadron bearing S. W." "Shortly after 6 P.M. we sighted strange vessels bearing south-west from the *Iron Duke* at a distance of about five miles. They were identified as our battle cruisers, steering east across the bows of the Battle Fleet. Owing to the mist it was not possible to make out the number of ships that were following the *Lion*." (J)

"At this stage there was still great uncertainty as to the position of the enemy's Battle Fleet." (J) No report had been received from Vice Admiral Beatty's command that would give this information. "In order to take ground to starboard, with a view to clearing up this situation without altering the formation of the Battle Fleet," (J) Admiral Jellicoe had signaled at 6.02 P.M.: "Alter course leading ships together, rest in succession to South. Speed 18 knots." The reduction in speed was "to allow of the ships closing up into station." (J) At 6.06 P.M. the *Lion* signaled (S. L.): "Enemy's Battle Cruisers bearing S. E." There was not yet any report from Vice Admiral Beatty as to the position of the German Battle Fleet, and Admiral Jellicoe had also been puzzled by a report from his cruisers which suggested that the enemy Battle Fleet might be "ahead of his battle cruisers." (J) "The conflicting reports added greatly to the perplexity of the situation, and I determined to hold on until matters became clearer." (J)

With the conviction that the British Battle Fleet would "strike the enemy's Battle Fleet on a bearing a

little on the starboard bow, and in order to be prepared for deployment," (J) the British Commander-in-Chief signaled at 6.06 P.M.: "Alter course leading ships together the rest in succession to S. E." At 6.08 P.M. signal was made to the destroyers: "Take up Destroyer disposition No. 1." (One flotilla on starboard bow of leading ship starboard wing column, distant 3 miles; one flotilla on port bow of leading ship port wing column, distant 3 miles; one flotilla abreast port wing column, distant one mile.)

At 6.01 P.M. Admiral Jellicoe had signaled to Vice Admiral Beatty: "Where is Enemy's Battle Fleet?" "This signal was repeated at 6.10 P.M., and at 6.14 P.M. he (Vice Admiral Beatty) signalled: 'Have sighted the enemy's Battle Fleet bearing south-south-west'; this report gave me the first information on which I could take effective action for deployment." (J) Admiral Jellicoe's statements as to this stage should be read with attention: "At 6.15 P.M. Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, in the *Barham*, commanding the 5th Battle Squadron, signalled by wireless that the enemy's Battle Fleet was in sight, bearing south-south-east.¹ The distance was not reported in either case, but in view of the low visibility, I concluded it could not be more than some five miles. Sir Cecil Burney had already reported the 5th Battle Squadron at 6.07 P.M. as in sight, bearing south-west from the *Marlborough*. The first definite information received on board the Fleet-Flagship of the Enemy's Battle Fleet did not, therefore, come until 6.14 P.M., and the position given placed it thirty degrees before the starboard beam of the *Iron*

¹ 6.10 P.M. *Barham* to C.-in-C., Flags and W. T.: "Enemy's battlefleet S. S. E."

Duke, or fifty-nine degrees before the starboard beam of the *Marlborough*, and apparently in close proximity. There was no time to lose, as there was evident danger of the starboard wing column of the Battle Fleet being engaged by the whole German Battle Fleet before deployment could be effective.¹ So at 6.16 P.M. a signal was made to the Battle Fleet to form line of battle on the port wing column, on a course south-east by east, it being assumed that the course of the enemy was approximately the same as that of our battle cruisers. Speed was at the same time reduced to 14 knots to admit of our battle cruisers passing ahead of the Battle Fleet, as there was danger of the fire of the Battle Fleet being blanketed by them."

The preceding account of this phase of the action, as the two battle fleets were drawing near one another, has been given, as much as possible, in Admiral Jellicoe's own terms, and with the British Commander-in-Chief's own reasoning for his dispositions in approaching the enemy, and his own explanation of his choice of deployment. It will be evident at once to the reader that Admiral Jellicoe's signal, "to form line of battle on the port wing column," (J) meant deployment on the column farthest away from the enemy, and did not close the enemy — and yet closing the enemy was the one logical object of the superior British force.

The continued failure of the British to give information of the enemy, even after the fleets were in contact, was further shown in other events which soon ensued at this phase — and these events led to unfortunate

¹ " . . . and there appeared to be danger of deployment on the starboard wing column involving it in action with the German battle fleet before the movement could be completed, and exposing the Battle Fleet to destroyer attack." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

losses for the British, as will be shown in the following narrative.

In the meantime, the engagement with the German light forces of Scouting Division II, which has been described, had taken an unexpected and serious turn. Concerning this situation, after the advent of Rear Admiral Hood's Third Battle Cruiser Squadron and the approach of Rear Admiral Arbuthnot's First Cruiser Squadron, Admiral Scheer wrote: "A message was then received from the leader of Scouting Division II that he had been fired upon by some newly arrived large ships. At 6.02 P.M. (GMT) came a wireless: '*Wiesbaden* incapable of action.' On receipt of the message I turned with the Fleet two points to port so as to draw nearer to the group and render assistance to the *Wiesbaden*. From 6.20 (GMT) onwards there was heavy fighting round the damaged *Wiesbaden*, and good use was made of the ships torpedoes. . . . A fresh unit of cruisers (three *Invincibles* and four *Warriors*) bore down from the north, besides light cruisers and destroyers," in ignorance that the German Battle Fleet was anywhere near the *Wiesbaden*.

Thus it was that the new British arrivals, the three battle cruisers of Rear Admiral Hood and the four armored cruisers of Rear Admiral Arbuthnot, met unexpectedly heavy concentrations of enemy gunfire, in consequence of the turn of the German Battle Fleet toward the *Wiesbaden*. On the other hand, at this time, the British Battle Fleet was turning away in its deployment, and, as a result, there was no force of British battleships closing and imposing upon the Germans their superior gunfire. This left the German Fleet free to concentrate its fire upon the newcomers, and con-

sequently this phase of the action, while Admiral Jellicoe's Battle Fleet was carrying out the movements of its deployment, proved to be costly for the British.

Admiral Jellicoe has stated: "Rear Admiral Arbuthnot was evidently bent on finishing off his opponent, and held on, probably not realizing in the gathering smoke and mist that the enemy heavy ships were at fairly close range. At about 6.16 P.M. the *Defence* was hit by two salvos in quick succession, which caused her magazine to blow up and the ship disappeared." *Warrior* and *Black Prince* were also put out of action. (*Warrior* disabled, and abandoned after attempt had been made to tow her home;¹ *Black Prince* turned away, and was sunk later.²) The remaining cruiser, *Duke of Edinburgh*, turned away "and eventually joined the 2nd Cruiser Squadron." (J) Vice Admiral Beatty stated in his report: "At 6.15 P.M. *Defence* and *Warrior* crossed our bows from Port to starboard necessitating our hauling to Port to clear. They were closely engaging an enemy Light Cruiser, but immediately after clearing us they came under the fire of enemy heavy ships, and passed down between us and the enemy on opposite courses."

Soon after, Rear Admiral Hood also met disaster. Of this Vice Admiral Beatty wrote in his report: "At 6.20 P.M. the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron appeared ahead steaming south towards the enemy's van. I ordered them to take station ahead, which was carried out magnificently, Rear Admiral Hood bringing his Squadron into action ahead in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors. At 6.25 P.M. I

¹ See Chapter XXIV.

² See Chapter XXIII.

altered course to the E. S. E., in support of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only 8000 yards from the enemy's leading ship. They were pouring a hot fire into her and caused her to turn to the Westward of South. At the same time I made a visual report to the Commander-in-Chief of the bearing and distance of the enemy Battle Fleet. At 6.33 P.M. *Invincible* was struck by a complete salvo about Q turret and immediately blew up."

This third disaster to a British battle cruiser came with the same appalling suddenness that attended the sinkings of the *Indefatigable* and *Queen Mary*. The following is Sir Julian Corbett's account of the overwhelming of the *Invincible*: "Flames shot up from the gallant flagship, and there came again the awful spectacle of a fiery burst, followed by a huge column of dark smoke which, mottled with blackened débris, swelled up hundreds of feet in the air, and the mother of all battle cruisers had gone to join the other two that were no more." This description of the column of smoke "hundreds of feet in the air" was proved true by some extraordinary photographs, which were taken by British destroyers at the times of the explosions on the three battle cruisers.¹ The *Invincible* had split in two, and one of these photographs showed her bow and stern sticking out of the water, "as though she had touched bottom."² The destruction of the personnel was as complete as in the other cases. Only six survivors from the *Invincible* were picked up by the British destroyer *Badger*.

Among these survivors was Commander Dann-

¹ Published in "The Fighting at Jutland."

² Sir Julian Corbett.

reuther, who had been in the control top. He reported: "The ship had been hit several times by heavy shell, but no appreciable damage had been done when at 6.34 P.M. a heavy shell struck Q turret and, bursting inside, blew the roof off. This was observed from the control top. Almost immediately following there was a tremendous explosion amidships indicating that Q magazine had blown up. The ship broke in half and sunk in 10 or 15 seconds. The survivors on coming to the surface saw the bow and the stern of the ship only, both of which were vertical and about 50 feet clear of the water."

CHAPTER XXI

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — THE EVASION OF THE WEAKER FORCE

(See Map at page 249)

AT the stage when this heavy toll of losses was being taken from the British, Admiral Jellicoe's Battle Fleet was in process of deployment "by Equal Speed pendant on the port wing division; course S. E. by E." (J) in accordance with the signal given at 6.16 P.M. It should be remembered that the speed of the Grand Fleet had been further reduced to 14 knots on deployment, "to allow the battle-cruisers, which were before the starboard beam, to pass ahead," (J) and Admiral Jellicoe has also stated: "The reduction of speed to 14 knots during deployment caused some 'bunching' at the rear of the line as the signal did not get through quickly. The reduction had, however, to be maintained until the battle cruisers had formed ahead."

Admiral Jellicoe has explained the fact that he made his choice to form line of battle on the port wing column, which was farthest from the enemy, instead of following his "first and natural impulse to form on the starboard wing column in order to bring the Fleet into action at the earliest possible moment." (J) The British Commander-in-Chief's own reasoning was in line with the guiding rules for conduct in action, which he had adopted in advance, with the approval of the Admiralty, and which have been quoted in this work.¹

¹ See Appendix, page 313.

His first reason given, against forming battle line on the wing nearest the enemy (the starboard wing), stated that "the High Sea Fleet was in such close proximity and on such a bearing as to create obvious disadvantages in such a movement. I assumed that the German destroyers would be ahead of their Battle Fleet, and it was clear that, owing to the mist, the operations of destroyers attacking from a commanding position in the van would be much facilitated; it would be suicidal to place the Battle Fleet in a position where it might be open to attack by destroyers during such a deployment, as such an event would throw the Fleet into confusion at a critical moment."

Secondly, "that, if the German ships were as close as seemed probable, there was considerable danger of the 1st Battle Squadron, and especially the *Marlborough's* Division, being severely handled by the concentrated fire of the High Sea Fleet before the remaining divisions could get into line to assist." (J)

Thirdly, "that the van of the enemy would have a very considerable 'overlap' if the deployment took place on the starboard wing division, whereas this would not be the case with deployment on the port wing column. The overlap would necessitate a large turn of the starboard wing division to port to prevent the 'T' being crossed, and each successive division coming into line would have to make this turn, in addition to the 8-point turn required to form the line. I therefore decided to deploy on the first, the port wing division." (J)

As stated, the port wing division was farthest from the enemy fleet, and consequently Admiral Jellicoe's deployment on this port wing division actually drew

the British Grand Fleet away from the enemy, instead of closing. Also consequently, it became a situation in which the overwhelmingly superior British force was drawing away from the inferior enemy force, instead of imposing its superior force as quickly as possible upon the inferior enemy force, which must always be the mission of the superior force.

Admiral Jellicoe's three reasons for adopting this delaying deployment have been here quoted. His first reason given, that "it would be suicidal to place the Battle Fleet in a position where it might be open to attack by destroyers," (J) clearly showed the strong effect of the British ideas adopted beforehand for conduct against torpedoes, which have been given at length. It has been pointed out that these ideas had led to thinking alone of the dangers for the British Battle Fleet, not of seeking to counter with British light forces and to subject the German Battle Fleet to the same dangers. In other words, this was conceding in advance to the Germans a superiority in torpedo attack, and trying to evade this German torpedo attack, instead of taking measures to neutralize it by use of British light forces and British counter attacks with torpedoes.

As to the British Commander-in-Chief's other reasons, especially Admiral Jellicoe's fear of "the *Marlborough's* Division being severely handled by the concentrated fire of the High Sea Fleet before the remaining divisions could get into line to assist" (J), it should be noted that not only would the approaching van of the German Battle Fleet have to engage this British starboard wing division,¹ but also the four battleships of the Fifth Battle Squadron, with

¹ *Marlborough, Revenge, Hercules, Agincourt.*

Vice Admiral Beatty in position to engage the German battle cruisers. The need to support these British forces was also an argument for Admiral Jellicoe to close.

At this time, as a matter of fact against these available British forces, the German Fleet was approaching in extended order, and not disposed for any sudden overwhelming concentration of gunfire that would be a menace to these British forces. On the contrary, in this actual situation, there was more of an opportunity for a destructive concentration of Vice Admiral Burney's Division, the Fifth Battle Squadron, and the British battle cruisers, against the approaching van of the German Fleet. These British forces were available, but it cannot be said that they were in hand and ready for concentrating fire against the German van. Vice Admiral Beatty was bringing up a divided force, which was unprepared for any such concentration. As has been shown, there was an utter state of confusion in the British information. Vice Admiral Beatty was joining the British main force, but giving no information, so far, to the British Commander-in-Chief as to the location of the German Battle Fleet. There was no trace of any provision in the tactical situation for the subordinate to suggest or initiate a concentration of these British forces against the Germans,¹ nor was there any suggestion of the advisability of a deployment on the right wing division from those who were in better position than the British Commander-in-Chief to gain accurate information.

¹ It should also be noted that, at the time of the turn to northward of the British battle cruisers and Fifth Battle Squadron, there had been a similar lack of any provision for the subordinate to suggest or initiate a concentration of the British forces.

Consequently, there was a confused situation on the British right at this first contact with the German main forces, and this situation was made more confused by the crowding of many craft in this area. Admiral Arbuthnot's armored cruisers had been adrift in the smoke, as has been described. Vice Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers were crossing to eastward, "and as they passed, they, too, had to mask some of the ships in the van."¹ The British destroyers here were also thrown into disorder.

The British Admiralty's official "Narrative" has given an account of this confusion: "As the battle cruisers passed the head of the battle fleet the destroyers of the 1st and 12th Flotillas began to run through one another's lines, and several had to stop and go astern to avoid a collision. Salvos were falling round them, and the *Attack* was hit by the nose of an 11-inch projectile. The lines were in some confusion at this juncture, and for a short time destroyers were busy getting out of one another's way."

Vice Admiral Burney reported, of this stage, that "great difficulty was experienced in distinguishing the enemy's from our own ships." Also, as a matter of course, there was an obscure knowledge of this situation on the *Iron Duke*, in consequence of the poor information Admiral Jellicoe had been receiving, and the British Commander-in-Chief was working with the handicap that the essential knowledge of the position and disposition of the German Battle Fleet had been long delayed.

The British starboard wing division was so near the enemy Battle Fleet that at 6.17 P.M. its flagship, *Marl-*

¹ "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

borough, opened fire at a range of 13,000 yards. Vice Admiral Burney, in the *Marlborough*, reported that, at this time (6.15 P.M.), "as the Battle Cruisers drew ahead and their smoke cleared, the German line could be more easily seen and 4 *Kaisers* and 4 *Helgolands* could be dimly made out." He also reported as to the "bunching" (J) of ships, when speed was ordered reduced to 14 knots to allow the battle cruisers to pass and draw ahead. This, as has been described, had added another element of confusion to the situation on the British right. Vice Admiral Burney reported: "At 6.20 P.M., the speed of 14 knots was ordered by general signal. Shortly after this there was much bunching up of ships in the rear of the line. *Marlborough* and other ships had to reduce to 8 knots and *St. Vincent* had to stop for a short time. Owing to the haze and the enemy's smoke, organized distribution of fire was out of the question; individual ships selected their own targets."

The Fifth Battle Squadron of four *Queen Elizabeth* battleships, which were following and conforming to the movements of the British battle cruisers, had thus approached a situation of which Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas had no adequate information. He reported: "At 6.06 P.M., *Marlborough* was sighted on the port bow steering E. S. E., but no other ships were seen for some minutes, and then only those astern of her. It was therefore concluded that this was the head of our battle line, and that the Fifth Battle Squadron would be able to form ahead of the Battle Fleet. At 6.19 P.M., however, other ships were sighted, and it was observed that the Grand Fleet was deploying to the Northeast, the Sixth Division being the starboard wing column. It

therefore¹ became necessary to make a large turn to port to form astern of the *Marlborough's* division, and to prevent masking the fire of the Battle Fleet." (Evan-Thomas)² This turn was executed by the Fifth Battle Squadron "in waters alive as they now were with rapidly moving ships,"³ and under heavy fire from the van of the German High Sea Fleet. The *Barham*, *Valiant*, and *Malaya* were able to keep station, and formed astern of the *Agincourt*, rear ship of the Grand Fleet, "by 6.30 P.M." (J)

But the *Warspite*, which had already suffered severe injury from German gunfire, jammed her helm, "causing her to continue her turn straight towards the enemy's battle fleet. However, by good handling, although hit several times while approaching the enemy's line, she was enabled to get away to the Northward." (Evan-Thomas) This put the *Warspite* out of action, as, "on receipt of the report of her damage,"⁴ Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas ordered her to proceed back to the base at Rosyth.

In this confused interlude, the total of British losses had been increased to an impressive figure. But even these heavy losses had not altered the underlying situation, that Admiral Scheer was in contact with an over-

¹ ". . . as she (*Barham*) could not follow Sir David Beatty's squadron, now some 3½ miles ahead of her, without masking the fire of the battle line. . . ." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

² "To follow Admiral Beatty across the front of the battle fleet would make the interference worse than it already was, and he decided his only course was to make a wide turn and lead on as best he could into his alternative battle station astern." — Sir Julian Corbett.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ "She had received 13 hits, one of which had opened the wings and appeared to threaten the engine-room bulkheads." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

whelmingly superior enemy force at this time. He could not hope to stand up against the British Grand Fleet in a battle of broadsides. On the other hand, with only a German fleet speed of 17 knots in contrast to the British fleet speed of 20 knots, Admiral Scheer could not possibly hope to gain safety by flight. It was at this crisis that the carefully rehearsed German fleet manoeuvre of evasion prepared for exactly such a situation, to break away from the pressure of a stronger enemy fleet, stood the German Commander-in-Chief in good stead, especially, as will be shown in the narrative, on account of his enemy's caution in closing and pressing the German Fleet.


At this stage Admiral Scheer had soon realized that he was in the presence of superior enemy forces, and here it should be noted that Admiral Scheer's screen was more efficient in giving information than were the British light forces. "A further message from the torpedo-boat flotillas, which had gone to support Scouting Division II, stated that they had sighted more than twenty enemy battleships following a southeasterly course. It was now quite obvious that we were confronted by a large portion of the English Fleet and a few minutes later their presence was notified on the horizon directly ahead of us by rounds of firing from guns of heavy calibre. The entire arc stretching from north to east was a sea of fire. The flash from the muzzles of the guns was distinctly seen through the mist and smoke on the horizon, though the ships themselves were not distinguishable." (S)

The German battle cruisers and the van of the Battle Fleet, Squadron III, were engaged, and Admiral Scheer "observed several enemy hits and consequent

explosions on the ships at our leading point. Following the movement of the enemy they had made a bend which hindered free action of our Torpedo-Boat Flotilla II stationed there. I could see nothing of our cruisers, which were still farther forward. Owing to the turning aside that was inevitable in drawing nearer, they found themselves between the fire of both lines. For this reason I decided to turn our line and bring it on to an opposite course. Otherwise an awkward situation would have arisen round the pivot which the enemy line by degrees was passing, as long distance shots from the enemy would certainly have hit our rear ships." (S) Admiral Scheer also emphasized the fact that the German Fleet was at a disadvantage for gunnery, as the German ships "stood out against the clear western horizon," (S) while the British ships "were hidden in the mist and smoke of the battle." (S) "A running artillery fight on a southerly course would therefore not have been advantageous to us." (S)

Consequently, at 6.35 P.M., Admiral Scheer put his line on an opposite course by performing his prepared manoeuvre,¹ a ships-right-about, all ships turning simultaneously to starboard and bringing the whole German Fleet onto a westerly course. "The swing-around was carried out in excellent style. At our peace manoeuvres great importance was always attached to their being carried out on a curved line and every means employed to ensure the working of the signals. The trouble spent was now well repaid." (S) In fact, the pressure on the German Fleet was relieved at once.

¹ "This was one of the critical moments of the action, and Admiral Scheer's manoeuvre was almost precisely similar in its main features to that which he performed three-quarters of an hour later at 7.15. It bears all the marks of a preconceived design." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."



Admiral Scheer's diagram of his first "swing-around," at 6.35 P.M. (G.M.T.), as published in "Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War."

The manoeuvre had been covered by the use of dense smoke screens, and Admiral Scheer's fighting ships were no longer under fire, as a result of this unsuspected evasion. "The cruisers were liberated from their cramped position and enabled to steam away south and appeared, as soon as the two lines were separated, in view of the flagship. The torpedo-boats, too, on the leeward side of the fire had room to move to the attack and advanced." (S)

Admiral Scheer had executed his well rehearsed manoeuvre successfully, but his enemy had not pressed him, as the British Fleet was not closing. The German Admiral, himself, has stated the reply the British should have made to his "swing-around," (S) and has also stated the danger to the German Fleet, if his enemy

had closed and held to the German Fleet, following up its change of course: "The enemy did not follow our veer around. In the position it was to our leading point, it should have remained on, and could have held us still further surrounded if by a simultaneous turn to a westerly course it had kept firmly to our line." (S) But Admiral Scheer also really gave the true state of the case when he added: "It may be that the leader did not grasp the situation, and was afraid to come any nearer for fear of torpedo attacks. Neither did any of the other officers on the enemy side think of holding firmly to our line, which would have greatly impeded our movements and rendered a fresh attack on the enemy line extremely difficult." (S) The truth was, the British did not at all realize what had taken place under cover of the Germans' dense smoke screen.

The British Admiralty's historian has left no doubt of the puzzling effect of Admiral Scheer's hidden manoeuvre of evasion: "The effect was all he (Admiral Scheer) could desire. In two or three minutes his fleet, already only visible from the British ships by glimpses, had disappeared, and all firing ceased. It soon appeared to Admiral Jellicoe that the enemy must have turned away, though whether they had turned right back to the southwestward, directly away from him, or had merely turned to a course for Heligoland, he was unable to discover.) What was he to do?" With the British thus at a loss, Admiral Scheer's whole fleet was withdrawing in safety to the westward, freed from the gunfire of his enemy.¹

¹ "In the thickening mist and smoke the enemy was lost to sight, and a lull ensued which gave Admiral Scheer a short and much needed respite." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

What Admiral Jellicoe himself wrote, concerning this stage, again emphasized the lack of information given to the *Iron Duke*, which was especially harmful in view of the British Commander-in-Chief's method of handling the Grand Fleet as a unit from his own flagship. Admiral Jellicoe stated: "At this time, owing to the smoke and mist, it was most difficult to distinguish friend from foe, and quite impossible to form an opinion on board the *Iron Duke*, in her position towards the centre of the line, as to the formation of the enemy's Fleet." The British battle cruisers had drawn ahead of Admiral Jellicoe's Battle Fleet at 6.30 P.M., and at that time the *Iron Duke* had opened fire upon the German Battle Fleet,¹ with also the Third and Fourth Divisions "and certain ships of the Second Battle Squadron." (J) But the deployment of the British Battle Fleet did not close the mass of smoke from which the German Fleet had successfully withdrawn at 6.35 P.M.

At 6.33 P.M. the speed of Admiral Jellicoe's Battle Fleet had been increased to 17 knots, "which speed was maintained until the Fleet left the scene for its bases on 1st June." (J)

"At about 6.38 P.M. the 6th Division was in line and our deployment was complete." (J) The British Commander-in-Chief reported: "At this time the visibility was about 12,000 yards, and for ranges about 9,000 yards," with the baffling conditions of mist and smoke which have been quoted, and the wind "W. S. W., force 2." (J) "At 6.45 P.M." (J) the battleship *Marlborough* was struck by a torpedo, causing "a heavy

¹ The *Iron Duke* had previously opened fire (at 6.23 P.M.) upon a German light cruiser.

explosion under the fore bridge abreast the starboard forward hydraulic engine-room." (J) The ship took a list "of some seven degrees to starboard," (J) but remained in action.

Admiral Jellicoe stated: "At 6.55 P.M. the course of the fleet was altered by divisions to south, conforming to the movements of the battle-cruiser squadrons and with a view to closing the enemy." But this was twenty minutes after Admiral Scheer's whole command had made its "swing-around," and was proceeding safely on its westerly course, and, consequently, this change of course of the British Fleet to the southward could not possibly have the desired effect of closing the German Fleet.

For the six remaining British battle cruisers, which from this time were united under the command of Vice Admiral Beatty, this was a period of confusion. Vice Admiral Beatty has stated in his report: "After the loss of the *Invincible*, the Squadron was led by *Inflexible* until 6.50 P.M. By this time the battle cruisers were clear of our leading Battle Squadron then bearing N. N. W. 3 miles, and I ordered the 3rd Battle Squadron to prolong the line astern and to reduce to 18 knots." The following is the British Admiralty historian's account of what ensued: "Nothing was in sight, and to maintain his (Vice Admiral Beatty's) station on the Battle Fleet he now (6.54) reduced speed to eighteen knots. At the same time, ordering the *Inflexible* and *Indomitable* to take station astern of him, he began to circle to starboard, but owing to a failure of the gyro-compass the turn was carried much farther than he intended before the defect was noticed. The consequence was that a complete circle had to be made, so

that by 7.1 he was once again where he had been when the turn started." Consequently also, it is evident that Vice Admiral Beatty was not closing the evading German ships at this time.

As a result of the fact that these movements of the British did not bring any pressure upon the Germans, Admiral Scheer was left free to take the initiative. Encouraged by this successful result of his rehearsed manoeuvre, the German Commander-in-Chief made ready for a new move. His only fighting ship seriously injured was the battle cruiser *Lützow*, which had to fall out of line, and Vice Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from her at 7 P.M.¹) Admiral Scheer found that all others could keep their places in the line. "No one reported inability to do so; I was, therefore, able to reckon on their being fully prepared to fight." (S) Fortified by this assurance, the German Admiral decided upon an unexpected course of action. His change of tactics was so remarkable that his reasons should be quoted at length:

"It was still too early for a nocturnal move. If the enemy followed us, our action in retaining the direction taken after turning the line would partake of the nature of a retreat, and in the event of any damage to our ships in the rear the Fleet would be compelled to sacrifice them or else to decide on a line of action enforced by enemy pressure, and not adopted voluntarily, and would therefore be detrimental to us from the very outset. Still less was it feasible to strive at detaching oneself from the enemy, leaving him to decide when he could elect to meet us the next morning. There was

¹ It was nearly two hours before Vice Admiral Hipper could get on board the *Moltke*.

but one way of averting this — to force the enemy into a second battle by another determined advance, and forcibly compel his torpedo boats to attack. The success of the turning of the line while fighting encouraged me to make the attempt, and decided me to make still further use of the facility of movement. The manoeuvre would be bound to surprise the enemy, to upset his plans for the rest of the day, and if the blow fell heavily it would facilitate the breaking loose at night.” (S)

To carry out these ideas Admiral Scheer at 6.55 P.M. executed a second swing-around of his whole fleet, turning ships-right-about to starboard as before. This put the German Fleet again on an easterly course and launched its van in an attack against the deployed British line, “to deal a blow at the centre of the enemy’s line.” (S) “The battle cruisers were ordered to operate at full strength on the enemy’s leading point.” (S) Ahead of the fleet there was sent forward a determined attack by the German torpedo flotillas, all of which “had orders to attack.” (S) In the words of Admiral Scheer, “This led to the intended result, a full resumption of the firing at the van.”

As has been stated, the British Fleet was feeling for the German Fleet on southerly courses,¹ without realizing that the Germans had slipped away to westward under cover of their smoke screens. At 7.05 P.M. Admiral Jellicoe had attempted to close by signaling: “Alter course together three points to starboard.”

At this very time Admiral Scheer’s fleet was returning on easterly courses to make his thrust against the British center. In the words of the Admiralty’s

¹ Signal, C.-in-C. to S. O., 1st B. S.: “Can you see any enemy battle-ships?” Reply: “No.”

official "Narrative," "It was now heading straight into the centre of the arc formed by the British fleet. In a few minutes the leading squadron and battle cruisers would be threatened with envelopment and the concentrated fire of practically the whole Grand Fleet."

Suddenly (7.10 P.M.) this return of Admiral Scheer to the attack had its effect, and his destroyers,¹ operating with the German van on easterly courses, made determined onslaughts against Admiral Jellicoe's battleships. So threatening were these destroyer attacks, suddenly emerging ahead of the German Fleet, that the British Battle Fleet "was turned away two points by the 'Preparative' and subsequently another two points," (J) to avoid the run of the torpedoes. Admiral Jellicoe stated that this move enabled his battleships to avoid many torpedoes, and that the range was opened by about 1750 yards. The German Admiral claimed that "the action of the torpedo-boat flotillas had achieved its purpose." (S)

So far as the fighting ships of the German Fleet were concerned, the practical effect in action of Admiral Scheer's thrust against the British center was to subject the ships of the German van to heavy damage, without doing any compensating harm to the British ships. The advancing German ships were exposed to a heavy concentration of British gunfire, as "the guns of practically the whole fleet joined in."² Admiral Scheer has admitted this damage to the ships of the German van, especially to his battle cruisers. These last suffered

¹ Flotillas VI and IX, which had been with the cruisers, and III and V, from the Main Fleet.

² "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

severely, as was natural from their exposed position in the lead.¹

It is established that the gunfire of the German Fleet did not score upon the British Grand Fleet. But, on the other hand, the accompanying sudden torpedo attacks, appearing unexpectedly from the smoke, directed against the British battleships, had actually accomplished the result of making the Grand Fleet turn away and open the range.² In spite of the serious damage sustained by the battle cruisers and battleships of the German van, in their attack upon the British center, Admiral Scheer stated that they won good results, as he claimed that putting the van of his fleet again into action "diverted the enemy fire and rendered it possible for the torpedo-boat flotillas to take so effective a share in the proceedings." (S)

In any case, it must be acknowledged that Admiral Scheer's extraordinary manoeuvres had accomplished a surprise effect upon his enemy, as, beside forcing the Grand Fleet to turn away from the weaker High Sea Fleet, the moral effect of this torpedo attack had a great influence upon the British conduct of the rest of the action. It is also evident that the British had not comprehended the tactics of the Germans.

One phase of the situation at this time has not been understood — but should be strongly emphasized. The fact was, the German Admiral, by his own act, had again placed his fleet in the same position from which

¹ "This heavy burst of firing lasted for about six minutes (7.14 to 7.20) and was for the German battle cruisers the most critical part of the action." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."


² "Although the German Flotillas did not succeed in hitting anything they played a decisive part in this encounter." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

he had once withdrawn — and this second creation of the same situation (following the “swing-around” at 6.55 P.M.) was *after* the British Grand Fleet had completed its deployment into line of battle. Consequently, in view of the way the battle was really fought, many of the long arguments as to the situation at the time of the British deployment were wasted words, now that it is known that Admiral Scheer actually came back again a second time to attack the fully deployed British Fleet. Even if, in the first place, the British deployment had not come to the Germans, the Germans had afterwards come to the British deployment. This time, the German Fleet had again put itself in contact with the British Fleet, after the British Fleet was in line of battle prepared for action and manoeuvre. Yet, this second time, the British Fleet, in its advantageous position for closing with its superior speed and imposing its superior force, not only did not close, but actually turned away and allowed the German Fleet to slip away to safety.

By so doing Admiral Jellicoe missed his best opportunity for close action in daylight with Admiral Scheer, as the British Commander-in-Chief thus allowed the Germans to gain their object of delaying close action while daylight lasted.

The British lack of understanding of Scheer's turn and return was plainly shown by Admiral Jellicoe, who wrote concerning the situation after 7 P.M.: “Our alteration of course to the south had, meanwhile, brought the enemy's line into view once more.” The British Command did not in the least realize that his enemy had actually voluntarily come back into the former position, and this was the real reason the German ships had reappeared.

Admiral Jellicoe's turnaway to avoid torpedoes had a doubly unfortunate effect, at this very stage, so far as any possibility of closing the German Fleet was concerned, because, just after the thrust of the German torpedo craft had accomplished the result of making the British Battle Fleet give ground, Admiral Scheer again suddenly withdrew his ships in a cloud of smoke. For the third time (7.17 P.M.) the German Commander-in-Chief executed his same manoeuvre of ships-right-



Admiral Scheer's diagram of his third "swing-around," at 7.17 P.M. (G.M.T.), as published in "Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War." This shows the return of the German Battle Fleet to contact with the fully deployed British Battle Fleet.

about, covered by a dense smoke screen thrown out by his destroyers.¹ In this third "swing-around" (S) Admiral Seheer's flagship, *Friedrich der Grosse*, was cramped and made the turn to port, in order not to interfere with other ships. But the evasive manoeuvre was again successfully accomplished — and again did the German Admiral leave a puzzled enemy,² as the German ships for a second time withdrew into safety on a westerly course, shrouded in smoke and freed from the gunfire of the British Fleet. The British Command again did not grasp the full import of the German move. He wrote of the difficulty of observation in the mist and smoke. Some of his subordinates reported that the Germans had turned away at this time, but none realized that a ships-right-about had been carried out. It was not until 7.41 P.M. that the British Battle Fleet was altered by divisions three points to the starboard to close, and again, as at the 6.35 turn, the British move to close was over twenty minutes after the German evasion.)

Shortly after (at 7.47 P.M.), Vice Admiral Beatty made signal to Lord Jellicoe (W/T): "Urgent. Submit that the van of battleships follow the cruisers. We can then cut off the whole of the enemy's battle fleet." This signal could not have much effect upon the actual events, as a study of Vice Admiral Beatty's chart,

¹ "So effective, however, was the smoke screen which the destroyers set up that, combined with the mist and the failing light, it sufficed for some time to prevent Admiral Jellicoe from having any idea of what the enemy was about." — Sir Julian Corbett.

² "The one effective feature of the attack was the smoke screen, which the destroyers developed so thickly as they returned that nothing could be seen of the German Fleet. No report of how complete the turn away was had reached the Commander-in-Chief. . . ." — Ibid.


signed by himself,¹ shows that the German Fleet was not on the assumed course, and that following Vice Admiral Beatty's indicated southwesterly course could not embarrass Admiral Scheer. In fact, this idea, to "cut off" the enemy, was not of value in the actual situation. As has been stated, the situation had existed, since 6 P.M., that Admiral Scheer's slower fleet was so far from its bases that it could not escape by flight. This had simplified Admiral Jellicoe's problem to a question of closing, with the superior British force of greater speed, while daylight lasted. This span of daylight was passing, and, at the time of Beatty's signal, the German Fleet had long before been extricated from its dangerous contact by the third "swing-around" (S) at 7.17 P.M. Thus the German ships were again safely proceeding on their altered course to westward, and the British were not following them up to close them. This was the whole trouble, which was losing for Admiral Jellicoe the opportunity to overwhelm the German Fleet by the superior British gunfire while it was still daylight.

It is strange comment on the battle to realize that the thrice executed German manoeuvre of ships-right-about was not observed by anyone on the British Fleet. None of the British maps or charts of the action showed these movements. The accompanying chart² is a typical British diagram of this stage of the action. It will be noted that the times (6.15 to 8.15) in the indications of the course of the German Fleet include the times of all three German turns of ships-right-about (6.35, 6.55, 7.17). Yet there is no trace of these German

¹ Chart on page 234.

² See chart on page 234.

II-0 P.M. TO IX-24 P.M. 31/5/16



This chart, signed and affixed to Vice Admiral Beatty's report, was published in the British Admiralty's official blue book "Battle of Jutland" (1920). This is a typical British chart of the action, and it is evident that the indicated course of the German Fleet showed no knowledge of the thrice executed change of direction of the German Fleet by ships-right-about (6.55, 6.55, 7.17).

manoeuvres on the plan. The chart at page 249 shows the contrast between these supposed movements of the Germans and their actual manoeuvres in the battle.

One reason for the failure of the British to understand this three times repeated manoeuvre of Admiral Scheer was the fixed conviction of the British that such a simultaneous turn of all the ships of a fleet was impracticable in action, and consequently they did not expect it to be used by their enemies. This doctrine has been stated unmistakably by Admiral Jellicoe, in explaining his own movements in the battle: "The objection to altering by turning all the ships together was the inevitable confusion that would have ensued as the result of such a manoeuvre carried out with a very large fleet under action conditions in misty weather." This positive statement of the British Commander-in-Chief, that "altering by turning all the ships together" would have been out of the question for the British Grand Fleet in the Battle of Jutland, was made over two years after the action,¹ in perfect unconsciousness that his enemy had actually carried out such a turn three times that very afternoon in the Battle.

¹ In Admiral Jellicoe's "The Grand Fleet 1914-1916," published over two years after the Jutland action.

CHAPTER XXII

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — THE FAILURE TO WIN A DECISION

(See Map at page 249)

AS has been narrated, Admiral Scheer's third use of his evasive manoeuvre of ships-right-about, at 7.17 P.M., had again enabled him to put the whole German Fleet in safety on opposite and westerly courses. The success of his smoke screened evasion was as complete as in the earlier swing-around (at 6.35 P.M.), in spite of the fact that his later turnaway was in the presence of the fully deployed British Grand Fleet, and "to thrust at the enemy's centre in line ahead was deliberately to expose himself to having his 'T' crossed by a superior fleet."¹ Yet Admiral Scheer had returned to contact with the enemy; had actually made this dangerous thrust at the enemy's center;² and had escaped even more quickly than before.³

The reason for this quick success of Admiral Scheer, in again shaking off his enemy, has been explained in the preceding chapter. It lay in the actual situation, that, at the time of this repeated German swing-around (7.17), not only did the British Fleet again fail, as before, to "follow the German veer-around," (S) the move

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² "The High Sea Fleet seemed to be rushing headlong to destruction." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

³ "Fitfully the firing died away; like a Homeric mist the smother of haze and smoke thickened impenetrably between the combatants, and Admiral Scheer, for the time at least had saved his fleet. . . ." — Sir Julian Corbett.

which Admiral Scheer admitted would have foiled his manoeuvre, but also Admiral Jellicoe, as has been explained, had turned away to avoid torpedoes at this very time. Thus, instead of closing, he was increasing his distance from the Germans, — and, as a matter of course, this put the fighting ships out of touch in a very short time, with the aid of the dense smoke screens thrown out by the Germans.

By these means, Admiral Scheer must be credited with having accomplished his stated object, after he decided, as has been quoted, “to make still further use of the facility of movement.” (S) As has also been stated, Admiral Scheer’s tactics must be considered merely as a move to play for time in the hope of being able to break off contact with his superior enemy. In this he had been completely successful, aided not only by Admiral Jellicoe’s preconceived caution in closing a retiring enemy fleet, but also by the fact that Admiral Jellicoe’s adopted methods for protection against torpedoes did not comprise turning toward his enemy, but consisted in turning away from the German Fleet.

Admiral Jellicoe has written with sincere conviction that his turnaway at this time saved his ships from danger. “It was fortunate that, owing to the turnaway of the Fleet, the torpedoes were apparently near the end of their run, and were consequently not running at high speed.” (J) The British Commander-in-Chief has also explained the absence of a defense against the first of these German torpedo attacks, by means of his own light forces, by stating that his 4th and 11th Flotillas “had been delayed in reaching their action station at the van,” (J) and were not in good position to counter the first torpedo attack of the German Flotillas VI and

IX, but "were in a very favorable position to counter the second destroyer attack" (J) of the German Flotillas III and V, which took place after the turn-away of the British Fleet. Admiral Scheer stated, of the first attack: "S35 was hit amidships and sank at once. All the other boats returned, and in doing so sent out dense clouds of smoke between the enemy and our own Main Fleet. The enemy must have turned aside on the attack of Flotillas VI and IX. Flotillas III and V that came after found nothing but light craft, and had no opportunity of attacking the battleships. The action of the torpedo-boat flotillas had achieved its purpose."

The British Admiralty's historian has written of this situation: "The one effective feature of the attack was the smoke screen which the destroyers developed so thickly as they returned that nothing could be seen of the German fleet. No report of how complete the turn-away was had reached the Commander-in-Chief, and as the rear ships were still firing, he could only conclude that his inability to see the enemy was due to the fouling of the western horizon. The guns he heard in his rear were really the last that were being fired at the retreating destroyers. This he could not tell, and he ordered the fleet to alter course five points towards the enemy — that is to south by west (7.35)¹ — expecting at any moment to have sight of them again as the smother cleared."

Of this situation, after the turnaway of the British

¹ "The two turns away and the individual manoeuvring to avoid torpedoes had brought the fleet into a ragged and irregular disposition. The German destroyers had retired, and at 7.35 the Commander-in-Chief made a signal to alter course to S. by W. and form single line ahead." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

Battle Fleet, Admiral Jellicoe wrote: "Line had again been formed at 7.33 P.M. on a S. by W. course and at 7.41 P.M. course was altered to the S. W." It was after this that the British Commander-in-Chief received the message from Vice Admiral Beatty, as has been described, suggesting that the British Battle Fleet follow the battle cruisers to "cut off the whole of enemy's battle fleet."¹

It will be clear to the reader, as explained in the preceding chapter, that neither these actual movements of the British Fleet nor this suggested move could produce the necessary result of closing the German Fleet and imposing the superior British force upon the enemy. The curtain of smoke and mist had fallen upon a more radical means of evasion than the British were prepared to counter, although, as Admiral Jellicoe stated in his report, the expected turning away tactics of the Germans had been "closely investigated on the Tactical Board." Of course so sudden a disappearance made it evident that the enemy fleet had turned away, but all British observations and reports fell far short of the actuality.² Again the account of the British Admiralty's historian should be quoted: "As for the Commander-in-Chief, he was still deeper in the dark. He had received no accurate information, either from his own ships or from the Admiralty, as to the strength or composition of the German fleet, still less of its order and disposition. Nor could he ascertain the all-im-

¹ "The situation was still obscure, nor is it clear on what evidence Admiral Beatty made his confident suggestion. By that time he had completely lost sight of the enemy in the smoke screen. . . ." — Sir Julian Corbett.

² On his position chart Admiral Jellicoe indicated an eight point turn. He quoted Captain of *St. Vincent* as maximum "eight or ten points."

portant facts with his own eyes. All that he had sighted was the dim shapes of a few ships, but whether they were van, centre or rear it was impossible to tell. Now even these had faded away, and whether their vanishing from view was caused by a thickening of the mist or a tactical movement he could only guess. The situation was indeed so completely wrapped in mystery as to baffle even his remarkable powers of penetration."

In his report Admiral Jellicoe wrote: "The 'turn-away' of the enemy under cover of torpedo boat destroyer attacks is a move most difficult to counter."¹ And this phrase of the British Admiral, in describing his enemy's tactics, gave in itself the reason why the German Fleet was not followed up in its screen of smoke. It was the fixed idea of caution in following a retiring fleet that threatened torpedo attacks, which Admiral Jellicoe had expressed so decidedly in the unmistakable statements that have been quoted in this work. Again in reference to this German turnaway, as in the case of the first German "swing-around" (S) at 6.35 P.M., it should be pointed out that the German Admiral, himself, gave the right counter to his own manoeuvre when he stated: "It (the British Fleet) should have remained on, and could have held us still further surrounded if by a simultaneous turn to a westerly course it had kept firmly to our line."

But, instead of anything of the kind, which would have put the German Fleet in a serious situation, this caution again prevented the British Fleet from closing and was Admiral Scheer's best protection. For it should be stated that, from this time, Admiral Scheer's fleet was not in great danger, nor even seriously en-

¹ "There is no counter." — Report, Admiral Jellicoe.

gaged, and both Admiral Jellicoe's turnaway and his subsequent holding aloof must be credited to this "cover of torpedo destroyer attacks." It is true that the *Marlborough* was the only British capital ship put out of action by a torpedo, but the influence of the torpedo upon the British conduct of the action, from this stage, was too strong to be mistaken. This was in accordance with the British preconceived views for conduct in action, and the result was great caution against "retiring tactics combined with destroyer attacks." (J) ¹

After the turn to a westerly course, the German Fleet had been brought around to a southwesterly, southerly, and finally to a southeasterly course "to meet the enemy's encircling movements and keep open a way for our return. The enemy fire ceased ² very soon after we had swung round and we lost sight of our adversary." (S) Consequently, Admiral Scheer was then free to make preparations for the night, as the "twilight was now far advanced." (S) He found all his battleships "were in condition to keep up the speed requisite for night work (16 knots) and thus keep their place in the line." (S) Of the battle cruisers, the *Lützow*, as has been stated, was out of the line of battle, and had been so badly damaged that Vice Admiral Hipper had transferred his flag. At 7.30 P.M. the *Lützow* could do 15 knots, and her condition grew steadily worse. But she was the only German ship that could not keep her place in the line.

Again, at this stage, Admiral Schcer's own statement of his intended plans deserves careful study: "The report made by the torpedo-boat flotillas as to the

¹ See Appendix, page 313.

² ". . . but by 7.55 P.M. fire had practically ceased." (J)

enemy's strength and the extension of his firing line made it certain that we had been in battle with the entire English Fleet. It might safely be expected that in the twilight the enemy would endeavor by attacking with strong forces, and during the night with destroyers, to force us over to the west in order to open battle with us when it was light. He was strong enough to do it. If we could succeed in warding off the enemy's encircling movement, and could be the first to reach Horns Reef, then the liberty of decision for the next morning was assured to us. In order to make this possible all flotillas were ordered to be ready to attack at night, even though there was a danger when day broke of their not being able to take part in the new battle that was expected. The Main Fleet in close formation was to make for Horns Reef by the shortest route, and, defying all enemy attacks, keep on that course. In accordance with this preparations for the night were made."

(The order of the German Fleet, after the ships-right-about at 7.17 p.m., had been Squadron II, Squadron I, Squadron III. But, on changing to a southerly course, Squadron II (the slower predreadnoughts) "had fallen out on the starboard side," (S) and, owing to its inferior speed, "it fell behind the ships of Squadrons III and I in the latter part of the day's battle." (S) In manoeuvring to port to regain station, Squadron II "came just in time to help the German battle cruisers that were engaged in a short but sharp encounter with the enemy just before dark." (S)¹ This was at 8.20 p.m.,

¹ "Help came from an unexpected quarter. Rear Admiral Mauve's squadron, of old *Deutschlands*, were ahead of the fleet and now came into action." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

when the German Scouting Divisions I and II were moving to place themselves at the head of the German line, and it was the only thing approaching a fight between heavy ships that occurred. At about the same time there was a short clash between light cruisers. Otherwise Admiral Scheer's fleet was practically disengaged, in its shrouding veil of concealment.

With this situation, and as a result of these German tactics, the British Admiral was always groping for his enemy in mist and smoke, and only gaining occasional glimpses of the German ships. Although the German manoeuvres had not been understood by the British, Admiral Jellicoe had become convinced by reports that the enemy had turned away and were moving to westward. Thereupon, at 8 P.M., general signal was made to the Battle Fleet: "Divisions separately alter course in succession to West preserving their formation. Speed 17 knots."¹ The light cruisers with the Battle Cruiser Fleet had been signaled: "Swep to westward and locate the head of the Enemy's line before dark." And, at 8.17 P.M. to support the light cruisers, signal was made to the Battle Cruiser Fleet: "Alter course in succession to West. Admiral intends to proceed at 17 knots." These movements brought on the clashes with the battle cruisers² and light cruisers (8.20 P.M.), con-

¹ "It was eight o'clock; three-quarters of an hour had passed since Admiral Scheer had turned away, and he was now some 15½ miles off." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

² At 7.50 P.M. Vice Admiral Beatty signaled for information as to condition of British Battle Cruiser Fleet, as to speed, guns, and ammunition. The replies are of great interest. *Princess Royal*, full speed, six guns; *Inflexible*, 25 knots, seven guns; *Indomitable*, full speed, all guns; *Lion*, Q turret out of action, A turret one gun correct, one hand-loading, B turret correct, X turret one gun correct and one gun temporarily disabled. All had plenty of ammunition. *Indomitable* at 7.55 P.M. signaled, "I have to ease to 14

erning which Admiral Scheer's comments have been quoted. But there was no chance that these slight encounters would bring about the one result necessary for the British, a general action with the German Fleet which would allow the overwhelming British superiority to exert its gun power upon the enemy. Daylight was fading — and these British tactics would never be able to force a general action upon the German Fleet.

This unfortunate situation, and the causes that had led up to it, contained the whole explanation of the British failure to win a decision at the Battle of Jutland, which has been buried under a mass of useless controversial writings founded upon assumptions that had no existence in fact. The truth is now evident — and it is a plain case to state. Admiral Scheer had come in contact with the whole British Fleet at 6.30 — but the preconceived tactics of the British did not comprise methods for closing a retiring enemy fleet, which was prepared for evasion in smoke. Consequently, Admiral Scheer's smoke-screened manoeuvres had been permitted to win for him immunity from the attacks of the stronger British Fleet, in spite of its superior speed, during the two remaining hours of daylight. The result was, at 8.30 P.M., the German Admiral had gained the inestimable advantage of approaching darkness, which was his best protection against the British superior force. The foregoing sums up the situation as darkness approached. The ineffectiveness of this situation was unmistakably stated in a single sentence by Admiral Jellicoe, himself: "At 8.30 P.M. the light was failing and

knots," but at 7.57 signaled that she could do 20 knots. *Tiger* signaled at 7.55 P.M., "Q magazine is flooded and I cannot right ship at present. I am taking in considerable water every time helm is put over."

the fleet was turned by divisions to a southwest course, thus reforming the single line again." For all practical purposes, this sentence comprised all the results that had been gained for the British in the two hours after the meeting of the rival battle fleets. At the end of this time, the British Grand Fleet was merely thus deployed in single line ahead on a southwesterly course, with the enemy safely screened to westward. Needless to say, almost nothing had been done, in the sense of accomplishing the destruction of the German Fleet. This gloomy picture must be visualized over the whole broad field of manoeuvre, with darkness impending, and the long line of miles of powerful British fighting ships, at a loss, peering into a vast cloud of miles of smoke and mist, behind which the German Fleet had disappeared.

So utterly had the British failed to feel out the positions of the enemy in this concealing cloud, that the German ships would only occasionally be visible in the smoke and mist. "The *Falmouth* was the last ship of the Battle Cruiser Fleet to be in touch with the enemy, at 8.38 P.M." (J)

As darkness came on, it is evident that these tactics on the part of the Germans, with increasing threats of torpedo attacks, became more and more baffling to the British Commander; and then came the crucial decision which ended the battle.¹ Admiral Jellicoe has stated: "At 9 P.M. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat of torpedo-boat-destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching darkness made it necessary for me to dispose of the fleet for the night, with a view to its

¹ "But the sun had set nearly an hour before; the gloom all round was deepening into darkness, and any further attempts to engage must involve a night action. This, like Lord Howe on the same day in 1794, he was determined not to hazard." — Sir Julian Corbett.

safety from such attacks, while providing for a renewal of action at daylight. I accordingly manoeuvred to remain between the enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas in a position in which they would afford protection to the fleet from destroyer attack and at the same time be favorably situated for attacking the enemy's heavy ships."

In his report Vice Admiral Beatty stated: "In view of the gathering darkness and for other reasons, viz: (a) Our distance from the Battle Fleet; (b) The damaged condition of the Battle Cruisers; (c) The enemy being concentrated; (d) The enemy being accompanied by numerous Destroyers; (e) Our strategical position being such as to make it appear certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight under most favorable circumstances, I did not consider it desirable or proper to close the enemy Battle Fleet during the dark hours."

Here the British Admiral and Vice Admiral Beatty were in accord, that it was not desirable for the British Fleet to fight a night action. In his report, the British Commander-in-Chief gave his reasons for his decision, most emphatically and beyond any question: "I rejected at once the idea of a night action between the heavy ships, as leading to possible disaster owing, first, to the presence of torpedo craft in such large numbers, and, secondly, to the impossibility of distinguishing between our own and enemy vessels." This last Admiral Jellicoe has explained in another paragraph of his report, and this is altogether an amazing concession to the better methods of the enemy for a night action: "The German organization for night is very good. Their system of recognition signals is excellent. Ours is practically nil. Their searchlights are superior to ours

and they use them with great effect. Finally, their method of firing at night gives excellent results. I am reluctantly compelled to the opinion that under night conditions we have a good deal to learn from them."

These explicit statements are unmistakable. Consequently, we must recognize the fact that Admiral Jellicoe declined a night action.¹ His decision at 9 P.M. must be considered as final, and the British Commander-in-Chief has made it plain that he so considered it, by stating the situation at the time and the reasons which influenced him. His decision must also be recognized as breaking off the Battle of Jutland, so far as concerned an action of the battle fleets. By his order the British Fleet steamed through the dark hours on southerly courses "some eighty-five miles" (J) from the battlefield. Although the British Fleet was thus placed in the general direction of Heligoland, this meant that Admiral Jellicoe relinquished contact, in a military sense, with the German Fleet. At the time it was undoubtedly Lord Jellicoe's intention to renew the action the next day, but it must be clearly understood that any such naval action on June 1 would not have been a continuation of the battle of May 31, by keeping in touch with the enemy fleet through the night and re-exerting his force upon the following day. It would have been a new battle, obtained by gaining a new contact with the enemy.

Admiral Jellicoe himself was explicit upon this point, and stated that "at 9 P.M." he ordered his fleet "to alter course by divisions to south, informing the Flag officers of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the cruiser and light

¹ "The Commander-in-Chief decided very rightly not to fight a night action. . . ." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

cruiser squadrons, and the officers commanding destroyer flotillas, of my movements in order that they should conform." (J) Nothing could be more definitely established than the fact that this broke off the action of fleets in every real sense of the word. The British light craft were to conform to the movements of the Battle Fleet, and there was no hint of maintaining a screen or contact that would develop the position of the enemy fleet:

This situation should be kept clearly in mind. There were many encounters throughout the night between British and German war-craft of various types, but these fought on their own initiative, and there was no concerted touch maintained with the German Fleet — nothing that could be called a part of the battle of fleets. The Germans simply ploughed their way home through the stragglers left in the wake of the British Fleet, and Lord Jellicoe frankly stated that he was out of touch with his cruisers and destroyers. Consequently, Lord Jellicoe's decision, and move to the south, ended the Battle of Jutland.

At 9 o'clock the German Fleet was to the westward. The British Fleet was between it and all its bases. The British Fleet was superior in speed, and had such an overwhelming superiority in ships and guns that it could afford to discard its damaged ships without impairing its superiority. The British Admiral had light cruisers and destroyers, to throw out a screen and to maintain touch with the German Fleet. There was a proportion of damaged ships in the German Fleet; and this, with its original inferior fleet speed, would have made it a hard task for the German Fleet to ease around the British Fleet and reach the German bases. These

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

(This Chart is diagrammatic only)

Most of the published narratives have used many charts to trace the course of the action. But it has been found possible to indicate the essentials on this one chart, which can be opened outside the pages for use as the account is read. Especially in regard to avoiding superimposed indications, where ships passed again over the same areas (German ships-right-about, &c.), it will be evident that this chart is diagrammatic only.

I. BATTLE CRUISER ACTION, 3.30-5.30 P.M.

- (1) 3.31 P.M. Beatty sighted Hipper. Airplane from *Engadine* had not been able to find enemy heavy ships.
- (2) 3.48. Battle cruisers engaged.
- (3) 4.06. *Indefatigable* sunk. British opened the range.
- (4) 4.42. Beatty sighted advancing High Sea Fleet and turned north, column-right-about.
- (5) 4.57. Evan-Thomas turned north. Hipper had also turned north ahead of the High Sea Fleet.
- (6) 5.30. Beatty's British advance force pursued by united German forces of Hipper and Scheer.

It should be noted that, after the German airships had been kept on the ground by weather conditions, five of these airships were sent up in afternoon of May 31, to scout to northward and westward. "They took no part in the battle that so soon was to follow, neither did they see anything of their own Main Fleet, nor of the enemy, nor anything of the battle" (S).

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conditions were in favor of keeping in touch with the German Fleet.

On the other hand, for Admiral Jellicoe to have kept his fleet in touch with the German Fleet through the dark hours, even by the most efficient use of his screen of destroyers and cruisers, would have meant taking the risk of a night action, which would have involved his capital ships, as Admiral Scheer intended to fight his way through that night. Above all things there was the ominous threat of torpedo attacks in the night, with possibilities of disaster to the Battle Fleet upon which depended the established British control of the seas.¹

Admiral Jellicoe has stated his case, and made a strong plea for his contention that, under the existing conditions of smoke, mist, and darkness, with the German Fleet skilfully taking advantage of these conditions, and with the handicap of the Grand Fleet in construction, equipment, and methods to contend with these tactics and conditions, there was no opportunity to force a decision without prohibitive risks of losing the existing supremacy of the British Navy on the seas.²

¹ "The British Fleet was not properly equipped for fighting an action at night. The German Fleet was. Consequently to fight them at night would only have been to court disaster. Lord Jellicoe's business was to preserve the Grand Fleet, the main defense of the Empire, as well as of the Allied cause not to risk its existence." — Sir Percy Scott, "Fifty Years in the Royal Navy."

² See "A Guide to the Military History of the World War," pp. 320-322.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND—THE ACTION BROKEN OFF

(See Map at page 293)

TO carry out Admiral Jellicoe's decision for breaking off the action, and not to be drawn into a night battle, the British Commander-in-Chief has stated his disposition as follows: "Accordingly, at 9 P.M., the fleet was turned by divisions to south (speed seventeen knots) the second organization being assumed, and the fleet formed in divisions line ahead disposed abeam to port, columns one mile apart, the object of the close formation being that the divisions should remain clearly in sight of each other during the night, in order to prevent ships mistaking each other for enemy vessels."

"At 9.24 P.M. Vice Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Fleet, in Latitude $56^{\circ} 29'$ N., Longitude $5^{\circ} 27'$ E., turned to south."

"At 9.27 P.M., the destroyer flotillas were ordered to take station five miles astern of the battle fleet."

"At 9.32 P.M. *Abdiel* was directed to lay mines in wide zig-zags from a position fifteen miles 215° from the Vyl light vessel in a mean direction 180° , ten mines to the mile."

It will be noted that this minelayer, *Abdiel*, was the only British craft of any description ordered to carry out offensive measures against the enemy. It is also stated by the British Admiralty's official "Narrative" that these orders to the *Abdiel* were "in accordance with instructions which had been previously issued. Orders

had been issued to lay this minefield before it was known that the High Sea Fleet was at sea. Her operation orders were sent to her before the fleet sailed on May 30th.”¹

It is true Admiral Jellicoe stated that the screens of destroyers behind the fleet were in position “for attacking the enemy’s heavy ships should they also be proceeding to the southward with the object of regaining their bases,” (J) but none of them was given a mission to seek out or keep in touch with the enemy.² On the contrary, all the British light forces were to conform to the movement of the British Fleet — away from the battlefield.

It should be repeated here, as stated in the preceding chapter, that this was breaking off touch with the German Fleet, so far as concerned a battle of fleets. The fact that the British Battle Fleet, with its light forces conforming, moved away from the battlefield meant that the whole British force was moving farther away from the German Fleet. Moreover, it also meant that the British were moving away from the position of advantage, which they held between the High Sea Fleet and Horn Reef. Admiral Jellicoe’s qualifying phrase, that he “manoeuvred to remain between the enemy and his bases,” did not offer any substitute for the interposing position that blocked the Germans from Horn Reef, the point, as was proved by the event, for which the Germans would desire to make.

Admiral Jellicoe has stated in his report that, at

¹ “The work was completed by 2.04 A.M. and the *Abdiel* returned to Rosyth.” — “Narrative of the Battle of Jutland.”

² “. . . and no instructions were given them to attack the enemy, nor were they informed of the enemy’s position.” — “Narrative of the Battle of Jutland,” Appendix G.

10 P.M., the *Iron Duke's* position was "latitude 56° 22' N., longitude 5° 47' E., course south, speed 17 knots, the order of the fleet from west to east being as follows: — Battle Cruiser Fleet; Cruiser Squadrons; Battle Fleet . . .; First Light-Cruiser Squadrons four miles one point before the starboard beam of the Battle-Cruiser Fleet; Second Light-Cruiser Squadron astern of the Fifth Battle Squadron and Second Battle Squadron; Third Light-Cruiser Squadron on starboard bow of the Battle-Cruiser Fleet; Fourth Light-Cruiser Squadron ahead of the Battle fleet; Destroyer Flotillas — five miles astern of the Battle fleet in the order west of east — Eleventh, Fourth, Twelfth, Ninth, Tenth, Thirteenth."

The British Battle Fleet steamed on to the southward, at 17 knots, "some 85 miles" (J) through the darkness toward a point about fifty miles west of the channel entrance at Horn Reef to the German bases.

Owing to the reduction of speed of the torpedoed *Marlborough*,¹ the Sixth Division of battleships fell behind out of touch. The British light forces became widely scattered in the dark hours, the destroyers especially, which were out of touch.

Within a few minutes of the time of Lord Jellicoe's signal for the move to the south, Admiral Scheer gave his order for the night (9.06 P.M., G. M. T.): "Course S. S. E. $\frac{1}{4}$ E. speed 16 knots." (S) The German Admiral fully expected to be attacked by the British Fleet and to meet strong opposition, but he adhered to his decision that the German "main fleet in close formation

¹ At 2 A.M. *Marlborough* reported that she "had been obliged to ease to twelve knots on account of stress on bulkheads at the higher speeds." (J) At 2.30 A.M. she was ordered back to the base, Vice Admiral Burney having transferred his flag to *Retenge*.

was to make for Horns Reef by the shortest route," (S) Admiral Scheer's reasons have been quoted in the preceding chapter, the desire to "be the first to reach Horns Reef" (S), to avoid being forced to the west and compelled to fight a new battle the next morning.¹ To gain this point of vantage, Admiral Scheer had determined to fight his way through any opposition that might be offered.

The Admiralty's official "Narrative" has recognized this situation, and has stated: "Admiral Scheer, it must be granted, was a man of quick appreciation and of bold and rapid decision. He decided to make straight for Horns Reef in close order during the night, maintaining his course regardless of attack."

To carry out this decision, the German Fleet was disposed in the same order, Squadrons I, III, II, with the battle cruisers covering the rear — "out of consideration for their damaged condition." (S) The German Admiral placed these weaker ships in the rear, as he thought his van would encounter resistance and might be heavily engaged in the expected night action. Of the German cruisers, Scouting Division II covered the van, and Scouting Division IV covered the starboard side. His torpedo flotillas were disposed "in an E. N. E. to S. S. W. direction,² which was where the enemy Main Fleet could be expected." (S)

Thus disposed the German Battle Fleet moved

¹ "This situation was one of extreme peril, for an action the next day might involve the practical annihilation of his fleet. His only hope lay in warding off the British encirclement. If he could reach Horns Reef by break of day he might win through and escape the net closing round him." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

² ". . . and all flotillas were ordered to be ready to attack during the night, although this might leave him bereft of destroyers in the battle impending the next day." — Ibid.

through the dark hours, on a straight course for Horn Reef, without meeting the expected attacks, which the strong Squadron I in the van was prepared to ward off. There really was no chance of engaging the British battleships, as the Grand Fleet had moved to the south before the German Fleet crossed Admiral Jellicoe's course.) The German dreadnought *Nassau* got out of station, when she rammed and sank a stray British destroyer in the darkness, and made for a morning rendezvous. The rest of the dreadnoughts of the High Sea Fleet met no delay nor mishap through the dark hours. Of the predreadnoughts, the battleship *Pommern* was sunk by a torpedo, with loss of all hands.

Many of the German destroyers had fired all their torpedoes, and these craft were used for emergencies. They were very necessary, as the disabled cruisers *Rostock* and *Elbing* were abandoned and blown up, and these destroyers did good service in taking off the crews. They also rescued the crew of the disabled *Lützow*, which was towed through the darkness until she was so down by the head that her screws spun in the air. She was abandoned, and destroyed by a torpedo at 1.45 A.M. Admiral Scheer cited the fact that these events could happen, without disturbance by the enemy, as "proving that the English Naval Forces made no attempt to occupy the waters between the scene of battle and Horns Reef." (S)

As a matter of fact this did not need any proof, because the British Fleet held steadily on its southerly course, without regard to the direction taken by the Germans. In the wake of the Grand Fleet were left scattered cruisers and destroyers — and there were many clashes between these and the Germans.

But all were isolated fights and adventures of lame ducks, as a result of the German Fleet crossing the wake of the Grand Fleet, and they were without control by the British Command and without coördination. A note in Appendix G of the Admiralty's official "Narrative" has left no doubt as to this last: "The flotillas were ordered to take station astern 5 miles, and no instructions were given them to attack the enemy, nor were they informed of the enemy's position. In these circumstances, no organized attacks were made in the dark hours." And this British official "Narrative" has, consequently also, left no question of the fact that, in every sense, the movement of the British Fleet to the south ended the battle so far as concerned an action between fleets, as has been explained in the preceding chapter.

As the German ships were ploughing their way through these British light forces, which were scattered about in the darkness, "Scouting Divisions I and II and the ships in Squadron I in particular were to ward off the attacks. The result was excellent. To meet these attacks in time, bring the enemy under fire and by suitable manoeuvring evade his torpedocs, demanded the most careful observation on board the vessels. Consequently the line was in constant movement, and it required great skill on the part of the commanders to get into position again, and necessitated a perpetual look-out for those manoeuvring just in front of them. Very little use was made of the searchlights. It had been proved that the fire from the attacking boats was aimed chiefly at these illuminated targets . . . The Second, Fifth and Seventh, and part of the Sixth and Ninth were the only Flotillas that proceeded

to the attack; the boats had various nocturnal fights with the enemy light forces." (S)

This last did not mean that Admiral Scheer had launched any real destroyer attacks against the British Grand Fleet. It simply meant that these were the only German destroyers that were engaged in attacks upon the British light forces, which were scattered in the wake of the Grand Fleet. Admiral Scheer has established this by stating: "They never sighted the Main Fleet" — which was of course out of the question, as it had passed to southward long before the German Fleet crossed its track.

On the British side, destroyers of many flotillas were engaged in what must be regarded as haphazard clashes with the enemy. The British Commander-in-Chief has reported these in detail, and there were many instances of individual daring and enterprise.¹ But it is now evident that there were not as many hits as were estimated. Admiral Jellicoe has commended the work "particularly of the 4th and 12th Flotillas." (J) The destroyers of the Fourth Flotilla "came in contact with the enemy cruisers at 11.30 P.M." (J) The *Rostock* was torpedoed and the *Elbing* damaged in collision. Both were later abandoned and blown up by the Germans, after their crews had been taken off as described. At midnight this flotilla "came in contact with an enemy battle squadron consisting of ships of the *Deutschland* class" (Squadron II). (J) But "the flotilla was eventually driven off by gunfire and obliged to retire to the northward." (J) In these encounters, the

¹ "When the German van cut through the flotillas, however, the individual destroyers attacked with great gallantry and persistence." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland," Appendix G.

British destroyers *Tipperary*, *Sparrowhawk*, *Fortune*, and *Ardent* were lost. *Broke* was disabled, but eventually reached the Tyne.

The Twelfth Flotilla at 2 A.M. made a successful attack upon the German Squadron II. It was in this attack that the predreadnought *Pommern* was destroyed by a torpedo at 2.20 A.M., and this was the only German battleship lost in the action. From the Twelfth Flotilla at this time was sent a report of the location of the German Battle Fleet. Admiral Jellicoe stated, "This message was unfortunately not received in the battle fleet, owing to telefunken interference."¹

But this message, and all other information as to the location and courses of the German Battle Fleet during the dark hours, could not have a real influence on the situation. Even with all the uncertainty as to the enemy enshrouded in smoke screens, the location of the German Fleet was well enough known. In addition to the fact that Admiral Scheer had driven through the British light forces left in the wake of the Grand Fleet, Admiral Jellicoe had received information from the Admiralty, culminating in the message (Admiralty to C.-in-C. 10.41 P.M.) that "the enemy was believed to be returning to its base as its course was S. S. E. $\frac{3}{4}$ E. and speed 16 knots." Yet all this was precluded from having any effect upon the result, because Admiral Jellicoe had disposed his whole force to keep on through the dark hours on southerly courses, with no intention of making any move against the enemy before daylight. By the time it became daylight, all such information

¹ "But even if it had been received it could not have affected the result, for the Grand Fleet was now too far from Horns Riff, and it was too late to intercept the enemy and bring him to action." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

was doubly of no value: first, because the German Fleet had passed safely on its way to Horn Reef; and secondly, because, as will be shown in the following narrative, Admiral Jellicoe decided that it was "undesirable to close the Horn Reef at daylight." (J) And this meant that the British Commander-in-Chief was not to seek a new action early in the morning of June 1.

The British Eleventh Flotilla had attacked enemy cruisers at 10.04 P.M. Of the Thirteenth Flotilla, which had become scattered, the *Petard* was damaged by the gunfire of the *Nassau*. The Ninth and Tenth Flotillas had also, in the words of Admiral Jellicoe, "become somewhat scattered." Of this last group, the *Turbulent* was the destroyer rammed and sunk by the *Nassau* (12.30 A.M.). "The Fourth Flotilla had ceased to exist as an organized force."¹

Of Admiral Jellicoe's cruisers, at 10.20 P.M. the Second Light Cruiser Squadron had engaged German light cruisers (Scouting Division IV) at close range. The German cruiser *Frauenlob* was sunk, and on the British side the *Southampton* and *Dublin* were damaged. "The signal reporting the *Southampton's* engagement did not reach the Commander-in-Chief until 11.38 P.M.² but the gun flashes and searchlights were seen by the whole battle fleet."³ The Admiralty's official "Narrative" has given the following account of the end of the *Black Prince*, which had lost touch with the fleet after Rear

¹ "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland." — "Those vessels of the flotilla that remained capable of action were now scattered and dispersed and took no further effective part in the operation."

² "The *Southampton's* wireless had been shot away, but at 11.30 she ordered the *Nottingham* to report the action." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

³ "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

Admiral Arbuthnot's squadron was overwhelmed, as described, and at 12.10 A.M. "found herself within 1,600 yards of the rear ships of the German First Squadron. A tornado of fire was opened on her from the *Thuringen* and *Oestfriesland*. She burst into flames and sank with a terrific explosion in four minutes."

As will be readily understood, these encounters meant that there was a great deal of shooting, with explosions and fire lighting up the darkness. Admiral Scheer thought that all this must have indicated his position, and, even after not encountering the expected night attacks, the German Admiral expected the British to renew the battle promptly at dawn. But in consequence of the British Admiral's dispositions for the night, it is evident that the German Fleet was in no danger of attack in the early morning. As has been explained, the German Fleet, on its southeasterly course, had crossed the wake of the British Fleet, which had moved off to the southward and had continued uninterruptedly on its southerly courses at 17 knots through the dark hours.

Consequently, the situation had been developed that Admiral Scheer had crossed to a position where he was to the northeastward of his enemy, and the German Commander-in-Chief was no longer in a position where the British Fleet could "force him over to the west in order to open battle with him when it was light," (S) which was the danger Admiral Scheer had planned to avoid.

The short night, of not much over five hours of darkness, had thus passed, and dawn was breaking.¹ The British Battle Fleet "accordingly altered to north at 2.47 A.M. (June 1) and formed line of battle." (J) "It

¹ "Meanwhile the fleet was approaching the end of its disappointing journey to the south." — "Narrative of the Battle of Jutland."

was now too late to bar the way to Horns Riff, for the *Iron Duke* was 33 miles, and the Germans only 12 miles from it.”¹

In his report Admiral Jellicoe has explained: “The weather was very misty at daylight, visibility being only three to four miles, and I deemed it advisable to disregard the danger from submarines due to a long line of ships and to form line of battle at once in case of meeting the enemy battlefleet before I had been able to get in touch with my cruisers and destroyers.” This northerly course was retracing the path the British Fleet had traveled in the night.

The reason for thus retracing his course, instead of seeking the German Fleet, was Admiral Jellicoe’s desire to collect his stragglers, which were widely scattered, as has been explained. In his book Admiral Jellicoe has left no doubt as to this situation in the early morning of June 1: “Partly on account of the low visibility, and partly because of the inevitable difference in dead reckoning between ships, due to their many movements during the action and during the night, considerable difficulty was experienced in collecting the Fleet. This applied particularly to the destroyer flotillas, which had been heavily engaged, and whose facilities for computing their positions under these conditions were only slight; but the same difficulty was experienced with all classes of ships, and, although awkward, the fact did not cause me any surprise. The cruisers were not sighted until 6 A.M.,² the destroyers did not join the Battle Fleet until 9 A.M., and the 6th Division of the

¹ “Narrative of the Battle of Jutland.”

² “The 5th Battle Squadron rejoined at 3.30 A.M. and took station ahead of the 2nd Battle Squadron.” (J)

Battle Fleet with the Vice Admiral of the 1st Battle Squadron was not in company until the evening.”

The following has given Admiral Jellicoe's own summing up of the situation: “The difficulties experienced in collecting the Fleet (particularly the destroyers), due to the above causes, rendered it undesirable for the Battle Fleet to close the Horn Reef at daylight, as had been my intention when deciding to steer to the southward during the night. It was obviously necessary to concentrate the Battle Fleet and destroyers before renewing action.¹ By the time the concentration was effected it had become apparent that the High Sea Fleet, steering for the Horn Reef, had passed behind the shelter of the German minefields in the early morning on the way to their ports.² The presence of a Zeppelin sighted at 3.30 A.M. made it certain that our position at that time would be known to the enemy, should he be at sea, but the information obtained from our wireless directional stations during the early morning showed that the ships of the High Sea Fleet must have passed the Horn Reef on a southerly course shortly after daybreak.” These statements of the British Commander-in-Chief make it certain that there was no possibility of a new naval action of fleets on June 1.

Admiral Scheer's fleet had arrived off Horn Reef at 2 A.M., where he waited for the disabled *Lützow*. At

¹ “In the series of desperate conflicts that had taken place the destroyers were scattered far and wide, and to take the fleet right into the enemy's waters without cruiser and destroyer cover was contrary to all principle. The least he could do was to steer north till he could get his light forces about him.” — Sir Julian Corbett.

² “The Commander-in-Chief had no such hope. He saw too plainly that there was now no possibility of recovering the lost chance of the vital hour when he had first caught his skilful adversary unawares, and the latter aided by misty conditions, had effected his escape.” — *Ibid*.

3.30 he learned that she had been abandoned. Up to that time the German Admiral had expected a new battle of fleets, but he soon divined that he was to be free from pressure on the part of his enemy. This was confirmed when Admiral Scheer learned through a German aircraft scout of the straggling of Lord Jellicoe's ships. (L-11 was the airship reported by the British "shortly after 3.30.") Admiral Scheer's comment is: "It is obvious that this scattering of the forces — which can only be explained by the fact that after the day-battle Admiral Jellicoe had lost the general command — induced the Admiral to avoid a fresh battle." Both commanders are consequently on record in agreement as to the reason for no new battle of fleets.

In his book Admiral Jellicoe has written the following, which is most interesting, as showing the wide field that must be kept in mind to grasp the proportions of this one great action of modern fleets: "Some idea of the area covered by the different engagements which constituted the Battle of Jutland will be gathered from a consideration of the distances steamed by our ships during the operations."

"The Battle Cruisers steamed some 64 miles between 3.48 P.M., the time of opening fire, and 6.17 P.M., the time that the Battle Fleet commenced action, and a further distance of some 57 miles to 9 P.M., when the Fleet turned to southward for the night. The Battle Fleet steamed some 47 miles between the commencement of their engagement with the High Sea Fleet and the turn to southward at 9 P.M."

"The whole Fleet steamed some 85 miles during the period covered by the night action — 9 P.M. to 2 A.M."

CHAPTER XXIV

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — THE RETURN OF THE FLEETS

(See Map at page 293)

THE German Fleet was consequently enabled to proceed to its bases undisturbed. On the way in, the dreadnought *Ostfriesland*, at 5.50 A.M., struck a mine. "The damage was slight; the vessel shipped 400 tons of water, but her means of navigation did not suffer, and she was able to run into harbour under her own steam. I signalled, 'Keep on.' The last ship passed through the area without coming across further mines." (S) This was the only mishap to the German battleships on their way into the ports at their bases. It is established that all claims of destruction of German ships, outside of those which have been recorded, were not founded upon fact. The first concealment by the Germans of the loss of the *Lützow*¹ gave color to British reports of greater German losses, but these claims are now known to have been mistaken. Outside of the loss of the *Lützow*, the German battle cruisers had suffered severely. This was very natural, as, aside from their being a long time in action with Vice Admiral Beatty's force, they had afterwards been in the van, of the German Fleet. Especially were they exposed to gunfire at the time of the last German thrust against the British line (following the German ships-right-about

¹ "The announcement of this loss was suppressed by the Naval Staff, though not at my request." (S)

of 6.55 P.M.), when they were in advance to support the German torpedo attacks, which caused the British Fleet to turn away shortly after 7 P.M. The German battle cruisers had received heavy hits as follows: *Derfflinger*, 19, *Seydlitz*, 21; *Moltke*, 4. The *Seydlitz* had also been damaged by a torpedo (4.47 P.M.), and, in the morning of June 1, was barely able to make her dock at Wilhelmshaven. The *Derfflinger* was also badly damaged. Admiral Scheer has stated of the morning of June 1: "The reports received from the battle-cruisers showed that Scouting Division I would not be capable of sustaining a serious fight."

In addition to the battle cruisers, the battleships of Squadron III, which had also been in the van at the time of this thrust against the British center after 6.55 P.M., had received heavy hits as follows: *König*, 10; *Grosser Kurfürst*, 8; *Markgraf*, 5; *Kaiser*, 2. This total of injury to the German ships emphasizes the fact, which was pointed out in the last chapter, that there was a proportion of damaged ships in the German Fleet when Admiral Jellicoe made his decision to break off the action at 9 P.M. Besides this, Admiral Scheer has stated that "the leading ships of Squadron III could not have fought for any length of time, owing to the reduction of their supply of munitions by the long spell of fighting." The *Frankfurt*, *Pillau*, and *Regensburg*, were "the only fast light cruisers now available," (S) and that many of the German destroyers were out of torpedoes has already been stated. All of this shows how necessary it was for Admiral Scheer to decide to fight his way home in the night, and avoid a new battle in the morning of June 1. This total of damage to the German Fleet also shows how unfortunate it was that the

British had not closed the damaged German Fleet in daylight, instead of allowing Admiral Scheer's tactics to gain the time to avail himself of the protection of darkness — for all this harm to the German fighting ships had been inflicted before dark.

On the British side, of course the battle cruisers and the battleships of the Fifth Battle Squadron were damaged,¹ but Admiral Jellicoe's great Battle Fleet of twenty three² dreadnoughts was practically uninjured. On this whole British Grand Fleet there had been only two hits, both on the *Colossus* with a total of five wounded. This fact, more eloquently than anything else, tells the story of the failure to impose this overwhelming British force in destructive contact upon the enemy.

There is not much to add to the disappointing and indecisive ending of the action for the British Fleet. After sighting the German Zeppelin, which "disappeared to eastward," (J) the British Fleet had been kept on a northward course. "At 4.10 A.M. the Battle Fleet was formed into divisions in line ahead, disposed abeam to starboard, in order to widen the front and reduce the risk of submarine attack," (J) and from this time it was only a question of picking up the British stragglers and looking for wreckage and stray enemy craft. The British cruiser *Dublin* had reported sighting an enemy cruiser and two destroyers. "At 5.15 A.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet joined the Battle Fleet in accordance with orders signalled, and was directed to locate the cruiser reported by the *Dublin*, whilst the

¹ Heavy hits: *Lion*, 12; *Princess Royal*, 6; *Tiger*, 10; *Barham*, 6; *Malaya*, 7; *Warspite*, 13.

² The *Marlborough* had been sent back to the base, after being torpedoed as described, and this reduced the number to twenty three.

Battle Fleet searched to the south-eastward for one of the enemy battle cruisers which was thought to be in a damaged condition and probably, therefore, still making for a German port." (J) To these small dimensions had the possibilities shrunk.

Admiral Jellicoe had a good deal of difficulty in joining up his destroyers. At 5.48 A.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet was "steering south-east at 18 knots, and at 6.15 A.M. altered course to south. At 6 A.M., not having met the destroyers, the Battle Fleet altered course to southeast, with the cruisers in company, steaming at 17 knots, and maintaining that course until 7.15 A.M., at which time course was altered to north, the Battle Cruiser Fleet altering course to north-east at 8 A.M." (J) At 8.52 A.M. the Battle Fleet turned "to a south-west course." (J) "At 10 A.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet was again in sight, ahead of the Battle Fleet, and course was altered to north by west, the destroyers, which had now joined, being stationed to form a submarine screen." (J)

"The Harwich Force, under Commodore Tyrwhitt, had been kept in port by Admiralty orders¹ on May 31st, and was despatched to sea on the morning of June 1st, when I was informed that it was being sent out

¹ The following is history of this episode as to the Harwich cruisers and destroyers. On May 31, 4.45 P.M. Commodore Tyrwhitt sent dispatch to Admiralty: "314. Have you any instructions?" Ans. from Admiralty, 5.15 P.M.: "Yours 314. Complete with fuel. You may have to relieve Light Cruisers and destroyers in B. C. F. later." Commodore T to Admiralty, 5.15 P.M.: "315, Priority. Urgent. I am proceeding to sea." Ans. from Admiralty, 5.35 P.M.: "Your 315. Return at once and await orders." June 1, 2.52 A.M., Admiralty to Commodore T: "5th Light Cruiser Squadron, 9th and 10th flotillas should join C-in-C to replace squadrons or flotillas short of fuel. Proceed towards Lat. 55° 30' N., Long. 6° 0' E., until orders are received from C-in-C."

to join me and to replace vessels requiring fuel.” (J) ¹ At 6 A.M. Commodore Tyrwhitt had reported to Admiral Jellicoe that he was proceeding to location with five light cruisers and thirteen destroyers, and requesting instructions. “At 7 A.M. I instructed Commodore Tyrwhitt to send four of his destroyers to screen the *Marlborough* to her base; he informed me at 2.30 P.M. that he had sighted the *Marlborough*. At 10.40 A.M. I had reported to the Admiralty that I did not require the Harwich Force. I desired Commodore Tyrwhitt to strengthen the *Marlborough*’s escort and told him that I did not need his ships.” (J)

“At noon the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 26.20 N., Long. 5.25 E., and at 12.30 P.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet was in Lat. 53.32 N., Long. 6.11 E. It was now clear that all disabled enemy vessels had either sunk or had passed inside the minefields en route to their bases. It had been evident since the early morning, from the information obtained by our directional stations, that the enemy’s fleet was returning to port. All our injured vessels were also en route for their bases, and I decided to return with the whole Fleet, and gave the necessary instructions to the Rosyth force to return independently.” (J)

Of the injured British ships the most important were the two battleships which had been put out of action, the *Warspite* and the *Marlborough*. At 7 A.M. the *Warspite* which had been “holed twice in wing engine room” ² was reported to Admiral Jellicoe, “Speed reduced to 16 knots.” Admiral Jellicoe stated in his

¹ Admiralty to C-in-C, 3.20 A.M. June 1: “Five Light Cruisers, 13 destroyers order from Harwich (towards location stated) to join you and replace vessels requiring fuel.”

² S. O. 5th B. S. 7.00 A.M. June 1.

report: "Several compartments were full, but the bulkheads were shored. The ship was being steered from the engine room. At 9.0 A.M. 1st June the Commander-in-Chief asked the Commander-in-Chief, Rosyth, to send local destroyers to screen *Warspite*. She arrived at Rosyth at 3.0 P.M. on 1st June having been unsuccessfully attacked by enemy submarines en route."

As has been stated, the *Marlborough* had also been screened by destroyers of the Harwich Force. "The *Marlborough* reported at 11 A.M. that a torpedo had been fired at her and had missed. Some anxiety was felt about the ship on the morning of June 2nd, as bad weather had set in and her pumps became choked; tugs were ordered out to meet her, but she arrived in the Humber at 8 A.M." (J)

These attacks by German U-boats were accounted for by the fact that "U-boats lying off English harbors were told to remain at their posts a day longer." (S) Admiral Scheer has stated that British destroyers were also attacked by these submarines, and that the mines were laid off the Orkneys which afterwards caused the loss of Lord Kitchener.

Of the other injured British ships, the case of the armored cruiser *Warrior* was hopeless from the first. After being put out of action, "both engine rooms being very soon flooded by hits well below the water line, as well as by several hits about the water line and through the upper deck,"¹ this British cruiser had attempted to shape a course for Kinnaird Head with speed reduced to 10 or 12 knots. But, "having ascertained that there was no possibility of the engines working for more than another hour,"² she was taken

¹ Captain's Report — H. M. S. *Warrior*.

² *Ibid.*

in tow (8 P.M. May 31) by the airplane carrier *Engadine*, and an attempt was made to tow her in. This proved to be impossible, as the ship filled and had to be abandoned at 7.45 A.M. June 1. The crew were taken off by the *Engadine*.

The light cruiser *Chester* had been ordered home at daylight, June 1, "three guns out of action, much damage to upper works and holed four places above water line." (J) She arrived at the Humber at 5 P.M. June 1. Of the destroyers, the damaged *Broke* arrived safely in the Tyne. The *Acasta* was towed in by the *Nonsuch*, and the *Onslow* towed in by the *Defender*.

As has been stated, the twenty three dreadnoughts of the Battle Fleet had not been heavily engaged and were practically uninjured. Consequently, Admiral Jellicoe was able to write: "The Fleet arrived at its bases on June 2d, fuelled, and was reported ready for sea at four hour's notice at 9.45 P.M. on that date." Of course this statement of readiness referred only to Admiral Jellicoe's Battle Fleet. The ships of Vice Admiral Beatty's command must not be considered as included. Of the four *Queen Elizabeth* dreadnoughts, Fifth Battle Squadron, only the *Valiant* was unimpaired for immediate service. Of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, it was reported on June 4, in answer to inquiry from Admiral Jellicoe, "Ships ready for immediate service *New Zealand, Indomitable, Inflexible.*" The *Lion, Princess Royal, and Tiger* were reported with "fighting efficiency impaired. These could fight in an emergency." Thus only three out of the nine British battle cruisers were left at full fighting strength.

In his book Admiral Jellicoe has stated: "The ships which had received damage in the Jutland Battle had

to be repaired without delay. The great majority of the repairs were completed during June or by the first week in July, and, whilst under repair, the opportunity was taken of effecting certain alterations which experience gained in the action had shown to be desirable. The *Marlborough* was the only large ship whose repairs occupied any considerable length of time, and even she rejoined the Fleet in August, although the work upon her was handicapped to some extent by being carried out in a floating dock moored in a somewhat inconvenient position. The light cruiser *Chester* was also detained at Hull until July 29th, as her injuries from gunfire were fairly extensive, and a great many alterations were carried out."

Of the German Fleet, Admiral Scheer made the claim: "The total impression produced by all the damage done was that by their splendid construction our ships had proved to be possessed of extraordinary powers of resistance." In the case of the German battle cruisers in particular it has been acknowledged that they had greater resistance than the British battle cruisers, and the shipbuilding doctrines of Admiral Tirpitz, which were emphasized in the previous volume of this work, unquestionably were justified in this naval action.

The *Seydlitz*, *Ostfriesland*, and *Helgoland*, were repaired in dock at Wilhelmshaven; the *Grosser Kurfürst*, *Markgraf*, and *Moltke*, at Hamburg; the *König* and *Derfflinger* at Kiel. "By the middle of August the Fleet was again in readiness, with the exception of the battle-cruisers *Seydlitz* and *Derfflinger*. But a new ship, the *Bayern*, had been added to the Fleet, the first to mount guns of 38 cm." (S)

CHAPTER XXV

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — THE CAUSES AND RESULTS OF THE BRITISH FAILURE

(See Map at page 293)

THIS account of the Battle of Jutland, in the very narration of the course of the action, has shown clearly the reasons for the tragic failure of the British to gain a decision in the one great naval battle of the World War. It can be called nothing less than a tragedy,¹ in view of the actual situation that existed on the afternoon of May 31, 1916. As has been described, the overwhelmingly superior British Battle Fleet was then in contact with the weaker German Battle Fleet of inferior speed — and this contact was out in the North Sea, so far from the German bases that for the slower German Fleet escape by flight alone was out of the question.

In this situation there cannot be found any possibility of a German victory that would have destroyed the British Battle Fleet. But this situation essentially must mean that an opportunity was presented to the British for destroying the German Battle Fleet. Such a victory for the British would have accomplished the destruction of the whole fighting force of the German Navy, as there was no reserve behind the German Battle Fleet. Yet, instead of anything of the kind, the

¹ "In our long and glorious naval history nothing directly comparable with this tragedy stands recorded." — Lord Sydenham, *English Review*, February, 1924.

overmatched and slower German Fleet was enabled to return to port, after inflicting losses much heavier than it had sustained. Herein lies the tragedy.

In the early British accounts of the battle there were fanciful tales of the pursuit of fleeing German ships. But, after these accounts were discredited, there arose one of the greatest naval controversies that ever agitated Great Britain. With that controversy this book has nothing to do, except to point out that the bulk of the arguments were founded upon imaginary situations which were not in accord with the facts, and many volumes were written which are now useless, as these distorted partisan pleas have thrown themselves out of court. The facts are now known, and these must be the basis of judgment.

It is always a good thing to reduce a problem to its simplest terms. For the purposes of this book, it is best to reduce the Battle of Jutland to the actual terms of the game that was played out, then and there in the North Sea, under the existing conditions, and with the ability and strength of the actual participants as factors. There has been too much straying away from the real case, that the battle was fought by the rival leaders and forces of May 31, 1916, and their own acts, and the springs of their action, decided the issue.

In the first place, with this due regard to the viewpoint of the actual participants, it is evident that, on the British side, we can eliminate the possibility of the British winning a decision by means of a night action. The statements, which have been quoted, of both Admiral Jellicoe and Vice Admiral Beatty, have shown beyond misunderstanding that anything of the kind, so far as the Battle of Jutland was concerned, was put out

of the question entirely. The British Commander-in-Chief has made it unmistakably clear that he conceded to the Germans a superiority for night action so great that he held it to be prohibitive. Admiral Jellicoe's avoidance of a night action was not alone a matter of the heavy fighting ships, but it also precluded the tactical use of his destroyers in night attacks upon the German Fleet. This was proved by the fact that at darkness his destroyers were ordered to conform to the movement away from the battlefield.¹ Consequently, we must regard it as an established condition that, if the battle should be prolonged until darkness, the British would break off the action — as happened in the actual event.

This established limitation of the British narrows the question down to a consideration of the possibilities for the British of only winning a decision before darkness. On this basis, as operations were actually carried out and as the battle was actually fought, another limitation of the British must also be taken into account, as shortening the time available for destructive contact with the German Fleet. The narrative of the action has plainly shown the breakdown of British information, when it was necessary to unite the separate British forces against the enemy. It was evident that the British on the day of the battle were not prepared in methods for joining up their forces, and there was confusion and delay in concentrating the whole British Fleet against the German Fleet. Consequently, this delay must be recognized as also curtailing the time in which the German Battle Fleet might have been overwhelmed.

¹ "At 9.27 P.M. the destroyer flotillas were ordered to take station five miles astern of the battlefleet." — Admiral Jellicoe, Report.

But, even with these drawbacks, it still must be held that the whole British fighting force was concentrated against the enemy by 6.30 P.M., at the latest. This left a good two hours of available daylight — and the German fleet speed was only 17 knots. Yet the British Battle Fleet did not close the German Battle Fleet.

There is no escaping the result of these eliminations and this deduction. We are forced to the conclusion that there was an opportunity for the British to win a decision, but the British lost that opportunity because they were not ready with methods for closing an enemy who was prepared for evasion in smoke screens, with threats of torpedo attack. As has been shown, the British entered the battle imbued with a preconceived caution in closing a withdrawing enemy. This cautious policy, as has also been shown, had been approved by the British Admiralty for "the conduct of the Fleet in action,"¹ and its ill effects should not be solely charged against the men who were fighting the battle. But the result of this British caution in closing was that Admiral Scheer was enabled to gain the protection of darkness — and at darkness the British Fleet withdrew from the battlefield. This sums up the essentials of the great naval action.

As to the effects and consequences of the battle, there is no question of the fact that this withdrawal of the British Battle Fleet from the battlefield had a great moral effect on Germany. Morale was all-important in the World War, and the announcement to the people and to the Reichstag had a heartening effect upon the Germans at the very time they needed some such stimulant, with an unfavorable military situation for the

¹ Quoted in full in Appendix, page 313.

Central Powers, and as an offset to the irritation of the German people at being forced to abandon the U-boat campaign upon the demand of the United States.

When we consider the indecisive tactical result on the battlefield, the Battle of Jutland cannot be said to have caused any immediate change in the broad situation which then existed on the seas. The claim was made that the Germans had so manoeuvred their Battle Fleet that detached forces of the superior British Battle Fleet were cut up. But this damage was not enough to do away with the established superiority of the British Battle Fleet, which still remained in control of traffic through the North Sea. After Jutland, as before, the Germans were barred from the waterways of the world. None of their ships was released from port, and there was no effect upon the blockade. These facts were cited at the time in Great Britain to show that the "defensive" use of the British Fleet had maintained the Allied supremacy on the seas, and that Jutland had the effect of a victory.

But this was a fallacy, on its own statement, because preserving the existing naval situation unchanged also preserved the German control of the Baltic, which has been shown to be the worst drawback for the sea power of the Entente Allies.

This German control of the Baltic depended upon the German Battle Fleet, and, as the German Battle Fleet was not destroyed at Jutland, Germany was still able to dominate the Baltic Sea. The German strangle-hold upon Russia remained unbroken, and it was impossible to get supplies through the Baltic to the Russians, to avert the exhaustion that was leading to collapse and revolution. German control of the Baltic also main-

tained the stream of supplies that went into Germany through the Baltic, and these supplies, especially the ores, were of great value in keeping up the fighting strength of Germany.

These were self-evident evils, which remained unchanged because the British had failed to destroy the German Fleet — and they show how hollow were the claims of comfort from the “defensive” idea. But, beyond any mistaking, in the actual naval strategy as the war was actually fought, the ensuing results of the British failure to win a decision at Jutland became more and more disastrous to the Entente Allies as time went on. The active rôle of the German Battle Fleet soon became that of keeping the gates for the U-boats in their destructive campaign. In performing this task, the German Fleet in being had an increasing and most important influence upon the ensuing stages of the World War. It was altogether a delusion to think that the career of the German Battle Fleet had ended at Jutland — in the familiar phrase, that it “never came out.” On the contrary, Admiral Scheer’s Fleet was a most active force in the war, and it kept a wide area in the North Sea cleared for the egress and entrance of the German U-boats.

To bring home the importance of this function of the High Sea Fleet, it should be baldly stated that, if the German Fleet had been destroyed at Jutland and had not been left to defend the waters around the German bases, the U-boat campaign could not have been carried out. Just as, on land, outworks and obstructions are only effective when maintained by strong forces, so, on the sea, the elaborate protections, extending far out beyond the German bases, were only effective when

defended by the German Battle Fleet. With the German Battle Fleet out of the way, the British would have been able to close in about the German bases, to sweep away the German obstructive minefields, and to use the British small craft of anti-submarine type, with British mine barrages, to hem in the U-boats. But, with the German Battle Fleet still in being and holding them off at a distance, the British found it impossible to work in close to the German bases. This is the true measure of the cost of the British failure to overwhelm the German Battle Fleet at Jutland — and there is no need to add anything to this statement.

But it should also be stated that, in addition to this continued far reaching ill effect of the escape of the German Battle Fleet, the prestige gained by the German Navy in the Jutland action gave the German Naval leaders the influence necessary to win their argument, and to induce the Germans to adopt the policy of the German Navy for unrestricted U-boat warfare. Consequently, the German Navy emerged from Jutland, not only with the naval forces necessary to maintain the U-boat campaign, but also with the added power necessary to bring about the adoption of this unrestricted U-boat campaign. An account of the German Naval leaders thus gaining their point will be given in a following chapter.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE EFFECT OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND UPON GERMANY

IN describing the impression made upon the Germans by the Jutland action, Admiral Scheer has stated: "Immediately after the battle joyful messages and congratulations on the success of the Fleet poured in from all divisions of the army in the field, from every part of the country and from all classes of the people." A few days after the battle the German Emperor visited the Fleet. "Several of the German princes also visited the Fleet, bringing greetings from their homes to the crews and expressing pride in the Fleet and the conduct of the men. The Grand Dukes of Meeklenburg-Schwerin and of Oldenburg came directly after the battle and were followed very soon after by the Kings of Saxony and Bavaria."¹

The German Naval Commander-in-Chief at once perceived that all this had strengthened his influence, and he took a shrewd advantage of the fact that, "as those visits proved, the battle had greatly enhanced the interest in the Fleet throughout the whole country."² He made use of this prestige to give force to his plea for unrestricted U-boat warfare. Admiral Scheer formally brought out this argument with great ingenuity: "We have been able to prove to the world that the English Navy no longer possesses her boasted irresistibility. To us it has been granted to fight for the rights of the

¹ Admiral Scheer.

² *Ibid.*

German nation on the open seas and the battle proved that the organization of our Navy as a High Sea Fleet was a step in the right direction. The German national spirit can only be impressed on the world through a High Sea Fleet directed against England. If, however, as an outcome of our present condition, we are not finally to be bled to death, full use must be made of the U-boat as a means of war, so as to grip England's vital nerve."

In his report of the battle Admiral Scheer also, as he expressed it, "laid great emphasis" on these views: "A victorious termination of the war within measurable time can only be attained by destroying the economic resources of Great Britain, namely, by the employment of submarines against British commerce. In the conviction that it is my duty, I must continue respectfully to dissuade Your Majesty from adopting any modified form of this warfare, because it would mean reducing this weapon to an anomaly and because the results would probably not be in proportion to the risk incurred by the boats. Further, even with the most conscientious care on the part of the Commanding Officers, it will be impossible to avoid accidents in British waters where American interests are so prevelant, which will force us to humiliating concessions, unless we are able to prosecute the submarine campaign in its acutest form."

There is no mistaking this language — the self-evident demand, founded on the deeds of the German Battle Fleet at Jutland, for a reversal of the surrender to the United States, and a resumption of unrestricted U-boat warfare in defiance of the United States.

The German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, how-

ever, was consistently opposed to this policy, because he wished "to ward off any further enemies from Germany, who, he was convinced, would soon show themselves on the proclamation of unrestricted U-boat warfare."¹ In holding to this view, the Chancellor must be credited with being farseeing as to the disastrous results for Germany, but Admiral Scheer's contentions prevailed with the military and naval leaders of Germany.

There was to be a new military régime in Germany, as the unfavorable situation for the Central Powers, especially the check of the German onslaughts at Verdun, brought about a radical change in the control of the German armies. Hindenburg was made Commander-in-Chief in August, 1916, and, for the question of the U-boat campaign, "the ultimate decision was left to the Supreme Army Command."²

For this new régime, in September, 1916, the Rumanian situation added to the complications of the war, and the German military leaders decided that this was the wrong time to begin unrestricted U-boat warfare. Upon this postponement, Admiral Scheer has stated: "I took occasion after that to send the Chief of the Staff of the High Sea Fleet to General Headquarters, to consult with General Ludendorff, and they agreed upon the following:

1. There is no possibility of bringing the war to a satisfactory end without ruthless U-boat warfare.

2. On no account must a half-and-half campaign be started, which could not achieve anything of importance, but involve the same military dangers, and would probably result in a new limitation for the nation.

¹ Admiral Scheer.

² Ibid.

3. The U-boat campaign should be begun as soon as possible. The Navy is ready.

4. The separate treaties with the Northern States, who had received considerable concessions in the matter of exports to England, must be cancelled with all speed, so that we can act without interference.

5. In no circumstances must there be any yielding.”

Although there was still postponement for reasons of military expediency, yet Admiral Scheer was able to write: “While at Pless (November, 1916) I took the opportunity of making myself known to Field Marshal von Hindenburg, and also to have an interview with General Ludendorff. I discussed the U-boat campaign with both officers, and it was agreed that if the war should drag on for so long, February 1, 1917, was the latest date at which to start the unrestricted U-boat campaign, that is to say before England could re-victual.”

In December, 1916, there was a definite agreement that unrestricted U-boat warfare should begin on February 1, 1917. “The Chief of the Naval Staff, with the approval of the General Field Marshal, succeeded in bringing about this decision, in which the Imperial Chancellor acquiesced.”¹ At this time the German Chief of the Naval Staff had, “in a detailed memorandum, given explicit reasons for adopting this form of campaign.”²

This memorandum stated the results of calculations, which showed that the U-boats would be able to keep supplies from Great Britain. And it contained this definite assurance: “I do not hesitate to assert that, as matters now stand, we can force England to make peace

¹ Admiral Scheer.

² Ibid.

in five months by means of the unrestricted U-boat campaign. But this holds good only for a really unrestricted U-boat campaign, not for the cruiser warfare formerly carried on by the U-boats, even if all armed steamers are allowed to be torpedoed."

This memorandum admitted that there would probably be a break with the United States, if this policy should be adopted. But the following was the argument of the Chief of the Naval Staff: "The declaration of unrestricted U-boat warfare will confront the Government of the United States with the question whether they are prepared to draw the logical conclusions from the attitude they have hitherto adopted towards the use of U-boats or not. I am most emphatically of the opinion that war with the United States of America is such a serious matter that everything must be done to avoid it. But in my opinion, fear of a break must not hinder us from using this weapon which promises success. In any case, it is desirable to envisage the consequences least favorable to us and to realize what the effect on the course of the war will be if America joins our enemies. So far as tonnage is concerned, this effect can only be very small. It is not probable that more than a small fraction of the tonnage belonging to the Central Powers which is lying in America, and perhaps also in neutral ports, will be quickly available for voyages to England. By far the greater part of it can be damaged to such an extent that it would be useless during the first months, which will be the decisive period. Preparations for this have been made."

"Nor would crews be immediately available for them. Decisive effects need not be anticipated from the co-operation of American troops, who cannot be brought

over in considerable numbers owing to the lack of shipping; similarly, American money cannot make up for the shortage of supplies and tonnage.”

“The question is, what attitude America would adopt if England were forced to make peace. It is improbable that she would decide to carry on the war single-handed, as she lacks the means to make a vigorous attack on us, and her shipping would meanwhile be damaged by our U-boats. On the contrary it is possible that she would associate herself with the peace concluded by England so as to return to healthy economic conditions as soon as possible.”

“I have therefore come to the conclusion that we must have recourse to unrestricted U-boat warfare, even at the risk of war with America, so long as the U-boat campaign is begun early enough to ensure peace before the next harvest, that is before August 1; we have no alternative. In spite of the danger of a break with America, an unrestricted U-boat campaign, begun soon, is the right means to bring the war to a victorious end for us. Moreover, it is the only means to that end.”

These calculations and conclusions were typical of the German habit of mind, of playing the game from their own side of the board. Of course, if the Germans' own formulas were the only ones to be applied, the United States would not be able to exert any active influence upon the war. But it is almost pathetic to see the utter unconsciousness of the fact that the German formulas, which were right for Germany, did not at all hold for application to the United States. The Germans could not grasp any inkling of the real state of things — that the American nation was totally different from the German nation, and that great forces, unmeasured by

the Germans, would be set in motion when the United States was aroused to action. This misconception, which came from always thinking in German terms, meant the difference between German victory and German defeat.

But, in the months of 1916 following the battle of Jutland, there was thus developed the German naval policy which was destined to bring about a crisis in the naval war — and yet this naval policy was also destined to prove a boomerang for Germany, because it recoiled upon Germany in the one blow that could bring defeat, the entrance of the outraged and thoroughly aroused United States in the World War.

CHAPTER XXVII

OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH SEA

(See Map at page 293)

IN the meantime, while the German leaders were committing themselves to unrestricted U-boat warfare, but with postponement of the campaign for reasons of military expediency, the German Commander-in-Chief made preparations for activity of the High Sea Fleet, in combination with the use of the U-boats "for military purposes"¹ and with the coöperation of airships. However, in addition to the time required for repairs of the High Sea Fleet after Jutland, nights of longer darkness were required for the airship raids. Consequently, there was no aggressive use of these German forces until August.

But both sides continued to make increasing use of minelaying, the Germans strewing mines off the British coasts, and the British attempting to shut in the German bases. This meant the necessity for both sides of increased numbers of minesweepers, with naval forces to protect them. In this respect, there was constant naval activity in the North Sea area.

Soon after the Battle of Jutland the British cruiser *Hampshire*, with Lord Kitchener on board, was sunk by a mine, which had been put in place off the Orkneys by a German submarine minelayer. Lord Kitchener was on a mission to Russia, and had left Scapa on the afternoon of June 5 for Archangel. There had been very

¹ Admiral Scheer.

strong weather which was considered "a protection against submarine attack which was at that time more to be feared than the danger from submarine laid mines."¹ Admiral Jellicoe has also stated: "Mine-sweeping on either side of the Orkneys had not been practicable for three or four days owing to the weather conditions."

The *Hampshire* had sailed at 5.30 P.M., accompanied by two destroyers, and under orders "to proceed at a speed of at least 16 knots, if the weather permitted, and to send the destroyers back if they could not maintain the *Hampshire's* speed."² It was found that the destroyers were unable to face the heavy seas at the speed of the *Hampshire*, and they were ordered back to Scapa at about 7 P.M. The following is Admiral Scheer's account of what occurred: "The cruiser *Hampshire*, on which Lord Kitchener went down, was sent to sea in a heavy storm in the belief that in such weather little danger was to be apprehended west of the Orkneys from mines or U-boats; and yet one of our boats (Lieutenant-Commander Curt Beitzen) had been at work, and had made use of the opportunity provided by the bad weather to lay the mines to which this ship was to fall a victim."³

"Between 7.30 and 7.45 P.M."⁴ the stricken British cruiser began to settle, only about a mile and a half from the coast, and in sight of people on shore, who at

¹ Admiral Jellicoe.

² *Ibid.*

³ "Besides this, one of our mine-layers, occupied in laying mines west of the Orkney Islands, achieved an important success. The English armoured cruiser *Hampshire* (11,000 tons) struck one of these mines on June 5 and sank; with her perished Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener and all his Staff." — Admiral Scheer.

⁴ Admiral Jellicoe.

once telephoned the news that the cruiser was in difficulties. Assistance was sent, but the *Hampshire* "sank in fifteen minutes, bows first."¹ The only survivors were twelve men, who drifted ashore on a raft. The extremely heavy seas prevented the boats from being hoisted out and, with the cold temperature of the water, prevented any swimmer from surviving. The body of Lord Kitchener was not recovered.

For the British, in June and July, there was constant activity of the cruisers and light forces, but the only movement of the British Battle Fleet as a whole was a cruise from July 17 to July 20 "to the northward and eastward of the Shetlands."²

On the part of the Germans, the first aggressive move, aside from the minelaying and U-boat attacks, was a resumption of airship attacks in August, against London and the Midlands. The German airships were also at the disposal of Admiral Scheer for a new attempt against Sunderland (August 18-20, 1916). This was planned by the German Commander-in-Chief, who stated: "The U-boat campaign against commerce in the war-zone round about England was still in abeyance, and the U-boats were ready for military purposes. These two weapons, the airships and the U-boats, would, I thought, make up for the superiority of the English Fleet in other respects."

Admiral Scheer frankly admitted that the former dispositions of the U-boats outside the British ports, before the Jutland action, "had resulted in no success worth speaking of," and "the matter was, therefore, reconsidered, and new arrangements made which promised greater success." Instead of assigning them

¹ Admiral Jellicoe.

² *Ibid.*

stations off the ports, the German Admiral devised a scheme for "a movable base line in the direction of the probable approach of the enemy, on which line the U-boats were to take up positions." This was an advance in the tactical use of submarines in coöperation with a fleet. His U-boats were divided into three groups, to be used in this scheme of protection for the High Sea Fleet, in accordance with his plan of operations.

"The following was the plan for this enterprise against Sunderland: The fleet was to put out by night, to advance through the North Sea towards the English coast, so that the line of U-boats might come into action, if required. If no collision with the enemy occurred, and there was no indication that the English Fleet would cut off our retreat from the sea, the ships were to push on to the English coast and bombard Sunderland at sunset. After the bombardment while the Fleet returned in the darkness to the German Bight, the U-boats were to take up their second positions in the direction of the probable approach of the enemy, if, as was expected, he should come up as a result of the bombardment."¹ Four airships were disposed as scouts toward the British coast, and four to the north to cover the stretch between Scotland and Scandinavia.

To carry out this operation, the High Sea Fleet put to sea from the Jade at 10 P.M. August 18. This time Admiral Scheer profited from his Jutland experience of the deficiencies of the predreadnought battleships, and did not take out, with the Battle Fleet, Squadron II, composed of these older ships, which from this time were relegated to guard duty at the German bases.

¹ Admiral Scheer.

Aside from their weaknesses, their lack of speed had slowed the German fleet speed to 17 knots at Jutland, which was too great a handicap.

It is also interesting to note that the interval between the German advance and the main body was reduced to 20 miles, "to ensure immediate tactical coöperation in the event of our meeting the enemy, and to prevent the Cruiser Division, together with the three valuable battleships which had been assigned to it,¹ from possibly failing to join up with the two other squadrons."²

In this order the German Fleet moved to westward throughout the night. On the morning of August 19, which was a very clear day, the German advance sighted a British submarine, "which induced me to manoeuvre the Fleet so as to evade this danger. Nevertheless, the submarine succeeded in getting within striking distance of the last ship of our line. At 7.5 A.M. the *Westfalen* reported that she had been hit amidships on the starboard side."³ This dreadnought was sent back, "and was able to return to the Jade under her own steam."⁴

The German Fleet held on to the westward to carry out its mission. As was the case in the sortie which brought about the Battle of Jutland, the Germans hoped to engage a part of the superior British Fleet at a disadvantage. Again Admiral Scheer had left no doubt of this: "The main object of our enterprise was to defeat portions of the English Fleet; the bombardment of Sunderland was only a secondary object, merely a means to this end. Therefore, when an opportunity

¹ *Bayern, Grosser Karfürst, Markgraf*, "because Scouting Division I was short two battle-cruisers still under repair." (S)

² Admiral Scheer.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

seemed to offer to attack hostile craft to the south, I had to seize it and not let it slip."

Again, also, the British naval forces were out, as on the afternoon of Jutland. Admiral Jellicoe has stated that, "On August 18th the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea for a sweep in southern waters. The presence of an unusually large number of submarines in the North Sea — a phenomenon which had been observed shortly before the Jutland Battle — had suggested the possibility of movement on the part of the enemy and a sweep appeared desirable." In accordance, "the Battle Fleet and cruisers concentrated at daylight on the 19th, in the vicinity of the 'Long Forties,' steering to the southward at a speed of advance of 17 knots. The Battle Cruiser Fleet had been ordered to a position 30 miles ahead of the British Battle Fleet."¹ The Harwich Force was also out (at 10 A.M. in position Lat. 52.50 N., Long. 3.38 E.). The torpedoing of the *Westfalen* had been promptly reported, and Admiral Jellicoe, upon this information, increased speed to attain "a position at which it was hoped the High Sea Fleet would be met, if the objective of that fleet was a bombardment of the works on the Tyne or in the neighborhood as seemed possible. My intention was to make for a position in about Lat. 55 N., Long. 0.40 E., where the Fleet would be favorably placed either to engage the enemy before he closed the coast or to cut him off from his bases afterwards."² The everlasting influence of the invasion idea upon the British leaders was also evident: "In the possible alternative of the movement being designed to cover a landing, the Fleet would also be favorably placed to prevent such an operation."³

¹ Admiral Jellicoe.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

Admiral Scheer received information throughout August 19 from his U-boats and airships of British naval forces being in the North Sea, but he stated that, at 1.40 P.M., "from all the information received no coherent idea of the counter-measures of the enemy could be formed." But, "at 2.22 P.M.," the German Admiral began to receive reports of British naval force from one of the airships (L-13) and these were definite enough for him to close his Cruiser Division, and push forward "in a south-easterly direction in column formation." However, "at 3.50 P.M.," the German airship had lost touch with these British forces, and they were not located again.¹ The bulk of the fleet continued to advance until stopped by the minefields in the south. It being then 4.45 P.M., our course was altered to E. S. E., and we began our return journey. There was no further prospect of coming up with the enemy in the south, and it had grown too late to bombard Sunderland."²

Admiral Scheer's coöperating U-boats had torpedoed and sunk two British cruisers, *Nottingham* in the morning, and *Falmouth* in the afternoon. But his tactical dispositions of these U-boats also had a strong deterrent effect against any concentration of superior British naval forces against the German Fleet. Admiral Jellicoe stated: "It seemed fairly certain to me that the enemy would leave a trap behind him in the shape of mines or submarines, or both; and, indeed, the numerous submarines already sighted made it probable

¹ "At 3.50 P.M. the L-13 reported that it had lost touch with the enemy forces because it had been forced to turn aside from its course to avoid thunderstorms. Unfortunately the airship failed to get into touch with them again." — Admiral Scheer.

² Admiral Scheer.

that the trap was extensive; it was therefore unwise to pass over the waters he had occupied unless there was a prospect of bringing the High Sea Fleet to action." At 3.56 P.M., accordingly, Admiral Jellicoe turned back his command.¹ The British Commander-in-Chief ordered the Harwich Force to a position northwestward of Terschelling for a night attack. But "the conditions for night attack proved to be unfavorable, and at 7.30 P.M. the Commodore reported that he had abandoned the pursuit."²

The main interest in this operation was the undoubted fact that Admiral Scheer's tactical use of the U-boats had the effect of increasing the British tendency to caution, which had been so marked a drawback at the Battle of Jutland. Admiral Jellicoe wrote: "The ease with which the enemy could lay a submarine trap for the Fleet had been demonstrated on the 19th of August: what had constantly puzzled me was that it had not been done very frequently at an earlier stage in the war. Since, however, it had been attempted and with some success, there seemed to be every reason to expect a repetition of the operation, and it was clear that it was unwise to take the Fleet far into southern waters unless an adequate destroyer force was present to act as a submarine screen for all ships. If the circumstances were exceptional and the need very pressing, it would be necessary to accept the risk. There was general agreement on this point between the flag officers of the Fleet and the Admiralty."

Admiral Scheer stated that a similar enterprise was

¹ "It was evident that the enemy was returning to his bases and was far beyond pursuit." — Admiral Jellicoe.

² Admiral Jellicoe.

AFTER THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

I. MOVEMENTS OF THE FLEETS WHICH HAD BEEN ENGAGED

The British broke off the action at 9 P.M. May 31, 1916, and both the Grand Fleet and the Battle Cruiser Fleet proceeded through the night "some 85 miles" (J) to (A) "at about 2.47 A.M." (J) June 1, 1916.

At almost the same time the German Fleet was disposed "in close formation" (S) and, crossing the wake of the British, proceeded to (B) off the Horn Reef, 3 A.M., June 1, 1916.

From (A) Admiral Jellicoe, instead of closing Horn Reef, retraced his course, to gather his straggling ships, to area (C) having been observed by a Zeppelin "shortly after 3.30" (J).

Consequently, from (B) the German Fleet proceeded in safety to the mined area of the German bases.

From (C) the British returned to their bases.


II. LATER MOVEMENTS IN THE NORTH SEA

(1) German airships disposed as scouts for sortie of German Fleet, August 18/19, 1916. It should be noted that for this operation U-boats were not disposed off the British coast, as this disposition before the Battle of Jutland "had resulted in no success worth speaking of" (S).

(2) Movement of German Fleet toward Sunderland, August 19, 1916, with U-boats disposed in "a movable base line in direction of probable approach of the enemy" (S). This operation did not bring on a serious action. The scouting of the German airships was not successful, and the British were wary of the U-boats.

A similar German operation, planned for September, was abandoned because of bad weather. The German Fleet came out into the center of the North Sea in October, without any action.

After this, the mission of the German Fleet was to keep an enlarged area free for the egress and return of the U-boats. That they were able to do this, and that the Germans maintained control of the Baltic, must be considered results of the British failure to destroy the German Battle Fleet at Jutland.



planned for September, but abandoned "because unfavorable weather made scouting impossible. At the beginning of October there was a change of German tactics," owing to the issue of instructions from the Supreme War Council for an immediate resumption of the U-boat campaign against commerce. This use of the U-boats was to be in a modified form — and was the preliminary to the German unrestricted U-boat warfare.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE U-BOATS OPERATING "ACCORDING TO PRIZE LAW"

ON October 7 the Fleet Commanders received the order to resume cruiser warfare with U-boats in British waters, and also to send four U-boats to the Mediterranean where submarine warfare had been carried on during the summer months with quite good results."¹ This resumption of submarine warfare by the Germans was to be "according to Prize Law," and was unsatisfactory to the German naval leaders, who so strongly insisted upon unrestricted U-boat warfare.

Admiral Scheer has written: "When, however, orders came through that the economic war against England was to be resumed in a modified form, although it was known that I considered the scheme to be useless, there was no chance of my opposition having the least effect in the face of this definite order, and in view of the fact that the Supreme Army Command considered it a matter of principle. . . . The support to be given by the Fleet to this form of warfare became a question of increasing importance, as the enemy recognized the danger of the U-boats, and strained every nerve to get the better of it."

This was the beginning of the new use of the German Battle Fleet, for its new main function of giving support to the U-boats, in order to insure a wide area for their egress and entrance far beyond the German bases. The

¹ Admiral Scheer.

value of this support for the U-boats, and the fact that it was a result of the survival of the German Battle Fleet at Jutland, have been emphasized by Admiral Scheer: "Free passage to the open sea had been gained for these (the U-boats) in the naval action on May 31, for the English Fleet stayed far North and did not dare to attack our coast and stamp out the U-boat danger at its source."

From this time, the German Commander-in-Chief recognized the condition that the care of the U-boats was the main object of the German Battle Fleet, even to the extent of risking his battleships for them. In reply to the criticism as to two battleships of Squadron III being injured by torpedoes, while attempting to save a U-boat ashore on the sands of Jutland, Admiral Scheer declared that too great caution in assisting U-boats would lose "the confidence in our power to defend the Bight which we had gained as a result of the sea fight." To the German Emperor he made the following strong plea, which is of great interest as showing the trend of German naval strategy in the last months of 1916: "It is of great value to uphold this principle, because in the course of the U-boat campaign, upon which, in my opinion, our entire naval strategy will sooner or later have to be concentrated, the Fleet will have to devote itself to one task — to get the U-boats safely out to sea and bring them safely home again. Such activities would be on precisely the same lines as the expedition to salve 'U-20.' To us every U-boat is of such importance that it is worth risking the whole available Fleet to afford it assistance and support." This was a far cry from naval ideas prevalent at the beginning of the World War!

For this resumption of the U-boat warfare, in 1916, the Germans had greatly increased forces available, in contrast with the premature effort of 1915. Of the latter part of 1916, Admiral Scheer wrote: "The creation of a new U-boat fleet demanded numerous efficient young men, with special technical knowledge, and these could only be drawn from the Fleet." The older pre-dreadnought battleships had been discarded, and Squadron II was reduced to "five or even fewer ships." By this means the needed complement was provided for the U-boats. "The U-boat flotilla had by this time a greater number of officers than all the large battleships of the Fleet."¹ This marked another long stride away from former ideas of naval strategy.

With this condition understood, and realizing the great advances that had been made in the construction and efficiency of the U-boats, it is not surprising that the U-boat warfare in the last months of 1916 did increasing damage to the shipping of the Entente Allies. In fact, in spite of the gloomy contention of the German leaders that the U-boats could not win results without unrestricted submarine warfare, this German "Prize Law" campaign was doing so much harm that it was causing a serious shortage of Allied tonnage.

In the British history "Scaborne Trade," the heading of the chapter on the period of October-December, 1916, is "Increased Losses and New Tonnage Crisis," describing the results of this U-boat campaign; and the first sentence of this chapter is as follows: "So grave was the tonnage situation in the autumn of 1916 that it became necessary to scrutinize most carefully the employment of shipping in Allied as well as in British services."

¹ Admiral Scheer.

The reader must picture the enormous and constantly increasing demands for shipping, to sustain the nations of the Entente Allies in the World War, which had assumed such undreamt proportions. This vast volume of transportation over the waterways of the world had soon gone far beyond the initial surplus tonnage of the world in 1914, which was so great a benefit to the Entente Allies at the beginning, as has been stated in the first volume of this work. To replace losses, and to provide for this increased demand, had been a great stimulus to shipbuilding, which had become an important war measure of the Entente Allies. But the losses caused by the U-boats in the last quarter of 1916 had risen to totals much greater than any possibility of replacement by this means.

In these last three months of 1916 the average monthly losses of tonnage were, British 176,000, Allied 60,000, Neutral 100,000. "The gravity of these losses could not be denied. If the destruction of British tonnage continued at the same rate during 1917 it was necessary to estimate for a loss of over 2,000,000 tons, an amount nearly double the total shipbuilding output of the last two years." ¹ To add to the gravity of this situation, it was certain that there would be an increased need on the part of the Entente Allies for shipping in the coming year, "and this fact gave additional significance both to the rapid increase in the net wastage of tonnage, and to the various efforts made to economise its employment." ²

In "Seaborne Trade" the results, from "the greater number and extended range of the submarines now available," have been thus stated: "Accordingly the

¹ "Seaborne Trade."

² *Ibid.*

month of October was marked, not only by a wide extension of the area of attack but by the especial severity with which the losses fell on neutral shipping. . . . In European waters the submarines were ubiquitous. Their attacks were taking place in the Bay of Biscay, off the Scillies, off the Fastnet, in the English Channel, off Tory Island, off the Orkneys, in the North Sea, in the Arctic Ocean, the Skagerrak, and the Baltic.”¹

The extensions of attack to the north were directed against transportation to Russia, through the White Sea and by way of the ice-free ports of the Murman Coast. The Murman Railway had been put in operation,² although it was only a single line badly equipped, and was the only means of getting supplies into Russia, after the freezing of the White Sea Ports, except the long and inadequate service of the Siberian Railway.

But it was in the Mediterranean that the U-boats were gaining their greatest successes at this time. So widespread was the destruction of shipping in the Mediterranean area, that it produced another result which must be added to the score for the U-boats. It brought about the diversion of through traffic from the Mediterranean, and the interruptions and delays caused by this diversion must be counted, and included with the actual losses of shipping used in supplying the Mediterranean ports and maintaining the Allied forces in the Eastern Mediterranean.

One German U-boat was sent to the coast of the United States. The U-53 made the voyage across the Atlantic, by way of the Newfoundland Bank, and on

¹ “Seaborne Trade.”

² Officially declared open December 8, 1916.

October 7, 1916, came into Newport. After a stay of only a few hours, the commander merely calling upon the Naval authorities without taking in supplies, the U-53 put to sea again, and early in the morning of October 8 was off the Nantucket Lightship. There she lay in wait, outside the waters of the United States, and consequently outside the jurisdiction of the United States, "to carry on war according to Prize Law off the American coast."¹ On this day the U-53 sank five steamers, three British, one Dutch, and one Norwegian. The same night the U-boat left on her homeward voyage, which was successfully accomplished. But, like the trips of the commercial submarine *Deutschland*, this proved to be only an isolated demonstration for effect, not the precursor of other U-boat attacks off the coast of the United States in that year.

At the last of the year 1916 new measures were taken to cope with the shipping situation which was thus growing unfavorable for the Entente Allies. In the latter part of November there was a conference between Great Britain and France, and agreements were reached as to the use and distribution of tonnage, in view of "the general situation arising from the shortage of tonnage."² At the time of the change in the British Government (December 7, 1916) a Shipping Controller was appointed, who was to have ministerial rank, and on December 26 a Food Controller was appointed, also of ministerial rank. Like the Ministry of Munitions, these offices gave a more powerful supervision to these matters, so vital to carrying on the war.

But, it must be admitted, the increase in efficiency of the U-boats had jumped ahead of the means that

¹ Admiral Scheer.

² "Seaborne Trade."

were being taken to combat their ravages. As has been stated, the Entente Allies had not fully realized that the U-boat campaign had been twice given up solely on account of the demands of the United States. It was not on account of the failure of the U-boats, as had been too hastily assumed. On the contrary, there had been a steady improvement in the German submarines, and when this improvement was suddenly demonstrated by deeds, the Allies were caught by surprise with inadequate defenses against them.

Many merchantmen had been armed, and this was a protection. But the U-boats had been improved beyond trusting to this for safety. The U-boat "was no longer the little fragile craft of 1914, capable of carrying few torpedoes and scanty stores and confined to near and shallow seas. It was now as big and as strong as a small merchant ship, and had a range of action of some thousands of miles; was able to stay at sea for weeks and to carry large stores of provisions and torpedoes." ¹

The main defense against the U-boats at this time was altogether defective. This was the system of "protected approach areas." Such an area of protected waters was in the form of a great triangle guarded by patrolling light craft. Merchantmen entered it along a wide base line upon secret orders. "This system was ineffective from the beginning, and in time proved a positive death trap." ² The Convoy System, which afterwards became the most effective means of defense against submarines, had been worked out and urged frequently by its advocates. But the British Admiralty had hitherto rejected it. The argument that it would

¹ "Allied Shipping Control."

² *Ibid.*

cause delay ¹ had been deemed sufficient to overbalance its great advantages and, for the time being, the British Naval leaders were against its use. Consequently, it must be recognized, as a factor in the success of the U-boats, that the best defense available against them was not being used at the end of 1916.

¹ "There is one inherent disadvantage in this system which cannot be overcome, although it can be mitigated by careful organization, viz. the delay involved." — Admiral Jellicoe. ~

CHAPTER XXIX

THE DIE CAST BY GERMANY FOR UNRESTRICTED U-BOAT WARFARE

FOR the Central Powers in the last half of 1916, there had been a decided change for the better in the general military situation, since the time when the naval action of Jutland had given the Germans encouragement at a gloomy period of the war for Germany. At the beginning of June, 1916, the situation, both in the west and in the east, had been very unfavorable for the Central Powers. The great German offensive at Verdun then bore the evident stamp of failure. The Russian armies had suddenly come back to the offensive, and were attacking all along the south-eastern front. These unexpected Russian attacks not only endangered the Austro-Hungarians in the south-east, but also diverted Austro-Hungarian troops from their offensive against the Italians — and thus ended any hopes of following up the earlier Austro-Hungarian gains on the Italian front. This relief allowed the Italians in turn to take the offensive, in the campaign which resulted in the capture of Gorizia, August 9, 1916. On the Western Front, the Allies were also preparing for their great offensive of 1916 (Battle of the Somme), which was to be the assault of the new British armies obtained by conscription.

But none of these threatening dangers had the impelling force that would bring defeat to the Central Powers. It is true that the Verdun assaults of the

Germans were smothered in an ending of utter failure. But the same fate overtook the Somme offensive of the Entente Allies, from which so much had been expected. These long successions of uncoördinated piecemeal attacks upon intrenchments, which have been called the Battle of the Somme (July–November, 1916) actually consumed the British armies as fast as they were poured into the trenches. And, when these attempts ended in exhaustion, nothing had been accomplished toward breaking the German armies on the Western Front. On the Italian front, although the capture of Gorizia had aroused great popular enthusiasm in Italy and brought the Italians at last to declare war upon Germany (August 28, 1916), it proved to be only a barren victory, with the Italian armies again held up in the mountainous country for the rest of the year 1916.

The first appearance of success for the Russians under Brusiloff, in their attacks against the Austro-Hungarians in the southeast, had brought Rumania into the war on the side of the Entente Allies (August 28, 1916) in an eager effort to gain Transylvania which Rumania coveted. But, here in the southeast also, the Entente Allies, even with the reinforcement of a new nation entering the war on their side, were not able to accomplish anything, and only laid themselves open to defeat. In fact, the attacks of the Russian armies were already breaking down by the time the Rumanians entered the war, and the Rumanian invasion of Transylvania was merely an isolated attack against a prepared enemy. Consequently, not only were the Rumanians quickly driven out of Transylvania, but Rumania was invaded and overrun, just as Serbia had been in 1915. In this disaster of 1916, the Russians had not been able to

help the Rumanians. In fact, the 1916 offensive of the Russian armies had proved to be a last short-lived effort, before the demoralization which led to the Russian Revolution early in 1917 — and the end of 1916 saw the end of the Russian armies for any strong effect upon the war. They had fought wonderfully well, in spite of their constant handicap from the shortage of supplies, caused, as has been described in this work, by shutting off Russia from the waterways of the sea by means of the Teutonic control of the Baltic and the Dardanelles. In giving the true naval history of the World War, the collapse of Russia must be attributed to this cause.

As a consequence of these overturns, even Ludendorff, who always took pains to depict the Germans as struggling against great odds for existence, wrote of “the successful close of the year 1916.” In view of the change to this successful military situation, which was destined to result in the elimination of Russia, it is a strange fact, in the naval history of the war, that the final decision of Germany for unrestricted U-boat warfare was made under conditions the very opposite of those under which the German leaders had put forward their urgent pleas in 1916. Consequently, this last German resort of unrestricted U-boat warfare,¹ which had been first pressed as the one means of victory in an unfavorable military situation, was actually adopted in a most favorable military situation, with other means of winning victory at hand for the Germans. If the

¹ “In view of the fateful conclusion of the war, it has been suggested that the declaration of the unrestricted U-boat campaign was a last desperate throw. That judgment is intended to be a condemnation of our decision on political, military and even ethical grounds.” — Hindenburg, “Out of My Life.”

Germans had realized that Russia was on the point of breaking down,¹ they could have made it their policy to consolidate their victory over Russia, and thus rid themselves of a powerful enemy, instead of resorting to their provocative policy of unrestricted U-boat warfare, which brought into the war a new enemy to take the place of defeated Russia.

Thus again, as in 1914, it was a case with the Germans of adhering to the laid out plan, and to calculations which had taken so strong a hold upon the minds of the German naval and military leaders that they were supposed to be infallible. The new Hindenburg-Ludendorff Supreme Command had joined forces with the German Naval Staff in advocating the U-boat campaign as the German strategy for 1917. Ludendorff has thus put it on record: "In a long discussion on December 23, the Field Marshal expressed to the Chancellor his view that the adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare was essential."

The Imperial Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, who had foreseen the ill effects that would follow the adoption of this ruthless policy, consistently opposed unrestricted U-boat warfare. This should always be remembered to the credit of the judgment of Bethmann-Hollweg. But his opposition was overborne by the German military and naval leaders. In this respect, also, there was a parallel to the initial campaign of 1914, when the German Great General Staff had unalterably committed German strategy to the plan of envelopment through Belgium. In the fall of 1916 the memorandum of the German Great General Staff has stated: "On the

¹ "No intelligence came through to us which revealed any striking indications of the disintegration of the Russian Army." — Hindenburg.

other hand, in view of England's economic situation, the Imperial Admiralty promises us that by the ruthless employment of an increased number of U-boats we shall obtain a speedy victory which will compel our principal enemy, England, to turn to thoughts of peace in a few months." Against this self-assured attitude, Bethmann-Hollweg's opposition had no chance. Hindenburg has written: "On January 9, 1917, our All-Highest War Lord decided in favor of the proposals of the Naval and General Staffs, and against the Imperial Chancellor. Not one of us was in doubt as to the seriousness of the step."

Thus the fateful die was cast for Germany, and it was decreed that unrestricted U-boat warfare was to begin on February 1, 1917. Another paragraph of the memorandum of the German Naval Chief of Staff should also be quoted, as showing the spirit in which this ruthless policy was undertaken: "A further condition is that the declaration and commencement of the unrestricted U-boat warfare should be simultaneous, so that there is no time for negotiations, especially between England and the neutrals. Only on these conditions will the enemy and the neutrals be inspired with 'holy' terror."

There is no question of the fact that the Germans had absolute faith in the certainty of their calculations, that by means of unrestricted U-boat warfare they would be able to win the war in a short time. It must be admitted that, in the actual event, the unrestricted U-boat campaign became a menace, in 1917, that was averted with the greatest difficulty. The same had been the case in the failure of the German military plan of 1914. Yet the narrow margins of defeat must not blind the reader to the same innate defect in each project, of

working from German formulas alone. This was characteristic of the Germans. In the calculations of the Germans for the strategy of 1917, it brought about a double error — and this in the end upset their calculations, which to their minds had insured the quick success of ruthless U-boat warfare.

In thus playing the game from their own side of the board alone, the first mistake of the Germans lay in not admitting the idea that the menace of the new weapon would arouse their enemies to find new means of countering it. Their second mistake was their utter failure to estimate the effect the entrance of the United States would exert upon the course of the war.

Their first mistake came from not taking into account the condition that the Entente Allies had not been using all available means of defense against the U-boats in 1916, as explained in the preceding chapter. This led the Germans to found their calculations upon the results that had been already gained in the past, without making subtractions for the adverse elements that would be introduced in the future. As has been stated, aside from other defenses against the U-boats, the convoy system had been worked out by its advocates, who were only waiting for its adoption by the Admiralty to provide the margin of protection that would turn the scale against the U-boat campaign. This was to be another illustration of the old axiom that there will be found counters to all tactics and all weapons, and the effect of these counters must be considered in the result. This truth stands today as a warning to those in the Services who may become prejudiced by the strength of their enthusiasm for some one means of waging war.

As to the second mistake, and the sequence of the double error, Hindenburg has written that the estimates of the German Naval Staff were so convincing, "we were entitled to face the risk of finding that we had brought another adversary into the field as the result of employing the new weapon." The mistaken German estimates of the ability of this "other adversary," the United States, have been quoted. The great forces latent in the United States were far beyond the ken of the German mind. Least of all could the German leaders imagine a future situation for the Germans, in which, after gaining once more a military superiority through the downfall of Russia, they were to see the unexpected military reinforcement of the United States appear on the battlefield against them, to overcome this Teutonic superiority and bring defeat to Germany in the World War.

To the leaders who had shaped the war policies of Germany, this was destined to be a final retribution for their own continued failure to measure the strength of moral forces in the war. They had deliberately adopted a method of waging war that would outrage America and drive her into the war, and, as a result, with other means of victory within their grasp, they were to be baulked by the new forces which their own acts had antagonized and aroused to fight against Germany.

Although the decision of the Army and Navy leaders of Germany was thus the result of their calculations, and their conviction that unrestricted U-boat warfare was the best possible strategy for Germany, yet there was another element in the situation that had a strong influence upon the German nation at large. As has been stated, in the last half of 1916 the Entente Allies were

at length taking the right means to use their control of the sea to enforce the exclusion of supplies from the Central Powers. As a result, Germany was feeling the pressure of Sea Power to a degree that could not be mistaken, and, in addition to its effect upon the armed forces of the Central Powers, this had also been brought home to the German people, because it was causing widespread discomfort and even privation. The rationing policy, which made the amount of the normal consumption of a neutral nation the measure of the imports allowed to go into that nation, had dammed the flow of supplies into Germany. Whatever results had thus far been obtained from the U-boats had not been as damaging as this blockade, which was at last being felt in full force in Germany. It was natural that the nation should acclaim, as a retaliatory measure, a naval means which promised to impose the same hardship upon their enemies. The German writings have been filled with arguments and justifications on these grounds.

But, again, this was going outside the record and making a special plea. If we review the actual course of events, the case is as follows: At the beginning, in 1914, as has been detailed in the first volume of this work, Germany had undertaken the war with the Schlieffen military plan of envelopment through Belgium as her one scheme of strategy, in full belief that this long cherished military plan would be able to win the war in short order, before Sea Power could have an influence upon the result. For this reason, Germany believed that Sea Power could be ignored — and the German naval plans were nil. This German “dry-land” plan had failed in 1914, and, by the end of 1916, Sea Power

was relentlessly pressing upon Germany. This very factor, which the German leaders had overconfidently ignored, was then doing Germany more harm than anything else. And now that it was working against Germany, it was denounced as if it were some new form of oppression, which would justify Germany in casting aside all rules of warfare at sea. It is not strange that this special pleading was not accepted as an excuse for unrestricted U-boat warfare. On the contrary, there was a revulsion that brought the United States into the war against Germany. This was an event so momentous that it inaugurated an entirely different phase of the World War, an account of which will be given in the following volume of this work.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

LETTER OF ADMIRAL JELlicoe TO THE BRITISH ADMIRALTY, AND THE WRITTEN APPROVAL OF THE ADMIRALTY, DEFINING THE "CONDUCT OF THE FLEET IN ACTION."

No. 339/H. F. 0034.

"IRON DUKE," 30th October, 1914

SIR,

The experience gained of German methods since the commencement of the war makes it possible and very desirable to consider the manner in which these methods are likely to be made use of tactically in a fleet action.

2. The Germans have shown that they rely to a very great extent on submarines, mines and torpedoes, and there can be no doubt whatever that they will endeavour to make the fullest use of these weapons in a fleet action, especially since they possess an actual superiority over us in these particular directions.

3. It therefore becomes necessary to consider our own tactical methods in relation to these forms of attack.

4. In the first place, it is evident that the Germans cannot rely with certainty upon having their full complement of submarines and minelayers present in a fleet action, unless the battle is fought in waters selected by them, and in the Southern area of the North Sea. Aircraft, also, could only be brought into action in this locality.

5. My object will therefore be to fight the fleet action in the Northern portion of the North Sea, which position is incidentally nearer our own bases, giving our wounded ships a chance to reach them, whilst it ensures the final destruction or capture of enemy wounded vessels, and greatly handicaps

a night destroyer attack before or after a fleet action. The Northern area is also favourable to a concentration of our cruisers and torpedo craft with the battlefleet; such concentration on the part of the enemy being always possible, since he will choose a time for coming out when all his ships are coaled and ready in all respects to fight.

6. Owing to the necessity that exists for keeping our cruisers at sea, it is probable that many will be short of coal when the opportunity for a fleet action arises, and they might be unable to move far to the Southward for this reason.

7. The presence of a large force of cruisers is most necessary, for observation and for screening the battlefleet, so that the latter may be manœuvred into any desired position behind the cruiser screen. This is a strong additional reason for fighting in the Northern area.

8. Secondly, it is necessary to consider what may be termed the tactics of the actual battlefield.

The German submarines, if worked as is expected with the battlefleet, can be used in one of two ways: —

- (a) With the cruisers, or possibly with destroyers.
- (b) With the battlefleet.

In the first case the submarines would probably be led by the cruisers to a position favourable for attacking our battlefleet as it advanced to deploy, and in the second case they might be kept in a position in rear, or to the flank, of the enemy's battlefleet, which would move in the direction required to draw our own Fleet into contact with the submarines.

9. The first move at (a) should be defeated by our own cruisers, provided we have a sufficient number present, as they should be able to force the enemy's cruisers to action at a speed which would interfere with submarine tactics.

The cruisers must, however, have destroyers in company to assist in dealing with the submarines, and should be well in advance of the battlefleet; hence the necessity for numbers.

10. The second move at (b) can be countered by judicious handling of our battlefleet, but may, and probably will, involve a refusal to comply with the enemy's tactics by moving in the invited direction. If, for instance, the enemy battlefleet were to turn away from an advancing Fleet, I should assume that the intention was to lead us over mines and submarines, *and should decline to be so drawn.*

11. I desire particularly to draw the attention of their Lordships to this point, since it may be deemed a refusal of battle, and, indeed, might possibly result in failure to bring the enemy to action as soon as is expected and hoped.

12. Such a result would be absolutely repugnant to the feelings of all British Naval Officers and men, but with new and untried methods of warfare new tactics must be devised to meet them.

I feel that such tactics, if not understood, may bring odium upon me, but so long as I have the confidence of their Lordships I intend to pursue what is, in my considered opinion, the proper course to defeat and annihilate the enemy's battlefleet, without regard to uninstructed opinion or criticism.

13. The situation is a difficult one. It is quite within the bounds of possibility that half of our battlefleet might be disabled by under-water attack before the guns opened fire at all, if a false move is made, and I feel that I must constantly bear in mind the great probability of such attack and be prepared tactically to prevent its success.

14. The safeguard against submarines will consist in moving the battlefleet at very high speed to a flank before deployment takes place or the gun action commences.

This will take us off the ground on which the enemy desires to fight, but it may, of course, result in his refusal to follow me.

If the battlefleets remain within sight of one another, though not near the original area, the limited submerged radius of action and speed of the submarines will prevent the submarines from following without coming to the surface,

and I should feel that after an interval of high-speed manœuvring, I could safely close.

15. The object of this letter is to place my views before their Lordships, and to direct their attention to the alterations in pre-conceived ideas of battle tactics which are forced upon us by the anticipated appearance in a fleet action of submarines and minelayers.

16. There can be no doubt that the fullest use will also be made by the enemy of surface torpedo craft.

This point has been referred to in previous letters to their Lordships, and, so long as the whole of the First Fleet Flotillas are with the Fleet, the hostile destroyers will be successfully countered and engaged.

The necessity for attaching some destroyers to the Cruiser Squadrons, alluded to in paragraph 9, emphasizes the necessity for the junction of the 1st and 3d Flotillas with the Fleet before a fleet action takes place.

17. It will, however, be very desirable that *all* available ships and torpedo craft should be ordered to the position of the fleet action as soon as it is known to be imminent, as the presence of even Third Fleet Vessels after the action or towards its conclusion may prove of great assistance in rendering the victory shattering and complete.

The Channel Fleet should be accompanied by as many destroyers, drawn from the Dover or Coast patrols, as can be spared.

I trust that their Lordships will give the necessary orders on the receipt of information from me of an impending fleet action.

18. In the event of a fleet action being imminent, or, indeed, as soon as the High Sea Fleet is known to be moving Northward, it is most desirable that a considerable number of our oversea submarines should proceed towards the Fleet, getting first on the line between the Germans and Heligoland in order to intercept them when returning. The German Fleet would probably arrange its movements so as to

pass Heligoland at dusk when coming out and at dawn when returning, in order to minimise submarine risk. The opportunity for submarine attack in the Heligoland Bight would not therefore be very great, and from four to six submarines would be the greatest number that could be usefully employed there. The remainder, accompanied by one or two light cruisers, taken, if necessary, from the Dover patrol, should work up towards the position of the fleet, the light cruisers keeping in wireless touch with me.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

J. R. JELlicOE, *Admiral*.

The Secretary of the Admiralty.

M. 03177/14

ADMIRALTY, 7th November, 1914

SIR,

I have laid before My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter of the 30th ultimo, No. 339/H. F. 0034, and I am commanded by them to inform you that they approve your views, as stated therein, and desire to assure you of their full confidence in your contemplated conduct of the Fleet in action.

2. My Lords will, as desired, give orders for all available Ships and Torpedo Craft to proceed to the position of the Fleet Action on learning from you that it is imminent.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

The Commander-in-Chief,
H. M. Ships and Vessels,
Home Fleets.

APPENDIX B.

ORGANIZATION OF THE BRITISH FLEET.

BATTLE FLEET.			
		Organization No. 5.	Organization No. 2.
2nd Battle Squadron	}	<i>King George V.</i>	<i>King George V.</i>
		<i>Ajax</i>	<i>Ajax</i>
		<i>Centurion</i>	<i>Centurion</i>
		<i>Erin</i>	<i>Erin</i>
4th Battle Squadron	}	<i>Orion</i>	<i>Orion</i>
		<i>Monarch</i>	<i>Monarch</i>
		<i>Canquoror</i>	<i>Conqueror</i>
		<i>Thunderer</i>	<i>Thunderer</i>
1st Battle Squadron	}	<i>Iron Duke</i>	<i>Iron Duke</i>
		<i>Royal Oak</i>	<i>Royal Oak</i>
		<i>Superb</i>	<i>Superb</i>
		<i>Canada</i>	<i>Canada</i>
Attached Cruisers	}	<i>Benbow</i>	<i>Benbow</i>
		<i>Bellerophon</i>	<i>Belleraphan</i>
		<i>Temeraire</i>	<i>Temeraire</i>
		<i>Vanguard</i>	<i>Vanguard</i>
1st Battle Squadron	}	<i>Colossus</i>	<i>Marlborough</i>
		<i>Collingwood</i>	<i>Revenge</i>
		<i>Neptune</i>	<i>Hercules</i>
		<i>St. Vincent</i>	<i>Agincourt</i>
Attached Cruisers	}	<i>Marlborough</i>	<i>Colossus</i>
		<i>Revenge</i>	<i>Collingwood</i>
		<i>Hercules</i>	<i>Neptune</i>
		<i>Agincourt</i>	<i>St. Vincent</i>

5TH BATTLE SQUADRON.

Barham
Valiant

Warspite
Malaya

BATTLE CRUISERS.

Lion.

1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.
Princess Royal
Queen Mary
Tiger

2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron.
New Zealand
Indefatigable

3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron.
Invincible
Inflexible
Indomitable

LIGHT CRUISERS.

1st Light Cruiser Squadron.
Galatea
Phaeton
Inconstant
Cordelia

2nd Light Cruiser Squadron.
Southampton
Birmingham
Nottingham
Dublin

3rd Light Cruiser Squadron.
Falmouth
Yarmouth
Birkenhead
Gloucester
Chester

CRUISER SQUADRONS.

1st Cruiser Squadron.

Defence
Warrior
Duke of Edinburgh
Black Prince

2nd Cruiser Squadron.

Minotaur
Hampshire
Cochrane
Shannon

LIGHT CRUISER SQUADRON.

4th Light Cruiser Squadron.

Calliope
Constance

Comus
Caroline

Royalist

LIGHT CRUISER — *Canterbury*.

DESTROYER FLOTILLAS.

12th Flotilla.

Faulknor
Marksman
Obedient
Mænad
Opal
Mary Rose
Marvel
Menace
Nessus
Narwhal
Mindful
Onslaught
Munster
Nonsuch
Noble
Mischief

11th Flotilla.

Castor
Kempenfelt
Ossory
Mystic
Moon
Morning Star
Magic
Mounsey
Mandate
Marne
Minion
Manners
Michael
Mons
Martial
Milbrook

4th Flotilla.

Tipperary
Broke
Achates
Porpoise
Spitfire
Unity
Garland
Ambuscade
Ardent
Fortune
Sparrowhawk
Contest
Shark
Acasta
Ophelia
Christopher
Owl
Hardy
Midge

1st Flotilla.

Fearless
Acheron
Ariel
Attack
Hydra
Badger
Goshawk
Defender
Lizard
Lapwing

13th Flotilla.

Champion
Nestor
Nomad
Narborough
Obdurate
Petard
Pelican
Nerissa
Onslow
Moresby
Nicator

9th and 10th Flotillas.

Lydiara
Liberty
Landrail
Laurel
Moorsom
Morris
Turbulent
Termagant

SEAPLANE CARRIER.

Engadine.

ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN FLEET.

BATTLESHIPS.

3rd Squadron	}	<i>König</i>	}	5th Division
		<i>Grosser Kurfurst</i>		
		<i>Kronprinz</i>		
		<i>Markgraf</i>		
		<i>Kaiser</i>		
1st Squadron	}	<i>Kaiserin</i>	}	6th Division
		<i>Prinzregent Luitpold</i>		
		<i>Friedrich der Grosse</i> (Fleet Flagship)		
		<i>Ostfriesland</i>		
		<i>Thüringen</i>		
2nd Squadron	}	<i>Helgoland</i>	}	1st Division
		<i>Oldenburg</i>		
		<i>Posen</i>		
		<i>Rheinland</i>		
		<i>Nassau</i>		
2nd Squadron	}	<i>Westfalen</i>	}	2nd Division
		<i>Deutschland</i>		
		<i>Hessen</i>		
		<i>Pommern</i>		
		<i>Hannover</i>		
2nd Squadron	}	<i>Schlesien</i>	}	3rd Division
		<i>Schleswig-Holstein</i>		
				4th Division

CRUISERS.

1st Scouting Group (Battle Cruisers).	2nd Scouting Group (Light Cruisers).	4th Scouting Group (Light Cruisers).
<i>Lützow</i>	<i>Frankfurt</i>	<i>Stettin</i>
<i>Derfflinger</i>	<i>Wiesbaden</i>	<i>München</i>
<i>Seydlitz</i>	<i>Pillau</i>	<i>Hamburg</i>
<i>Moltke</i>	<i>Elbing</i>	<i>Frauenlob</i>
<i>Von der Tann</i>		<i>Stuttgart</i>

DESTROYER FLOTILLAS.

<i>Rostock</i> (light cruiser)	<i>Regensburg</i> (light cruiser)
1st Leader of Torpedo Boats.	2nd Leader of Torpedo Boats.
First half of 1st Flotilla	2nd Flotilla
3rd Flotilla	6th Flotilla
5th Flotilla	9th Flotilla
7th Flotilla	

Note. — Each flotilla consisted of 11 destroyers, and was divided up into two half-flotillas, the 1st Flotilla consisting of the 1st and 2nd Half-Flotillas, the 2nd Flotilla consisting of the 3rd and 4th Half-Flotillas, and so on.

APPENDIX C.

BRITISH CASUALTIES

Ship.	Officers.			Men.		
	Killed.	Wounded.	Prisoners of War.	Killed.	Wounded.	Prisoners of War.
<i>Marlborough</i>	2
<i>Colossus</i>	5	..
<i>Barham</i>	4	1	..	22	36	..
<i>Valiant</i>	1	..
<i>Warspite</i>	1	3	..	13(2)	13(1)	..
<i>Malaya</i>	2	61(4)	33	..
<i>Lion</i>	6	1	..	93(2)	43	..
<i>Princess Royal</i>	1	..	22(2)	77	..
<i>Queen Mary</i> (sunk)	57	2	1	1,209	5	1
<i>Tiger</i>	2	22	37	..
<i>Indefatigable</i> (sunk)	57	960(5)	..	2
<i>Invincible</i> (sunk)	61	965(5)
<i>Southampton</i>	1	..	35(1)	40	..
<i>Dublin</i>	1	2	24	..
<i>Chester</i>	2	3	..	33	39	..
<i>Defence</i> (sunk)	54	849(4)
<i>Warrior</i> (sunk) ¹	1	2	..	70	25	..
<i>Black Prince</i> (sunk)	37	820(5)
<i>Calliope</i>	2	..	10	7	..
<i>Defender</i>	1	2	..
<i>Tipperary</i> (sunk)	11	174	2	8
<i>Broke</i>	1	3	..	46	33	..
<i>Porpoise</i>	2	2	..
<i>Spitfire</i>	3	..	6	16	..
<i>Ardent</i> (sunk)	4	1	..	74	1	..
<i>Fortune</i> (sunk)	4	63	1	..
<i>Sparrowhawk</i> (sunk)	6
<i>Shark</i> (sunk)	7	79	2	..
<i>Acasta</i>	1	5	1	..
<i>Moorsom</i>	1	..
<i>Turbulent</i> (sunk)	5	85	..	13
<i>Castor</i>	1	..	13	22	..
<i>Nessus</i>	2	5	7	..
<i>Onslaught</i>	3	2	2	..
<i>Nestor</i> (sunk)	2	..	5	4	..	75
<i>Nomad</i> (sunk)	1	..	4	7	..	68
<i>Petard</i>	2	1	..	7	5	..
<i>Onslow</i>	2	3	..
Total	328	25	10	5,769	485	167

¹ Casualties sustained prior to loss of ship.

Numbers in brackets indicate the number of civilians included.

GERMAN CASUALTIES.

Ship.	Officers.		Men.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
<i>Ostfriesland</i>	1	10
<i>Oldenburg</i>	4	3	4	11
<i>Rheinland</i>	1	10	19
<i>Nassau</i>	2	2	10	13
<i>Westfalen</i>	1	2	7
<i>Pommern (sunk)</i>	71	..	769	..
<i>Schlesien</i>	1	1	..
<i>Schleswig-Holstein</i>	3	8
<i>König</i>	1	1	44	26
<i>Grosser Kurfürst</i>	3	1	12	10
<i>Markgraf</i>	1	11	12
<i>Kaiser</i>	1
<i>Scydlitz</i>	5	4	93	46
<i>Moltke</i>	17	22
<i>Derfflinger</i>	1	2	153	24
<i>Von der Tann</i>	1	3	11	32
<i>Lützow (sunk)</i>	5	5	106	49
<i>Pillau</i>	4	23
<i>Frankfurt</i>	1	1	2	20
<i>Wiesbaden (sunk)</i>	27	..	543	..
<i>Elbing (sunk)</i>	1	4	9
<i>Rostock (sunk)</i>	1	..	13	6
<i>Stettin</i>	1	9	26
<i>München</i>	1	4	7	15
<i>Hamburg</i>	1	4	13	21
<i>Frauenlob (sunk)</i>	17	..	325	..
<i>S. 32</i>	3	1
<i>G. 40</i>	1	1
<i>B. 98</i>	1	2	10
<i>V. 48 (sunk)</i>	6	..	84	..
<i>V. 4 (sunk)</i>	1	..	17	4
<i>VI. Flotilla</i>	3	3	13
<i>IX. Flotilla</i>	12	..	108	15
Total.....	160	40	2,385	454

LIST OF SHIPS SUNK.

British.		German.
	BATTLESHIPS.	
—		<i>Pommern</i>
	BATTLE CRUISERS.	
<i>Queen Mary</i>		<i>Lützow</i>
<i>Indefatigable</i>		—
<i>Invincible</i>		—
	ARMORED CRUISERS.	
<i>Defence</i>		—
<i>Warrior</i>		—
<i>Black Prince</i>		—
	LIGHT CRUISERS.	
—		<i>Wiesbaden</i>
—		<i>Elbing</i>
—		<i>Rostock</i>
—		<i>Frauenlob</i>
	DESTROYERS.	
<i>Tipperary</i>		V. 48
<i>Ardent</i>		V. 4
<i>Fortune</i>		V. 27
<i>Sparrowhawk</i>		S. 35
<i>Shark</i>		V. 29
<i>Nestor</i>		—
<i>Nomad</i>		—
<i>Turbulent</i>		—

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11

APPENDIX D

TABLE OF DATES OF THE WORLD WAR

FEBRUARY, 1915

4. "Declaration of War Zone" by Germany.

MARCH, 1915

- 10-12. British defeat in Battle of Neuve Chapelle.
13. General Hamilton left to take command at Dardanelles.
14. German cruiser *Dresden* sunk off Juan Fernandez (Chile) by British cruisers *Kent* and *Glasgow* with *Orama*.
18. Final defeat of naval attacks at Dardanelles.
22. Przemyśl surrendered to the Russians.
24. General Hamilton at Alexandria.

APRIL, 1915

5. United States demanded reparation for sinking of *William P. Frye*.
8. German armed auxiliary cruiser *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* interned at Newport News, U. S. A.
9. Germans agreed to compensate owners of *William P. Frye*.
11. German auxiliary cruiser *Kronprinz Wilhelm* at Newport News, U. S. A. (interned April 26).
16. British apology to Chile for sinking the *Dresden* in Chilean waters.
22. German offensive at Battle of Ypres, with first German use of gas.
- 25-26. Landings at Gallipoli, Dardanelles, with great British losses.
26. Secret Pact with Italy signed in London.

30. German warnings against sailing in *Lusitania* published in U. S. press.

MAY, 1915

1. Beginning of great Austro-Hungarian defeat of the Russians in Galicia (Battle of Dunajec, Gorlice-Tarnow).
7. *Lusitania* sunk by German U-boat.
Germans captured Libau, Courland.
9. Beginning of attempted great Allied Offensive on Western Front (French Battle of Artois, British Battle of Festubert).
13. First American *Lusitania* Note.
19. Coalition Ministry in Great Britain announced.
22. Lord Fisher resigned as First Sea Lord.
23. Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary, and at once attacked toward Trent and Trieste.
25. British battleship *Triumph* torpedoed by U-boat at Dardanelles.
26. End of British attacks near Festubert.
27. British battleship *Majestic* torpedoed by U-boat at Dardanelles.
31. German delaying reply to American *Lusitania* Note.

JUNE, 1915

3. Przemyśl recaptured in great Austro-German offensive in Galicia.
5. German Emperor ordered that "passenger vessels" should not be sunk by U-boats.
10. Second American *Lusitania* Note.
- 12-30. Galicia overrun by Austro-Hungarians.

JULY, 1915

5. German Southwest Africa surrendered.
14. Great attack from north and south on Warsaw salient begun. National Registration in Great Britain.
- 15-31. Continued Russian reverses.
23. Third American *Lusitania* Note.

AUGUST, 1915

- 1-5. Russian defeats, and Warsaw evacuated.
- 6-10. Landing at Suvla Bay, Gallipoli. Heavy British losses.
19. *Arabic* torpedoed and sunk.
- 20-31. Fall of Russian fortresses.

SEPTEMBER, 1915

1. Germany agreed to sink no more liners without warning, Bernstorff notified State Department. (Mem. of September 18: "Practically complete cessation of all employment of submarines.")
5. Czar in command of all Russian armies. Grand Duke Nicholas sent to Caucasus.
- 16-18. Russians driven from Pinsk and Vilna.
22. Bulgaria ordered mobilization of army.
24. Greece ordered mobilization of land and sea forces.
25. Great Allied attack on Noyon salient (French Battle of Champagne, British Battle of Loos).
29. General Townshend's force at Kut-el-Amara.

OCTOBER, 1915

2. Greek protest against landing of Allied troops at Salonica.
5. Allied Army landed at Salonica.
7. Austro-German invasion of Serbia begun (Belgrade occupied September 9).
10. Bulgarian invasion of Serbia.
15. Great Britain declared war on Bulgaria.
16. France declared war on Bulgaria.
- 16-30. Serbia overrun.

NOVEMBER, 1915

- 6-25. Serbian armies defeated, and retreated into Albania.
13. Lord Kitchener at the Dardanelles.

23. Evacuation of Gallipoli recommended by War Committee.
26. British retreat in Mesopotamia.

DECEMBER, 1915

3. British force in Mesopotamia besieged in Kut-el-Amara.
- 5-12. Austro-Hungarians and Bulgarians in occupation of Montenegro and Macedonia.
- 19-20. Suvla and Anzac (Gallipoli) evacuated.
20. Italian troops in Albania.
30. Austria-Hungary yielded in case of *Ancona*, punishing U-boat commander, and admitting principle of safety of passengers.

JANUARY, 1916

5. Military Service Bill in British Parliament (conscription).
8. Entire Gallipoli peninsula evacuated by the Allies.
- 13-23. Austro-Hungarians in possession of Montenegro.
16. Railway open to Constantinople. Turks in Caucasus in retreat to Erzerum.

FEBRUARY, 1916

1. British steamer *Appam* brought into Norfolk by German prize crew.
14. Erzerum taken by the Russians.
21. Great German offensive begun against Verdun.
- 21-28. German gains at Verdun.

MARCH, 1916

4. "Decisive session" of German General Headquarters — unrestricted U-boat campaign to begin on April 1.
10. Germany declared war on Portugal.
17. Admiral Tirpitz dismissed.
19. Russians captured Ispahan, Persia.

- 24. French Channel steamer *Sussex* torpedoed with Americans on board.
- 27. Demand that Germany explain attack on *Sussex*.

APRIL, 1916

- 4. New British budget \$9,000,000,000, largest in world's history.
- 10. German evasive Note on *Sussex*.
- 18. American Note on *Sussex* an ultimatum to Germany. Congress summoned with explanation that President Wilson was obliged to send an ultimatum.
- 24. Irish revolt in Dublin, 12 persons killed.
- 24-25. German naval raid against the British coast. Bombardment of Yarmouth and Lowestoft. Germany yielded to United States ultimatum, "the beginning of our capitulation." — Tirpitz.
- 28. British force at Kut-el-Amara, Mesopotamia, surrendered to the Turks.

MAY, 1916

- 4. Unsuccessful British raid with seaplanes against Tondern Zeppelin sheds.
- 14-31. Austro-Hungarian offensive through the Trentino.
- 18. Admiral Scheer's orders for a naval raid of High Sea Fleet against British coast at Sunderland.
- 30. German naval plan changed to sortie to northward, as airships were unable to leave the ground.
- 31. Battle of Jutland, the one great naval action of the war.

JUNE, 1916

- 1. British and German fleets put back to port after indecisive naval Battle of Jutland.
- 4. Sudden great offensive of Russians in Volhynia and Galicia. Heavy losses for the Austro-Hungarians.
- 5. Lord Kitchener and staff lost, when British cruiser *Hampshire* was sunk on way to Russia.

- 7-24. Russians continued to make gains. Lutsk and Czer-nowitz captured, and most of Bukowina overrun.
- 21-30. Hard fighting at Verdun, with the German offensive repulsed by the French.

JULY, 1916

1. Battle of the Somme begun. Heavy British losses.
- 4-7. Russian offensive resumed, to the Styr and Stochod rivers.
6. Lloyd George British War Secretary.
10. German merchant submarine *Deutschland* at Baltimore.
14. Renewed attacks in Battle of the Somme.
27. Brody captured by the Russians.

AUGUST, 1916

1. Fighting at Verdun and on the Somme.
Italian offensive begun against Gorizia.
9. Gorizia captured by the Italians.
- 18-19. Naval raid of the German High Sea Fleet toward the British coast.
23. *Deutschland* reached Germany.
28. Germany declared war against Rumania.
Italy declared war against Germany.
29. Hindenburg German Chief of Staff.
31. At German war council at Pless unrestricted U-boat warfare was postponed, on account of Rumanian situation.

SEPTEMBER, 1916

1. Bulgaria declared war against Rumania.
- 1-10. Austro-Germans and Bulgarians invaded Rumania.
Silistria captured.
14. Italian attacks in the Carso.
15. British attacks in Battle of the Somme. Tanks in action for first time.

- 16. Rumanians in retreat.
- 19-25. Allied blockade of Greece. Revolution in Greece.

OCTOBER, 1916

- 7. German Fleet Commanders ordered to resume U-boat warfare, but operations to be "according to Prize Law."
German U-boat U-53 at Newport, R. I.
- 8. U-53 sank 5 steamers off Nantucket, outside of United States waters, and left for Germany the same night.
- 16-17. Entente Allies recognized provisional Government of Venizelos in Greece, and Allied troops landed at Athens.
- 22. Rumanian reverses. Mackensen captured Constanza.
- 24. Germans driven back in Verdun sector. Fort Douaumont recaptured by the French.

NOVEMBER, 1916

- 1. Germans evacuated Fort Vaux, Verdun.
German submarine *Deutschland* arrived at New London, on second trip from Bremen.
- 5-25. Rumanians defeated. Teuton armies united in their invasion, and Rumanian position hopeless.
- 19. Monastir occupied by General Sarrail's force.

DECEMBER, 1916

- 5. Fall of Asquith Ministry in Great Britain.
- 6. Lloyd George head of War Cabinet in Great Britain.
- 12. German peace proposals.
General Nivelle given command of French armies.
- 13. British advance in Mesopotamia.
- 18. Lloyd George announced for the Entente Allies that restitution and reparation would be the only basis of peace.
- 20-31. Rumanians in retreat into Moldavia.
- 20. President Wilson suggested that belligerents should state peace terms.

23. The German General Staff stated that "adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare was essential."
30. Entente Allies rejected German peace proposals.

JANUARY, 1917

9. Decision by the German Emperor for unrestricted U-boat warfare, against the Imperial Chancellor.

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